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Abstract 
 
Deliberately lit fires make up over 15% of all fires in New Zealand buildings yet they are 
typically omitted from the design brief for fire engineering purposes. This report examines 
where deliberately lit fires should be included as part of the fire engineering design by 
examination of all deliberately lit fires recorded in the New Zealand Fire Incident 
Reporting System (NZ FIRS) between the years 1996 and 2006. 
 
The main types of buildings identified where consideration of deliberately lit fires within 
the design would provide benefits are: 
· Prisons 
· Psychiatric institutions 
· Schools 
· Crowd activities 
· Attached accommodation 
 
The report also examined what is required to include deliberately lit fires as part of the 
design process. Based on an analysis of the fire incident statistics, the majority of 
deliberately lit fires are the result of unplanned activities and existing design fires will be 
adequate. Two critical fire scenarios were identified as exceeding these requirements, the 
ignition of multiple fires and the use of accelerants. Greater life safety benefits are obtained 
by considering accelerants. 
 
In the case of multiple fires, each fire is likely to be within the capabilities of a fire 
engineered building however a number of such fires may overwhelm the fire protection 
features of a building. A number of issues for the fire engineer to consider are briefly 
discussed. In the case of accelerants, a number of experiments were completed to 
characterise the heat release rate and species production of a Molotov cocktail based on the 
fuel volume used. A second round of experiments extended this work by examining the 
scenario where a Molotov cocktail containing 1000 milliliters of petrol was deployed 
within a stairwell. 
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 xxi 
Nomenclature Cont. 
 
Symbol Description       Units 
XCO2  Molar fraction of carbon dioxide in exhaust duct.  - 
yCO  Yield of carbon monoxide     g/g fuel 
¥,COy   Yield of carbon monoxide under well ventilated conditions. g/g fuel 
Z  Height of rise from the fuel package to the bottom of the m 
  Smoke layer. 
α  Correlation coefficients for the fuel package   - 
β  Correlation coefficients for the fuel package   - 
βinst  Correction coefficient for instrument    - 
ζ   Correlation coefficients for the fuel package   - 
Φ  Equivalence ratio.      - 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
All fires are started through one of three paths. They may be started through natural 
circumstances such as a lightning strike, accidental means including the failure of an 
electrical circuit or the buildup of static electricity or, they may be deliberately started by 
the conscious actions of an individual. Within a structure, natural fire causes are rare. In 
the 2004-05 year the New Zealand Fire Service coded only 1.5% of structure fires as 
‘Extreme conditions’ with another 9.0% coded as ‘Other supposed causes’1 The majority 
of fires are considered accidental and this description covers causes such as ‘Operating 
failure’, ‘Design, construction, installation faults’ and ‘Mechanical failure, malfunction’ 
and the ‘Carelessness’ and ‘Recklessness’ categories. Collectively, accidental causes 
account for 73.7% of all structure fires. The remaining 15.6% of fires are categorized as 
deliberately lit. This is summarised below as Figure 1.1. 
 
Over the years there has been a large body of work completed by the fire engineering 
community characterising a wide range of common fire scenarios, from the ignition of 
upholstered furniture to the ignition of electrical appliances such as computers. This work 
has been largely targeted towards accidental fire scenarios. 
 
Over the last thirty years there has also been a significant amount of effort put into the 
development of strategies to combat arson, from education programs in schools2 through 
to improvements in investigation techniques3 and tools4. In the UK, the Arson Control 
Forum (ACF) was established in 20005 to coordinate a national response to arson, while, 
in the US a number of organizations such as the United States Fire Administration 
(USFA) and Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) are involved 
in programs to combat arson. The fire engineering community has provided assistance 
through fire investigation training programs6, however there appears to have been little 
work completed on addressing deliberately lit fires from a design perspective. 
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Deliberately Lit
15.6%
Recklessness
1.6%
Carelessness With 
Heat Source
31.7%
Carelessness With 
Material Ignited
3.9%
Mechanical Failure, 
Malfunction
18.1%
Design, Construction, 
Instalation Fault
4.1%
Operating Failure
14.2%
Extreme Conditions
1.5%
Other Supposed 
Cause
9.0%
Not Recorded
0.2%
 
Figure 1.1: Cause of structure fires in New Zealand during the 2004-05 year. (Source: 
FIRS incident statistics). 
 
 
 
1.1 Report Structure 
 
This report is broken up into seven chapters, each covering a different part of the 
deliberately lit fire problem. Chapter one introduces a number of terms commonly used to 
describe fires that have been deliberately lit. It then proceeds to critique the current 
design philosophy and to define what will be considered as a reasonable deliberately lit 
fire case for the rest of this report. Finally it presents the justification for designing 
buildings around deliberately lit fires. 
 
Chapter two investigates the methods used by authorities to predict deliberately lit fires 
and focus the resources of authorities to catch such individuals. A number of techniques 
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are examined to determine their value to the fire engineer when constructing fire 
scenarios. 
 
Chapter three covers an analysis of the New Zealand Fire Incident Reporting System 
(FIRS) database. It covers almost ten thousand fires that occurred in structures between 
1996 and 2006. Structures are broken up corresponding to the principle building use as 
outlined in the Department of Building and Housings compliance document, C/AS17, to 
identify trends within each building category. Each category is examined to identify 
where designing for deliberately lit fires offers the greatest potential benefits. 
 
Chapter four covers one of the two severe fire scenarios identified in chapter three, 
namely the ignition of multiple fires. The ignition of multiple fires creates a number of 
issues not covered under the current design fire philosophy and those issues that are 
significant to the fire engineer are discussed. 
 
Chapters five and six address the other severe fire scenario, namely the use of accelerants 
to alter fire growth rates. Chapter five details the experimental procedure used to 
characterize a design fire for a Molotov cocktail based on the quantity of petrol used. 
Chapter six builds on this work by characterizing the impact that the surroundings have 
on the Molotov cocktail fire through the examination of the scenario where a Molotov 
cocktail is deployed within a stairwell. 
 
Chapter seven brings all of the earlier work together to show what building types should 
consider including deliberately lit fires as part of the design process and what form such a 
fire should take before concluding with a number of recommendations. 
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1.2 Terminology 
 
Before proceeding with further with this work, there are a number of terms used by the 
Fire Service and the Police when dealing with fires that have been deliberately lit that 
have similar meanings. To avoid confusion for the reader these terms need to have their 
definitions clarified. 
 
Arson: DeHaan8 defines arson as ‘the willful and malicious burning of a person’s 
property.’ The term ‘arson’ is actually a legal term and in New Zealand, Section 267 of 
the Crimes Act9 defines it as: 
(1) Every one commits arson and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years 
who-  
a)  intentionally or recklessly damages by fire or by means of any explosive any property if 
he or she knows or ought to know that danger to life is likely to ensue; or  
b) intentionally or recklessly, and without claim of right damages by fire or by means of any 
explosive any immovable property, or any vehicle, ship or aircraft, in which that person has no 
interest; or 
c) intentionally damages by fire or by means of any explosive any immovable property, or 
any vehicle, ship or aircraft, with intent to obtain any benefit, or to cause loss to any other person. 
 
Deliberately Lit (Lawful): Used by the New Zealand Fire Service to describe a fire 
where the supposed cause is for some lawful or socially condoned purpose such as 
heating, cooking, rubbish disposal or agricultural purposes10. 
 
Deliberately Lit (Unlawful): Used by the New Zealand Fire Service to describe a fire 
where the supposed cause of a fire is one where all possible accidental causes have been 
eliminated and one or more indicators as listed in sections 19.2 and 19.3 of NFPA 
921:200411 have been observed. These fires may be reported as “incendiary”. No 
judgement is required to be made as to whether or not the elements of the offence of 
arson or otherwise have been established12.  
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Incendiary Fires: Defined by Cropp12 as fires ‘where physical evidence of legal 
decision indicated that the fire was deliberately lit.’ In the USA the term has been 
replaced by ‘Intentional Fires’13. This is another term used to describe unlawful 
deliberately lit fires. 
 
Suspicious Fires:  Defined by Cropp12 as fires where circumstances indicate that the 
fire may have been deliberately set. The term differs from Incendiary Fires only by the 
level of proof required. If there is insufficient evidence to show that the fire has been 
deliberately set then the fire will be coded as suspicious rather than incendiary. The New 
Zealand Fire Service consider applying this term to describe a deliberately lit (unlawful) 
fire where one or more accidental causes cannot be eliminated and at least one incendiary 
fire indicators as defined in sections 19.2 and 19.3 of NFPA 921:2004 have been 
observed. 
 
Unknown—used to indicate the supposed cause of a fire for which: 
a) one or more accidental causes have been identified but not eliminated, and 
b) no indications exist that the fire resulted from a deliberate act. 
This does not exclude the possibility that the fire was intentionally set, but indicates that 
the investigator found no indications as such. 
 
Structure Fire: The NFPA definition of a structure14, used by fire departments when 
defining fire incidents, includes buildings but is not limited to them. It includes all man-
made objects such as tunnels, storage vessels or covered walkways. For the purposes of 
this report, all non-building structures will be collectively grouped as ‘other structures’. 
 
As this report considers only those fires that are considered unlawful, the legality 
component of the term has been omitted. Within this report, all fires that are described as 
deliberately lit may be assumed to be unlawful. 
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1.3 Bounding The Problem 
 
Deliberately lit fires may be viewed as a spectrum ranging from the ignition of materials 
located within the compartment through to the attacks on the World Trade Center where 
an aircraft containing approximately thirty tonnes of aviation kerosene was crashed into 
the building. This is illustrated graphically as Figure 1.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The deliberately lit fire spectrum indicating the impact on the design fire 
curve. 
 
In the case of using a match to ignite materials present in the compartment, the fact that 
the fire has been deliberately lit has virtually no impact on the development of the 
resulting fire and standard design fire curves will remain adequate to test the resulting 
fire.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum the use of a large quantity of aviation fuel represents an 
introduced fuel load. The growth rate of the resulting fire from such an event will be 
determined more by the introduced fuel load than the objects present in the building prior 
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to the aircrafts impact. To design for these types of incident, special design fire curves are 
required as the design fires currently used by fire engineers are effectively irrelevant.  
 
Between these two extremes lie incidents where the method used to start the fires does 
impact on the resulting fire growth however fire development is still largely determined 
by the objects present in the compartment. The use of accelerants is one example of this 
sort of incident. 
 
As the severity of the fire increases the number of incidents drops off dramatically, this 
puts attacks such as that on the World Trade Center on a similar footing to the bombing 
of buildings, they are low-probability/high-consequence events15. Designing structures to 
survive the blast of a bomb or the burning of a number of tonnes of fuel represent 
significant challenges to the engineering community and impose significant costs onto 
the client. Clearly it is not practical to design all buildings against such rigorous standards 
so the use of bombs and explosive fires will not be considered. 
 
Arson may also be used as a tool to commit murder. From a legal perspective the 
deliberate use of fire as a tool to kill an individual or group of people is considered 
murder rather than arson. This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter but such 
scenarios represent another rare situation in New Zealand and will not be specifically 
addressed in this report.  
 
 
1.4 Current Fire Engineering Design Philosophy 
 
The New Zealand Building Code comprises the first schedule of the New Zealand 
Building regulations16 and requires that buildings be constructed to ensure the life safety 
of building occupants during a fire. To achieve these requirements, the current fire 
engineering design philosophy is to derive fire scenarios based on the structure’s intended 
use. It is the use of the structures that determines the likely arrangement of the fuel load, 
thus enabling an assessment as to the credible fire size and growth rate for each scenario. 
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A number of different fire scenarios, covering fires in different locations throughout the 
structure should be examined to critically test the various components of the fire 
engineering design. 
 
A particular fire scenario is typically selected based on: 
 
· The historical incidence of fires in similar buildings. 
· To stress a particular element of the design such as escape provisions or external 
fire spread. 
 
If the fire scenarios selected are appropriately severe for the building use then a building 
that achieves the design objectives when tested against each scenario is deemed to be 
‘safe’ and complies with the Building Code. This philosophy is adequate for accidental 
fires as the resulting fire development is governed by the principles of fire dynamics such 
as flame spread, energy transfer and ignition properties. It may not be adequate for 
deliberately lit fires as there is another parameter that is not considered, namely the 
actions of the individual lighting the fire. 
 
 
1.5 Why Design For Deliberately Lit Fires? 
 
There are four main reasons why deliberately lit fires should be considered as part of the 
design process. Firstly the design process should consider the most likely fire scenarios; 
if a common fire scenario is not included in the design process then the resulting design 
may have shortfalls against a reasonably likely fire threat. Secondly the design process 
should consider the risks that a given fire scenario poses to building occupants. A 
scenario that results in a serious fire should be given more significance than a scenario 
that results in a less severe fire. Finally, although arson is generally considered a property 
crime there are significant life safety risks that need to be considered. 
 
 9 
Finally, there is also the issue of property protection, while not a requirement of the New 
Zealand Building Code, the loss of property may have significance far beyond its 
monetary value.  
 
1.5.1 Cause of Fire 
 
Deliberately lit fires represent a major contributor to fire losses, both in New Zealand17 
and around the world. The proportion of fires that are deliberately lit varies around the 
world; the 2004 United Kingdom fire statistics report a total of 16,100 deliberately lit 
fires in buildings other than dwellings18. This represents almost 43% of the total number 
of fires in these buildings. The 2003 United States statistics for structure fires gives a 
much lower proportion of 7%13. Part of the reason for this significant difference is the 
inclusion of dwellings in the US statistics; if they are included in the UK statistics then 
the proportion of fires that are deliberately lit drops to 29%. As stated earlier, the 
proportion of New Zealand structure fires that are deliberately lit is approximately half 
way between the UK and US data at 15.6%.  
 
Many reports claim that arson is a growing problem; however in recent years the United 
Kingdom, United States and New Zealand have all experienced a decline in the number 
of deliberately lit fires in structures. There is anecdotal evidence indicating that much of 
Europe follows the United Kingom19 so the downward trend may be more widespread 
than this. While the overall trend is downwards, deliberately lit fires still remain more 
likely than most other fire scenarios. In New Zealand, it the third most likely ignition 
scenario in structures after carelessness with a heat source and equipment malfunction. 
 
 
1.5.2 Fire Severity 
 
Deliberately lit fires tend to be more severe than accidental fires. UK data over the last 
fifty years indicates that the proportion of all fires that are deliberately lit has increased 
from less than one percent in the 1950’s though to 25% in 199320. Between 1966 and 
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1993, the cost of losses attributed to deliberately lit fires increased from approximately 
6% through to almost 50% of the total cost of all fires. While these numbers are 
indicative only, they do suggest that deliberately lit fires are responsible for more damage 
than accidental fires. 
 
Part of the reason for this is that intentional ignitions are more likely to spread beyond the 
compartment of origin. Data based on US fire statistics between 1994 and 1998, 
compiled by the NFPA and presented as Table 1.1 shows the probability that a fire will 
spread beyond the room of origin21. 
 
Major Cause of Fire Percent 
Exposure (to other hostile fire) 54.7 
Incendiary or suspicious causes 47.9 
Open flame, ember or torch 34.7 
Child playing with fire 32.0 
Natural causes 31.7 
Electrical distribution equipment 27.9 
Other heat source (e.g. candle) 23.6 
Other equipment 23.1 
Smoking 22.8 
Heating equipment 21.5 
Appliances or tools 13.3 
Cooking equipment 6.9 
 
Table 1.1: Probability that a fire spreads beyond compartment of origin for US fires 
between 1994 and 1998. (Reference 21). 
 
The use of accelerants by perpetrators is likely to be a significant contributor to this. A 
significant proportion of deliberately lit fires are small and even self extinguish, however 
when accelerants are used the heat release rate of the fire increases faster resulting in an 
increased likelihood that the fire will not self extinguish. Accelerants may also be used to 
spread the fire quickly from one object to another. 
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1.5.3 Life Safety Considerations 
 
The crime of arson is frequently viewed as a property crime. New Zealand statistics 
record it as a property crime22, alongside willful damage as shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Arson offense rate graph taken from Statistics New Zealand website 
(Reference 22) illustrating the treatment of arson as a property crime. 
 
While many deliberately lit fires do not pose a significant risk to life, considering the 
crime of arson as a property crime ignores the one quarter of incidents that do23. These 
incidents do represent a significant life safety risk that is currently not being addressed 
directly by authorities. In the United Kingdom, roughly one in six fire casualties occur in 
fires that are deliberately maliciously ignited24. In the United States, one in ten fire 
casualties is the result of a deliberately lit fire25. 
 
Based on these three points, a deliberately lit fire is a fire scenario that has more than a 
trivial chance of occurring, has a significant probability of spreading beyond the 
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compartment of origin and may also endanger life. By not considering arson as a 
potential fire scenario, the requirements of the New Zealand Building Code are not being 
met. 
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2.0 Predicting Deliberately Lit Fires 
 
No work on deliberately lit fires would be complete without a discussion as to why 
people light fires and the methods used to predict such behaviour. Individuals light fires 
for a large number of reasons ranging from the fire play activities of children through to 
the deliberate targeting of structures by extremists. The aim of this chapter is to examine 
the methods commonly used by organizations such as the Police and the Fire Service to 
combat the deliberate ignition of fires and to determine whether they have any value as 
tools for the fire engineer. 
 
There are three main strategies that have been employed to predict the deliberately lit fire 
risk to an individual structure. Each of these will be discussed in turn along with an 
examination of their strengths, weaknesses and relevance to the fire engineer. The three 
strategies are: 
 
· Focus on the individual setting the fires. 
· Focus on the structure under consideration. 
· Examination of past fire incidents. 
 
While the strategies presented here have their origins in either the Fire Service or Police, 
understanding what drives someone to light a fire and the likely level of planning 
employed can assist in countering the efforts of these individuals. 
 
 
2.1 Offender Focused Methods 
 
There have been a large number of studies which have examined fire incidents and those 
offenders who get caught in an attempt to try and understand what drives them to commit 
arson. This work has been typically done either to identify groups or individuals who 
pose the greatest risk of fire setting behaviour, or to attempt to reduce the number of 
suspects when investigating a number of fires that may be related.  
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2.1.1 Motives to Commit Arson 
 
There are a large number of reasons used by individuals to justify the lighting of fires. 
However these are commonly distilled down to a list of six commonly reported offender-
based motives, based on a study of 1016 offenders, completed by the Prince George’s 
County Fire Department (PGFD)26. The PGFD study determined that the most common 
motives are: 
 
· Vandalism 
· Excitement 
· Revenge 
· Crime concealment 
· Profit 
· Extremist beliefs. 
 
Due to the complexities of human nature, these motives should not necessarily be 
considered in isolation. In many cases, there are elements of two or more motives 
involved. The ordering of this list is significant, reflecting the level of planning and 
therefore the overall risk to the structure. As one moves down this list the risk to the 
structure increases. The risk to building occupants does not follow this trend however. 
 
Vandalism: Vandalism motivated fire setting is intended to cause damage to property. 
Offenders motivated by vandalism typically target education facilities and residential 
structures as well as vegetation and scrubland. The fires are generally not planned in any 
way with offenders typically starting the fires with materials present at the scene. The use 
of accelerants is not common. While the fires are not planned in advance, the offender 
lacks regard for the safety of others8, so vandalism motivated fire setting does pose a risk 
to the safety of other people. The offender is typically a male, aged between 14 and 18 
with average or below average intelligence27. 
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Excitement:  Some individuals light fires for the excitement it causes. They may derive 
excitement from the fire itself, the response by authorities or from the recognition of 
‘discovering’ the fire. In rare cases, some individuals derive sexual gratification from the 
fire. People motivated by excitement are more likely to target construction sites or 
unoccupied structures as well as residential buildings. While the majority of fires still set 
using materials present at the scene there is a higher likelihood that the offender has 
prepared in some way so the use of accelerants or delayed triggering mechanisms is more 
common. The offenders are usually associated with the fire site in some way and are 
seeking to gain either attention or sympathy from others. Most fire setting by security 
guards and members of the Fire Service28 falls into this category. 
 
Revenge: People who light fires as an act of revenge are motivated to correct some real 
or imagined injustice. The perceived unjust event may have occurred recently, or it may 
have occurred years prior to the fire setting. This is an example of a targeted attack at a 
specific organization or individual so the most common targets for individuals motivated 
by revenge are residential structures (in the case of domestic disputes) or commercial 
premises (for corporate targets). Cases such as the Happy Land nightclub fire29 show that 
offenders may also attack entertainment venues and other structures to strike at a target 
person. The use of accelerants by offenders is more common, with some offenders using 
considerably more accelerant than required. 
 
Crime Concealment: Fires may be lit to conceal another crime, ranging from theft to 
murder. Obviously the target structure will depend on the crime that is being concealed 
so there is more diversity in the type of structure targeted. The degree of effort used to 
light the fire largely depends on the magnitude of the crime being concealed, in most 
cases the lighting of the fire is a spur of the moment decision and the use of accelerants is 
not likely. For more serious crimes such as murder, the use of accelerant is more common 
as an attempt to destroy forensic evidence. 
 
Profit: People who commit arson for profit are intending to financially gain from the 
exercise, either directly from an insurance claim, or indirectly through the elimination of 
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a competitor. There may also be non-financial benefits that may be realized from the 
destruction of property, such as the use of a fire to threaten an adverse witness in a court 
case. One of the most frequently encountered forms of profit motivation is the intention 
to defraud an insurance company as a method to recover from a financial loss or 
difficulty. There are a large number of potential reasons that may drive an individual to 
commit arson to achieve this goal30 and, as insurance companies face significant 
difficulties in proving that a claim is fraudulent31, it is seen as a low risk option. Because 
of this common motivator, both residential and business structures may be targeted by 
this type of arsonist. In the UK it is estimated that arson for fraud amounts to at least 10% 
of the total arson bill32. 
 
The use of hired “torches” is more common in cases that are profit motivated and the 
more skilled professional torches may take steps to render fire protection equipment such 
as sprinklers or detectors inoperative. Skilled individuals have an understanding of fire 
development and often have prior access to the site of the proposed fire to plan the strike. 
With the goal of destroying the target structure, the use of significant quantities of 
accelerants and multiple points of origin are more likely. As the motive is making money 
rather than targeting people, arsonists motivated by profit are more likely to time their 
attacks to when the structure is unoccupied.  
 
Extremist Beliefs: Also called sensation arson, the use of fire as a weapon against people 
or organizations with differing beliefs has been around for hundreds of years. This is 
another form of targeted attack covering the whole spectrum of deliberately lit fires, 
ranging from the torching of churches and business such as research laboratories and 
abortion clinics, through to the attacks on the World Trade Center33. Political activists 
start fires for two reasons;  
 
· To gain publicity for their cause. 
· To destroy property of the people or establishment that they hate. 
 
 17 
It is more likely that a group of people will be involved with this motive than any of the 
other common motives discussed, so these attacks are more likely to have a significant 
degree of planning including how to bypass fire protection and security systems. The 
presence of individuals in a structure is frequently not a concern34, greater publicity is 
obtained when a number of people have been killed or injured so arson motivated by 
extreme beliefs can represent a significant life safety threat. Fortunately this is a much 
rarer motive than the other motives discussed. 
 
The six motives identified by the PGFD are collectively known as the rational motives. 
There are two commonly reported groups which do not fit into these motives and these 
are referred to as irrational fire setting. The groups that fall into this behaviour are: 
 
· Fire play by children. 
· Fire setting by the mentally handicapped. 
 
Fire play by Children: Many children have access to matches and lighters long before 
they develop the understanding of the dangers inherent in fire. While a significant 
number of fires lit by children are purely accidental, caused by experiments with fire that 
has got out of hand, a proportion of such fires are caused deliberately. The methods used 
are typically simple, such as the throwing of lit matches or the use of home made 
fireworks. Due to their limited mobility, the majority of fires lit by children under the age 
of ten are set at their home. Between the ages of 10 and 18, there is a shift in fire setting 
behaviour towards external targets such as schools, rubbish bins and scrubland and 
during this age period most authorities assume the individual is able to take some 
responsibility for their actions. Most children, under the age of 10 are assumed in law to 
be unable to form the intent to harm13 however; fire play by children does pose a 
significant risk to life, being the sixth most common cause of civilian deaths in residential 
structures in the US35. 
 
Fire setting by the Mentally Handicapped: Fires lit by the mentally handicapped are 
often referred to as pyromania, however there are actually a number of mental afflictions 
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that may manifest themselves as fire setting behaviour. From a fire engineering 
perspective, the fires are typically unplanned, started using only simple materials such as 
newspaper and matches. There is typically no connection between the arsonist and the 
structure so these individuals may target any structure. Frequently these incidents are 
seen as a cry for help.  
 
The distribution of each of these motives is subject to debate among psychologists with 
published motivation statistics being quite variable. Early US data, based on a 1979 study 
for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration36, was indicative as it is based on 
responses of 16 major cities, only two of which used actual case data. The remainder 
gave impressions of the distribution. It was also not clear whether fire play by children 
was included as an option for this study, as the data contradicts the residential fatality 
statistics presented earlier. Subsequent analysis, completed by the Arson Prevention 
Bureau in 199337, gives a better examination of the motives and is presented as Figure 
2.1. As vandalism has not been specifically included in these results, it is likely to be 
represented as ‘no apparent motive’. 
 
Revenge, 
19%
Alcohol/Drug 
Related, 17%
Extremeism, 
2%
Heroics, 1%
No Apparent 
Motive, 17%
Excitement, 
3%
Profit, 9%
Mental 
Problems, 
17%
Crime 
Concealment, 
8%
 
 
Figure 2.1: Breakdown of arson by motive based on the Arson Prevention Bureau study. 
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2.1.2 Murder/Suicide by Fire 
 
Fire has been used as a tool to commit murder or suicide for many years. Some 
researchers claim that in between 10 and 20% of adult cases, the arson was committed as 
an attempt to commit suicide while in the case of juvenile arson, one quarter of incidents 
were an attempt at suicide38. Other researchers, looking at residential arson, quote much 
lower figures, of the order of 5%39. The actual ignition of oneself is considered unusual. 
There appears to be cultural differences in the use of fire as a tool to commit suicide, with 
Japanese fire death statistics dominated by incendiary suicide; which consistently 
accounts for one third of all fire fatalities13. 
As stated earlier, fire has been used as a tool to cover up a prior murder. It has also been 
used as a tool to commit murder directly. One trend identified in the US, which illustrates 
this point, is filicide by fire, the killing of children by their parents using a fire to do the 
actual killing40. 
The biggest issue for fire engineers is how to consider such events in the context of the 
design brief. It would be difficult to design a system that is capable of responding fast 
enough to prevent the death of an individual who has been doused with a flammable 
liquid and ignited without the system being prohibitively expensive. This issue is further 
complicated by the fact that distinguishing between murder and suicide by fire can be 
quite difficult without other supporting evidence41. It would be useful if such cases could 
be readily identified in fire statistics so their significance can be determined. 
 
 
2.1.3 Spatial Profiling 
 
Another arsonist focused method, used by the Police to help them catch offenders is a 
profiling technique known as circle theory, developed in 1993 by Canter and Larkin42.  
The basis of this technique is that to commit a crime and escape detection, a criminal 
requires a degree of knowledge about where the area surrounding the crime scene. As the 
seriousness of the crime increases, both the police response and the value of this 
knowledge also increase. Unless they have recently moved into an area, an individual’s 
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knowledge of an area will be greatest around their places of residence or work. Circle 
theory concludes that the majority of criminal activity is likely to occur within a short 
distance of either the offenders’ place of residence or their work. Serious crimes such as 
murder and arson do follow this rule and the mean distance traveled by arsonists to 
commit a crime was 2.06 km43. Revenge motivated arsonists, who are targeting a specific 
individual or organization travel further to achieve their goals if required. 
 
The basis of circle theory is to plot the incidents under consideration and find the center 
of the circle formed by the two most distant events. While the area covered by such a 
circle has the potential to be quite large, on average a few square kilometers, other 
profiling techniques may be used in conjunction to eliminate potential suspects.  
 
 
2.1.4 Value of Offender Focused Methods to the Fire Engineer 
 
The examination of motive has some value to the fire engineer as this provides an 
estimate of the level of planning and probable methods used by arsonists who may 
threaten a particular structure. This will allow the creation of a credible worst case 
deliberately lit fire scenario to test the fire protection systems. One criticism of these 
methods is that they are generally based on an analysis of those offenders who get caught. 
Consequently planned attacks and the activities of professional torches are likely to be 
under-represented in the statistics. 
 
While circle theory has some use to enforcement agencies its value is limited to the fire 
engineer. Firstly the area of the circles is relatively large, comparable to the size of the 
central business district of many cities which would result in all buildings being designed 
around deliberately lit fires resulting in a substantial increase in the cost of fire 
protection. Secondly the fire engineer must consider the whole life of the building, likely 
to be of the order of fifty years or more and it is not possible to plot out the activities of 
an arsonist a number of years into the future. As many arsonists are juveniles this 
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effectively requires the engineer to predict the fire setting activities of an individual 
before their birth. 
 
 
2.2 Structure Focused Methods 
 
The second option considered was to focus on the structure itself. Buildings such as 
schools face a significantly higher risk of being targeted by arsonists with a high 
proportion of fires in such structures being deliberately lit. Studies have identified a large 
number of variables which influence a structure’s deliberately lit fire risk including 
security, economic and demographic factors44. 
 
 
2.2.1 Arson Predictive Tools 
 
Over the years there have been a number of attempts to model the risk that a given 
structure faces from deliberately lit fires. Early attempts typically combined a number of 
factors to calculate some form of risk index. One of these studies, completed by the New 
York City Arson Strike Force calculated an index called the Arson Risk Prediction Index 
(ARPI)45 in an attempt to identify arson prone buildings to prioritize the work of building 
inspectors. The variables covered by the study included: 
 
· Building use (residential/non residential) 
· Vacancy rate 
· The length of the building frontage.  
· Location of building (suburb) 
· The number of quarters of tax arrears owed by building owners. 
· Previous suspicious fire 
 
Each of these variables were weighted and then summed to calculate the overall index.  
While the results were crude and of limited effectiveness they do illustrate the number of 
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variables that impact on a buildings risk. One of the most significant variables is the 
location of the building as poorer suburbs face a much greater overall fire risk than 
wealthier neighborhoods. The poor generally have a higher proportion of family 
instability, lower levels of education and higher levels of substance abuse, all of which 
are factors linked to higher fire rates46. The rate of incendiarism is also higher in poor 
suburbs, in one Toledo study; the rate of incendiary or suspicious fires was 14.4 times 
higher in the low-income inner city suburbs than it was in the high-income 
neighbourhoods47.  
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Figure 2.2: US incendiary and suspicious fire rate per 100,000 population by size of 
community [Ref 13]. 
 
NFPA studies have also identified that the community size also plays a role in the 
deliberately lit fire rate13. Both communities with large populations and those with small 
populations have a higher rate of deliberately lit fires per head of population than medium 
sized communities. This is illustrated as Figure 2.2. Published New Zealand data for the 
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incendiary fire rate per head of population shows a similar trend, however the increased 
rate of fires in small communities is absent12. 
 
2.2.2 Value of Structure Focused Methods to the Fire Engineer 
 
One major problem with structure focused models is that they are typically designed 
around the solution of a short term issue such as prioritizing work and consequently focus 
on the risks faced over the next year or so. Because of this their value to the fire engineer, 
who must consider longer time periods, is limited. Due to the number of variables 
involved and the divergent nature of the variables, these models contain information 
difficult to obtain by the fire engineering community. For example, it is unrealistic to 
expect that clients are willing to offer tax information to their fire engineer. 
While not directly useful, structure focused prediction methods do offer an insight into 
the variables that impact on the deliberately lit fire rate. Two significant variables that 
can be used by the fire engineer to consider the deliberately lit fire risk are the 
community population and level of poverty in the neighborhood. 
 
 
2.3 Analysis Of Past Fires 
 
Finally, the examination of past deliberately lit fires can be used to obtain an estimate of 
the future risks faced to a structure. Fire statistics are available from most national fire 
bodies and these statistics may be used to identify the important risk factors relevant to 
each individual structure. If combined with building population information, this sort of 
analysis is able to identify what structures are more likely to be targeted by arsonists. 
Even without population information, there is a significant amount of information that 
can be obtained from such studies including identification of likely fire scenarios based 
on the building use. 
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2.3.1 Arson Maps 
 
Past deliberately lit fire incidents may be plotted over a street map of a community to 
construct a risk profile for the various suburbs within a city. Such studies have been 
completed for some large cities in an attempt to focus arson prevention efforts48. This 
allows the risk for locations within a neighborhood to be calculated and, over a period of 
time, a geographical picture of that community’s deliberately lit fire risk may be 
obtained. To remain relevant, these maps should remove old information as new data 
becomes available. 
 
 
2.3.2 Value of Past Fire Analysis to the Fire Engineer 
 
The use of past fire incidents to obtain estimates of a future fire risk is a common 
practice. It is based on the analysis of large amounts of data which is relatively easily 
obtainable to the fire engineering community however; the limitations of this practice do 
need to be considered.  
 
Analysis of past fire incidents is effectively basing a judgment on a historical viewpoint. 
Data that is too old may no longer be relevant due to changes in technology or processes. 
This technique will almost certainly be slow to identify trends that stem from changes in 
the political or social climate. 
 
How the original data was collected can influence the results obtained from subsequent 
analysis. For example changes in terminology or the grouping of incidents within the 
database can introduce false trends into the data.  Nonetheless, analysis of past fires 
remains a valuable tool to the fire engineer and forms the basis of the next chapter. 
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3.0 Analysis of Fire Incident Statistics 
 
The fire departments of many countries collect statistics on their activities49 for reporting 
purposes and this data may be available to the fire engineer. The New Zealand Fire 
Service use the Fire Incident Reporting System (FIRS) and it is from this database that 
the New Zealand national fire statistics are compiled. The NZ FIRS database was 
upgraded in July 199550 with a number of coding options changed or removed so data 
prior to this time has not been included in the analysis. 
 
 
3.1 Deliberately Lit Fires in New Zealand 
 
In the 2004/2005 fire year (the Fire Service year runs from July the 1st through to June 
30th the following year) the New Zealand Fire Service responded to 21859 fire incidents1. 
Of these incidents 6487 fires (or 29.7% of the total) involved structures. As discussed 
earlier, the majority of these incidents had an accidental cause however 1013 fires, or 
15.6% of the total, were identified as being deliberately lit. 
 
After a peak in the 2002/2003 year the number of deliberately lit structure fires has 
declined slightly, however the proportion of structure fires that were deliberately lit has 
remained roughly constant as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
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Figure 3.1: Number of deliberately lit structure fires occurring in New Zealand from July 
2000 to June 2005. (FIRS statistics) 
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of New Zealand structure fires that were deliberately lit from July 
2000 to June 2005 (FIRS statistics). 
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To investigate further, data from January 1st 1996 through to December 31st 2006 was 
taken from the New Zealand FIRS database to identify trends. The dataset was restricted 
to structure fires that had been coded as either unlawful or suspicious (supposed cause 
codes 111 and 114) to remove those fires that were the result of lawful activity such as 
heating and cooking. While some of those fires coded as ‘legality not known’ may in fact 
be deliberately lit, the small number of fires attributed to this category (1-2% of 
deliberately lit structure fires) is unlikely to have a significant effect on the results. 
 
 
3.2 Analysis of The Overall Statistics 
 
Between 1996 and 2006 there were a total of 9606 deliberately lit fires, an average of 873 
fires per year. The annual deliberately lit fire rate peaked at 1003 incidents in 1997 and 
has since been trending downwards slightly as shown in Figure 3.3.  
 
 The average number of incidents in the five years between 2002 and 2006 was 847 per 
year compared with an average of 924 incidents per year between the years 1996 and 
2000. This represents an 8.3% reduction in the annual deliberately lit fire rate. The dark 
line in Figure 3.3 (and in subsequent Figures) is a linear line of best fit to the data, 
obtained using Excel. The average number of incidents presented in the text represents a 
five year average, done to reduce the effect of anomalous years, and this has been used to 
calculate the change over the course of the study. Due to the differences in calculation the 
numbers occasionally do not exactly match the linear curve given in the figures. 
 
Note that these numbers may differ slightly from those found in the annual fire incident 
statistics due to both the different year boundaries used and also small data changes due 
to error correction and outstanding reports being completed. When talking about average 
numbers of incidents the data will be rounded to the nearest whole number. This has been 
done as fractional incidents have no meaning in the physical world. 
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Figure 3.3: New Zealand overall annual deliberately lit fire rate between 1996 and 2006 
(FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.2.1 Time of Occurrence 
 
Cropp12 showed that peak time for deliberately lit fires differs from that of all fires both 
in the daily distribution and in the time of day. While the overall fire frequency is roughly 
evenly split between the seven days of the week, the daily fire frequency for deliberately 
lit fires is biased towards the weekend. The time of day where fires are most likely to 
occur, both in New Zealand and around the world has been established to occur at around 
6 p.m. and falls away to a low point at around 4 a.m., then steadily increases throughout 
the day. For incendiary/ suspicious fires the peak occurs around midnight and the low 
point occurs from about 6 a.m. through to 1 p.m. Cropp’s data covered the period from 
1986 through to 1990. 
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Over the last ten years these trends have continued with 38.6% of all deliberately lit fires 
occurring on either a Saturday or Sunday. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Comparison between the proportion of deliberately lit fires occurring each 
day of the week for the periods 1986-1990 (Ref 11) and 1996-2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
While still strongly biased towards the evening hours, the time of day of incidents 
appears to have had some flattening out. Cropp’s data indicates that the number of 
incidents occurring at the peak time of midnight is approximately 300 fires and the 
number of incidents occurring at the minimum time of 8 a.m. is approximately 50 fires. 
This gives a ratio of maximum to minimum deliberately lit fire rates of approximately 
6:1. 
 
While the time of occurrence of the peak and minimum rate has not changed significantly 
the ratio of maximum to minimum deliberately lit fire rates has decreased significantly to 
3.5:1.  The time of day for deliberately lit fires from 1996 to 2006 has been plotted as 
Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5: Comparison between the proportion of deliberately lit fires occurring each 
hour of the day for the periods 1986-1990 (Ref 11) and 1996-2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
If Figures 3.4 and 3.5 are combined to give the deliberately lit fire rate as a function of 
both time of day and day of the week, as illustrated in Figure 3.6, it shows that these two 
trends are generally additive. The daily trough in the deliberately lit fire rate during the 
morning occurs every day, however during the weekend, it does occur at a slightly later 
time. On Saturday and Sunday the minimum deliberately fire frequency occurs between 9 
and 10 a.m. compared with between 6 to 8 a.m. during the weekdays. 
 
The rate of deliberately lit fire ignition on a Sunday evening is generally similar to the 
weekdays as well suggesting that the increased rate of fires occurring on Sundays is 
likely to be influenced by activities such as the consumption of alcohol the previous 
night. 
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Figure 3.6: Overall deliberately lit fire rate by both hour and by day (FIRS statistics). 
 
What this means for the fire engineer is that if deliberately lit fires are to be considered, 
to meet the life safety requirements of the Building Code, more significance should be 
placed when designing structures which are likely to be occupied during the evenings and 
the weekend. This includes accommodation buildings such as apartments, retail shopping 
where late night trading is done and buildings used for entertainment. 
 
 
3.2.2 Compartment of Origin 
 
When assessing likely fire scenarios the compartment of origin for a fire is of critical 
importance. Where a fire starts is one of a number of factors that determines whether a 
fire is a minor event or a significant event that poses significant risks to building 
occupants. For deliberately lit fires there is a diverse range of locations where fires may 
be started. The most common points of ignition are given as Table 3.1. 
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There are a large number of descriptions used in the FIRS database and, for a large 
number of these options, only a few fires are recorded. The FIRS database also contains a 
number of options that would be considered unusual as options that can be selected for 
most structure fires such as ‘Lawn, Park, Sports field’. These entries are intended to 
describe fires in such structures as portable toilets located at parks and sporting events. 
To reduce the size of Table 3.1 these have all been listed as ‘Other compartment of 
origin’.  
 
Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 1287 13.4% 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 1077 11.2% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 800 8.3% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 791 8.2% 
Wall surface (exterior) 762 7.9% 
Kitchen, Cooking area 349 3.6% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 314 3.3% 
Product storage, Tank, Bin, Agricultural storage, Hay barn, 
Hay stack 312 3.2% 
Lobby, Entrance way 275 2.9% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 263 2.7% 
Small assembly area: Classroom, Meeting room, Multi-
purpose room 178 1.9% 
Multiple areas of origin 174 1.8% 
Wall assembly: Concealed wall space 135 1.4% 
Vacant structural area 134 1.4% 
Rubbish, Industrial waste, Waste container 117 1.2% 
Storage and garage area - not classified above 103 1.1% 
Crawl space, Basement 98 1.0% 
Other compartment of origin 2437 25.4% 
Total  9606 100.0% 
 
Table 3.1:  Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
There are also a number of options used to describe the various situations where the data 
is incomplete. It is common practice in many fire reports to assign these incidents 
proportionally amongst the known entries. This practice has not been done for this 
 33 
analysis and all such entries have also been grouped in the ‘Other compartment of 
origin’. This effectively means that the compartment of origin results presented should be 
considered as the lower boundary of the true situation. 
 
The overall distribution is flat with the top three items accounting for 32.9% of all 
incidents and only five entries achieving more than 5% of the total. In most cases fires 
are lit in only a single compartment, however in a small number of cases (2.2% of the 
total including ‘Outside area, multiple area - Not Classified above’) fires are lit in 
multiple locations and this poses additional risks to occupants. 
 
 
3.2.3 Object First Ignited 
 
To assess likely growth rates for a deliberately lit fire scenario the likely item first ignited 
is another critical piece of information. The item first ignited determines the initial rate of 
growth of the fire and, depending on the location of this item, it may also influence the 
peak heat release rate.  The rate of growth and the peak heat release rate are key 
parameters that determine the hazard to building occupants51. The most frequently 
encountered items that are ignited in deliberately lit fires are summarised as Table 3.2. 
Any object that accounted for less than 1.0% of the total was grouped into the ‘Other 
object first ignited’ entry. 
 
There are a few issues to note from this list. Firstly the incidence of ‘Unknown’ is much 
higher than it is for compartment of origin. This is due to the fact that in a significant 
number of cases the level of damage at the seat of the fire makes positive identification of 
the object first ignited difficult or impossible. There is also the issue of Fire Service 
resources that can be devoted to investigation of deliberately lit fires. Many smaller 
towns and rural areas do not have the resources to fully investigate all fires. Because of 
these issues the ‘Unknown’ entries have been left in as a separate category. 
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Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 1215 12.6% 
Unknown 1038 10.8% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 727 7.6% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 524 5.5% 
Multiple items 424 4.4% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 390 4.1% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 385 4.0% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 383 4.0% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 341 3.5% 
Box, Carton, Bag 293 3.1% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 268 2.8% 
Bedding e.g. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 258 2.7% 
Information not recorded 243 2.5% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 235 2.4% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 231 2.4% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 229 2.4% 
Interior wall covering 229 2.4% 
Floor coverings: Carpets, Mats, Rugs 197 2.1% 
Books 157 1.6% 
Agricultural: Hay, Straw (NOT food for human consumption) 141 1.5% 
Exterior trim e.g. Doors, Porches, Decks 125 1.3% 
Packing, Wrapping material 108 1.1% 
Structure components - not classified above 97 1.0% 
Other object first ignited 1368 14.2% 
Total 9606 100.0% 
 
Table 3.2: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
Secondly the proportion of cases where there are a number of fires lit within a 
compartment is greater than the incidence of lighting fires in multiple compartments. 
This is significant as multiple fires in a single compartment are able to interact and this 
may influence the time until flashover is reached. 
 
Other than multiple fires and the use of accelerants the overwhelming majority of 
deliberately lit fires may be adequately addressed by the appropriate selection of the 
design fire. The most common items ignited are rubbish, paper or cardboard in various 
forms and furniture items. This suggests that most deliberate fires are opportunistic. 
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3.2.4 Casualty Rate From Deliberately Lit Fires 
 
The New Zealand FIRS database records four levels of injury and these are not clearly 
defined in the FIRS manual. There also appears to be some differences in the way the 
terms are used by the Fire Service. For the sake of consistency the following definitions 
have been used: 
 
· Fatality - The person died as a result of the injury received. 
· Life-Threatening - The injury is serious enough to threaten the life of the victim. 
Such injuries require hospitalization and expert medical care to treat. 
· Moderate - The injury is not life threatening but may require hospitalization or 
expert medical care to treat. 
· Slight - The injury is not life threatening and does not require expert medical care 
to treat. These injuries are typically recorded for OSH purposes. 
 
The 9606 fires deliberately lit structure fires makes up 13.3% of the 72539 structure fires 
attended by the Fire Service between 1996 and 2006. These deliberately lit fires resulted 
in 28 fatalities and another 157 moderate or life threatening injuries*. There was also 
another 127 slight injuries. 
 
The 28 fatalities represent 10.6% of the overall death toll from structure fires and the 157 
injuries represent 9.8% of the total structure injury rate. On the basis of these results it 
appears that deliberately lit fires are under-represented in the overall fire casualty rate, 
reinforcing the belief that the crime of arson is a crime against property. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
* This number differs slightly from the 154 injuries obtained from an earlier search of the FIRS database. 
These differences are due to error checking on the live database. 
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3.3 Analysis By Purpose Group 
 
One limitation of the overall analysis is that the fire statistics are dominated by fires in 
private residences. One half of all of structure fires that occurred between 1996 and 2006 
occurred in a ‘Single House’ and the proportion of deliberately lit fires that occurred in a 
‘Single House’ is 35.4%. While useful for overall trends, any analysis of the overall 
statistics is likely to follow the trends for residential housing and trends in other types of 
structure may be missed. To get around this problem the analysis was repeated based on 
the purpose groups listed in the Compliance Document, C/AS17. 
 
C/AS1 lists four broad categories and a number of individual purpose groups covering 
the range of activities that are done in structures. The four broad categories and their 
associated purpose groups have been included as Table 3.3. 
 
Activity Purpose Groups Examples 
Crowd Activities CS/CL Schools, churches, cinema 
 CO Open grandstands 
 CM Retail shopping 
Sleeping Activities SC Hospitals, old aged care 
 SD Prisons 
 SA Temporary accommodation inc. 
Motels, hotels, boarding houses 
 SR Apartments and attached dwellings 
 SH Houses and separate dwellings 
Working, Business & 
Storage Activities 
WL Offices, banks, manufacturing/ 
storage of non-combustible products 
 WM/WH/WF Manufacture/storage of combustible 
products 
Intermittent Activities IE Exit ways 
 IA Car parks, toilets etc 
 ID Maintenance workshops 
 
Table 3.3: Purpose group summary (from C/AS1). 
 
To streamline the analysis purpose groups CS and CL have been combined into a single 
option. The reason for this is that these two groups differ only by the number of 
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occupants permitted. If a cinema has a maximum occupancy of less than 100 individuals 
then it is considered a CS purpose group and if its maximum occupancy is greater than 
100 individuals then it belongs to the CL purpose group. The Fire Service statistics do not 
indicate the occupancy limits of structures involved in fire so this distinction could not be 
completed with confidence. 
 
A similar situation exists with the manufacturing/storage purpose groups. Selection of the 
appropriate purpose group is done on the basis of the type and quantity of material stored 
and the resulting fire growth rate. Again the Fire Service reports do not generally contain 
this information so all industrial manufacturing and storage incidents have been recorded 
as Manufacturing/Storage, irrespective of the material stored. 
 
A large body of work has been written looking at deliberately lit fires in the education 
sector. They make up over 50% of the fires in CS/CL purpose groups. To separate them 
from the analysis an Education option, covering all education premises has been created.  
Purpose group IE does not typically apply to a whole structure so no fires have been 
applied to this group. 
 
There were a number of fires at locations such as vacant buildings or buildings under 
construction which do not clearly fit into any purpose group. These incidents have been 
collectively grouped as ‘Other’. 
 
The full list of property uses as recorded by the Fire Service, the number of incidents that 
have occurred at each property and the purpose group that has been assigned to each is 
recorded as Appendix A. The breakdown of deliberately lit fires by purpose group is 
given as Figure 3.7. Due to the large proportion of deliberately lit fires occurring in 
detached accommodation, these fires have been excluded from Figure 3.7 to better 
illustrate the relative significance of the other property types. 
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Figure 3.7: Breakdown of deliberately lit fires by property use (detached accommodation 
excluded) as defined by C/AS1.  
 
It can be clearly seen that in addition to detached accommodation buildings, education 
and crowd activities are also common targets for deliberately lit fires. The ‘other’ fires 
building category is also significant however due to the diverse nature of this catch all 
building category specific recommendations are likely to be of limited effectiveness. 
 
The proportion of deliberately lit fires in people’s homes is slightly higher in the US, 
where 51% of such fires occur in people’s homes36. As the definition of ‘home’ has not 
been specifically defined, it has been taken to be the sum of attached and detached 
accommodation. 
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3.4 Education Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Education premises have been defined to cover all school buildings from primary though 
to tertiary providers such as universities, polytechnics and trade colleges.  Between 1996 
and 2006, education facilities in New Zealand experienced 983 deliberately lit fires, an 
average of 89 per year. The vast majority of these fires occur in primary and high 
schools, with only 10.5% of such fires occurring in outside these premises. Deliberately 
lit fires make up 47.8% of the total number of fires that occur at education premises so 
such fires pose a significant risk to property as well as their risk to life safety. Studies in 
the US52 and UK53 have provided similar estimates of the proportion of fires that are 
deliberately lit and the risks they pose. 
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Figure 3.8: New Zealand education premises annual deliberately lit fire rate between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 40 
Of greater concern is that the number of fires in such premises has increased from 83 to 
95 incidents per year, an increase of 13.6% over the last eleven years. The trend over the 
period from 1996 to 2006 is illustrated as Figure 3.8. This is a continuation of a trend that 
goes back over the last twenty years however the rate of increase has slowed compared to 
the 75% increase in the number of incidents between 1986 and 199054. 
 
 
3.4.1 Education Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
Deliberately lit fires in education premises show a similar distribution of their day of 
occurrence however the distribution of time of day shows a much flatter distribution, 
especially during the afternoon hours. While there is still a significant dip in the fire 
frequency during the morning hours the incidence of fires during the afternoon is a much 
closer to the evening rate. Unless these fires occur during school holiday periods, the life 
safety risk may be higher than what is normally assumed despite the fact that the majority 
of fires occur at schools where there is no residential population. One reason proposed to 
explain this result is that the majority of deliberate fires at schools are lit by juveniles35. 
The daily fire rate has been summarised as Figure 3.9 and the hourly fire rate as Figure 
3.10. 
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Figure 3.9: New Zealand education premises deliberately lit fire rate by day between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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Figure 3.10: New Zealand education premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.4.2 Education Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
Fires were deliberately lit in a large range of locations as shown in Table 3.4. 
Deliberately lit fires appear to be lit where there is ready access, hence the high incidence 
of locations on the outside of the structure. These results are similar to what is found in 
intentional fires at education premises in the US13, the major difference being fires are 
much more likely to be started in the toilets in US schools. 
 
Overall, the distribution of location of origin is skewed with the top three items 
accounting for 40.3% of all incidents and seven entries achieving more than 5% of the 
total. The incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is low at 1.3%. 
 
Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Wall surface (exterior) 142 14.4% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 137 13.9% 
Small assembly area: Classroom, Meeting room, Multi-
purpose room 118 12.0% 
Patio, Court, Terrace, Gazebo 58 5.9% 
Lobby, Entrance way 57 5.8% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 56 5.7% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 55 5.6% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 33 3.4% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 30 3.1% 
Balcony, Porch, Veranda 26 2.6% 
Wall Assembly: Concealed Wall Space 21 2.1% 
Other Location of origin 250 25.4% 
Total 983 100.0% 
 
Table 3.4: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
education premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.4.3 Education Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The most commonly ignited items in education premises are given as Table 3.5. There is 
little difference in the items found in Table 3.5 compared to the overall statistics 
presented in Table 3.2. All items in Table 3.5, with the possible exception of flammable 
liquids, are commonly found in a school environment suggesting that the individuals who 
light fires in education premises are typically not introducing unusual items. This may be 
due to the opportunistic nature of lighting fires and the increased risk of getting caught 
bringing an additional fuel package to the scene. 
 
The incidence of igniting multiple fires is 3.7% and the total use of accelerants is 5.9%. 
This gives 9.6% of deliberately lit fires where an appropriately chosen design fire may be 
inadequate. 
 
Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 148 15.1% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 76 7.7% 
Unknown 66 6.7% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 61 6.2% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 52 5.3% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 52 5.3% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 42 4.3% 
Multiple items 36 3.7% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 35 3.6% 
Box, Carton, Bag 29 3.0% 
Basket, Barrel, Rubbish bin (NOT rubbish in bin) 27 2.7% 
Exterior trim e.g. Doors, Porches, Decks 27 2.7% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 25 2.5% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 24 2.4% 
Other Object first ignited 283 28.8% 
Total 983 100.0% 
 
Table 3.5: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
education premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
 44 
3.4.4 Education Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
The casualty rate in education premises is low with only two moderate and six slight 
injuries recorded between the years 1996 and 2006. These casualties resulted from eight 
separate incidents. In five of these incidents the fires were started in toilets; however 
there was no trend identified with the object first ignited. The most likely object ignited 
in incidents causing injury was some form of paper or rubbish. 
 
Deliberately lit fires are slightly under-represented in injury statistics. 42.9% of all 
moderate or life threatening injuries in education premises have occurred in fires that 
were deliberately lit. Such fires account for 47.8% of all fires in this type of premises. No 
fatality occurred during the study period. The low casualty rate is due to the fact that 80% 
of deliberately lit fires occur outside normal school hours.   
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3.5 Crowd Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Crowd premises have been defined to include all CS and CL purpose group activities 
other than education. This definition covers churches, community halls, cinemas, 
libraries, galleries, passenger terminals, drinking establishments, nightclubs and 
restaurants.  For statistical purposes, the New Zealand Fire Service combines restaurants 
and taverns with supermarkets and delicatessens under the description ‘Food and 
Beverage Sales’ so there is some crossover between this building category and the retail 
category. 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, crowd premises experienced 947 deliberately lit fires, or 
approximately 86 deliberately lit fires per year. Since 1996, the incidence of deliberately 
lit fires in crowd premises has decreased by 11.6% over this time dropping from 93 to 82 
incidents per year as shown in Figure 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11: New Zealand crowd premises annual deliberately lit fire rate between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 46 
 
While some structures in this category are more likely to experience a deliberately lit fire 
than others, on average 42.6% of the total number of fires that occurred in crowd 
premises were deliberately lit. As many of these structures have a greater occupancy 
during the evening and weekend this represents a risk to life safety. The incidence of 
deliberately lit fires in some of these structures in New Zealand differs to that found 
around the world. In New Zealand the proportion of fires in churches that is deliberately 
lit is 36.5% compared with approximately 66% in the UK55. Many of these structures 
have significant historical and community value in addition to their financial worth  
 
 
3.5.1 Crowd Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
Like education premises and the overall statistics, crowd premises are approximately 
50% more likely to experience a fire on a Saturday or Sunday compared to a weekday. 
The daily distribution of deliberately lit fires in crowd premises is illustrated as Figure 
3.12. 
 
When looking at the distribution by hour, two peaks are present. The first peak 
corresponds to the overall peak in deliberately lit fires, occurring at around midnight. The 
second peak occurs at roughly 4 p.m. and does not appear to have a clear cause. A plot of 
the probability that a fire will occur in a given hour is given as Figure 3.13. While not 
true for all crowd premises, deliberately lit fires do pose a significant risk to life safety as 
they are likely to occur during the time that these premises are occupied. 
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Figure 3.12: New Zealand crowd premises deliberately lit fire rate by day between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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Figure 3.13: New Zealand crowd premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.5.2 Crowd Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
The most frequently encountered compartments of origin for crowd premises are 
presented as Table 3.6. Overall, the distribution of location of origin is skewed, with the 
top three items accounting for 40.5% of all incidents and only two entries achieving more 
than 5% of the total. The remainder of the data for compartment of origin shows a very 
flat distribution. Again there is a strong bias towards both the exterior of the structure and 
those compartments where there is ready access. This is consistent with the most 
common location of origin for intentional fires in the US13.  The incidence of fires being 
lit in multiple compartments is low at 1.7%. 
 
Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 230 24.3% 
Wall surface (exterior) 108 11.4% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 45 4.8% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 43 4.5% 
Lobby, Entrance way 36 3.8% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 32 3.4% 
Small assembly area: Classroom, Meeting room, Multi-
purpose room 28 3.0% 
Large assembly area: Auditorium, Place of worship, Theatre, 
Arena, Lecture hall etc 26 2.7% 
Kitchen, Cooking area 21 2.2% 
Not Recorded 21 2.2% 
Recreational: Swimming pool, Health club, Massage parlour, 
Sauna 20 2.1% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 19 2.0% 
Other location of origin 318 33.6% 
Total 947 100.0% 
 
Table 3.6: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
crowd premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.5.3 Crowd Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The most common items first ignited in crowd premises have been listed in Table 3.7. 
The item first ignited in crowd premises is virtually identical to the overall trend with 
nine of the first ten most commonly lit items appearing in both Table 3.7 and Table 3.2. 
The reasons for this are likely to be the same as those mentioned in education premises. 
Due to the increased likelihood of other people being present and the increased risk of 
discovery the use of transient fuel load appears to be very unlikely. With the exception of 
flammable liquids all of the items on this list could reasonably be expected to be present 
in a crowd premises. 
 
The incidence of igniting multiple fires is 3.7% and the total use of accelerants is 5.3%. 
This gives 9.0% of deliberately lit fires where an appropriately chosen design fire may be 
inadequate. 
 
Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 132 13.9% 
Unknown 96 10.1% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 92 9.7% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 75 7.9% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 50 5.3% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 45 4.8% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 36 3.8% 
Multiple items 35 3.7% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 32 3.4% 
Box, Carton, Bag 28 3.0% 
Exterior trim e.g. Doors, Porches, Decks 21 2.2% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 20 2.1% 
Other object first ignited 285 30.1% 
Total 947 100.0% 
 
Table 3.7: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand crowd 
premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.5.4 Crowd Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Despite a high risk due to the expected occupancy at peak attack times there have only 
been five casualties in crowd occupancies between 1996 and 2006.  There have been two 
life threatening injuries, one moderate injury and two slight injuries during this period. 
Part of the reason for this good result is crowd premises are likely to have an equal or 
greater level of fire protection compared to working occupancies. The most commonly 
encountered fire scenario resulting in an injury was the ignition of the cladding on the 
exterior surface of the structure, resulting in two injuries. 
 
As already stated, deliberately lit fires comprise 42.6% of all fires in these premises. 
These fires accounted for 28.6% of the moderate and life threatening injuries in this 
sector which indicates that deliberately lit fires are under-represented in casualty 
statistics. The limited number of injuries in these premises means that this result should 
be treated with caution. 
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3.6 Retail Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Retail premises cover all locations where goods and services are traded. It covers such 
things as shopping malls, service stations, hardware stores and supermarkets. Between 
1996 and 2006, retail premises experienced 540 deliberately lit fires, or an average of 49 
incidents per year. This corresponds to 14.7% of all fires experienced by this sector. 
The incidence of deliberately lit fires in this sector is decreasing, dropping from 54 to 46 
incidents per year, a decrease of 14.4%. This trend is illustrated as Figure 3.14. 
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Figure 3.14: New Zealand retail premises annual deliberately lit fire rate between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.6.1 Retail Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
Retail premises show a greater bias towards deliberately lit fires during the weekend than 
other categories. 45.4% of all attacks occur on either a Saturday or Sunday. An attack is 
also significantly more likely to occur on a Sunday suggesting that this bias may be 
influenced by the increased likelihood that the retail store will be shut on Sundays, 
resulting in a lower risk of the offender being witnessed. The daily fire frequency is given 
as Figure 3.15. 
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Figure 3.15: New Zealand retail premises deliberately lit fire rate by day between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
During the day the maximum deliberately lit fire rate occurs shortly after midnight, 
consistent with the overall trend. The minimum deliberately lit fire rate also occurs at a 
consistent time with the overall trend; however, the rate remains low for a much longer 
period resulting in almost 50% of deliberately lit fires in retail premises occurring 
between the hours of 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. This is illustrated as Figure 3.16. 
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Figure 3.16: New Zealand retail premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.6.2 Retail Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
The compartment of origin for deliberately lit fires in retail premises is given as Table 
3.8. The two most common compartments of origin in retail premises are identical to 
what is found in both crowd and education premises, indicating their significance as a 
potential fire scenario. US data combines retail and office fires13; however the locations 
of origin listed in Table 3.8 are also present in the US data. 
 
Overall, the distribution of location of origin is flat, with the top three items accounting 
for 36.6% of all incidents and six entries achieving more than 5% of the total. The 
incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is low at 1.7%. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Wall surface (exterior) 92 17.0% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 58 10.7% 
Showroom, Sales area 48 8.9% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 36 6.7% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 36 6.7% 
Lobby, Entrance way 30 5.6% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 22 4.1% 
Rubbish, Industrial waste, Waste container 19 3.5% 
Patio, Court, Terrace, Gazebo 17 3.1% 
Product storage, Tank, Bin, Agricultural storage, Hay barn, 
Hay stack 15 2.8% 
Other location of origin 167 30.9% 
Total 540 100.0% 
 
Table 3.8: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
retail premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.6.3 Retail Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The item first ignited in retail premises is similar to what is ignited in other property 
groups. A list of the most commonly used items is given as Table 3.9. All of the items on 
this list are likely to be present in the retail sector; the diverse nature of retail stock also 
makes the identification of introduced fuels more difficult than in other sectors. However 
the use of introduced fuels is considered unlikely. 
 
The incidence of igniting multiple fires is 3.5% and the total use of accelerants is 6.1%. 
This gives 9.6% of deliberately lit fires where an appropriately chosen design fire may be 
inadequate. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 123 22.8% 
Box, Carton, Bag 48 8.9% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 42 7.8% 
Unknown 36 6.7% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 30 5.6% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 26 4.8% 
Multiple items 19 3.5% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 16 3.0% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 14 2.6% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 12 2.2% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 12 2.2% 
Basket, Barrel, Rubbish bin (NOT rubbish in bin) 12 2.2% 
Packing, Wrapping material 11 2.0% 
Rubbish in bin inside a structure, Ashtray 11 2.0% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 128 23.7% 
Total 540 100.0% 
 
Table 3.9: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand retail 
premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.6.4 Retail Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there was only a single casualty incident. A service station 
attendant was doused with a flammable liquid and set alight56. As the victim was intimate 
with the fire at the time of ignition, the buildings fire safety protection was unable to 
influence the outcome and the victim died at the scene. 
 
Due to the small number of casualty incidents for deliberately lit fires, this should not be 
considered either representative or worst case for the retail premises as a whole. This 
fatality was the only fatality in the entire retail sector during the study period. 
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3.7 Open Grandstand Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Open grandstand premises cover such structures as open air stadium, sports grounds and 
playgrounds. There have been a total of 123 fires in such structures between 1996 and 
2006, giving an average rate of 11 fires per year. While the number of incidents is much 
less than other categories it should be remembered that there are considerably fewer 
buildings of this type in towns and cities. Deliberately lit fires comprise 32.2% of all fires 
in such structures. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.17, there has been a significant increase in the number of 
incidents occurring at these premises, rising from eight to fifteen incidents per year, an 
increase of 92.1%. This trend is consistent with UK57 experience which showed that these 
structures are vulnerable to attack due to their isolation and infrequent use. 
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Figure 3.17: New Zealand open grandstand annual deliberately lit fire rate between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.7.1 Open Grandstand Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
The incidence of deliberately lit fires in open grandstands is strongly biased towards the 
weekend days as shown in Figure 3.18. This is consistent with the overall deliberately lit 
fire trend. When looking at the hourly distribution, in Figure 3.19, the maximum rate of 
deliberately lit fires occurs at a much earlier time, occurring during the middle of the 
afternoon at 4 p.m. This is considerably earlier than what is observed for other 
deliberately lit fires and suggests that the likely offender is a juvenile. 
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Figure 3.18: New Zealand open grandstand deliberately lit fire rate by day between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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Figure 3.19: New Zealand open grandstand deliberately lit fire rate by hour between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.7.2 Open Grandstand Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
Due to the different nature of these structures, compartment of origin options such as 
‘Lawn’ have been included in the list of most common location of origins. The most 
common locations of origin are tabulated as Table 3.10. Fires are significantly more 
likely to be lit in toilet blocks than other locations suggesting perpetrators value locations 
that reduce the risk of observation. Overall, the distribution of location of origin is 
skewed, with the top three items accounting for 41.5% of all incidents and fire entries 
achieving more than 5% of the total. The incidence of fires being lit in multiple 
compartments is low at 1.6%. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 28 22.8% 
Large assembly area: Auditorium, Place of worship, Theatre, 
Arena, Lecture hall, etc. 12 9.8% 
Wall surface (exterior) 11 8.9% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 9 7.3% 
Lawn , Park, Sports field 9 7.3% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 6 4.9% 
Recreational: Swimming pool, Health club, Massage parlour, 
Sauna 6 4.9% 
Wall assembly: Concealed wall space 5 4.1% 
Small assembly area: Classroom, Meeting room, Multi-
purpose room 4 3.3% 
Unable to classify 3 2.4% 
Open land, Scrub land, Farm land 3 2.4% 
Ceiling and floor assembly 3 2.4% 
Other location of origin 24 19.5% 
Total 123 100.0% 
 
Table 3.10: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
open grandstands between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.7.3 Open Grandstand Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The list of objects most likely to be used to start a fire in a grandstand is given as Table 
3.11. While the most likely items are similar to what is encountered in other purpose 
groups the presence of bedding at such locations may be considered as a transient fuel 
load. An appropriately selected design fire is expected to be able to cope with this 
scenario though. 
 
The incidence of igniting multiple fires is 1.6% and the total use of accelerants is 7.3%. 
This gives 8.9% of deliberately lit fires where an appropriately chosen design fire may be 
inadequate. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 19 15.4% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 11 8.9% 
Unknown 9 7.3% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 8 6.5% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 7 5.7% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 7 5.7% 
Structure components - not classified above 7 5.7% 
NON-Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle 
Seats 6 4.9% 
Box, Carton, Bag 4 3.3% 
Interior wall covering 4 3.3% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 3 2.4% 
Outdoor items - not classified above 3 2.4% 
Paint, Resin, Varnish, Thinners (include residue) 3 2.4% 
Other object first ignited. 32 26.0% 
Total 123 100.0% 
 
Table 3.11: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand open 
grandstands between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.7.4 Open Grandstand Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there has only been a single casualty at a grandstand premises. 
This was a slight injury as a result of a fire ignited by the use of fireworks on Guy 
Fawkes Night58. 
 
The low incidence of casualty incidents prevents further meaningful analysis. It 
represents 25% of the overall injury rate for this premises type. 
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3.8 Temporary Accommodation Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Temporary accommodation covers all structures where the majority of occupants sleep in 
the building but they do not actually live there. It covers motels, hotels, dormitories of 
schools and universities, backpackers, timeshare accommodation and home stay 
accommodation. 
 
Between 996 and 2006 there were 145 fires in temporary accommodation premises, an 
average of 13 fires per year. This represents 8.6% of the total number of fires involving 
these structures. The average number of fires per year dropped from 17 fires per year in 
the first half of the study to 11 fires per year in the later half, a decrease of 33.7%. The 
deliberately lit fire rate for temporary accommodation premises is given as Figure 3.20. 
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Figure 3.20: New Zealand temporary accommodation premises annual deliberately lit 
fire rate between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.8.1 Temporary Accommodation Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
Deliberately lit fires are more evenly distributed throughout the days of the week in 
temporary accommodation premises than in other premises. While the first half of the 
working week has a lower incidence of deliberately lit fires, the latter half of the working 
week has a rate that is virtually the same as the weekend. The daily distribution of 
incidents is given as Figure 3.21. 
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Figure 3.21: New Zealand temporary accommodation premises deliberately lit fire rate 
by day between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
On an hourly basis the general trend is the same as for other purpose groups with the 
maximum probability of an attack occurring during the night and the minimum 
probability occurring during the late morning. The hourly probability of a deliberately lit 
fire occurring is given as Figure 3.22. However, these premises are likely to have their 
greatest occupancy during their time of greatest risk - during the evenings and weekends. 
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Occupants may also be unfamiliar with the building further increasing the risk to life 
safety. 
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Figure 3.22: New Zealand temporary accommodation premises deliberately lit fire rate 
by hour between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.8.2 Temporary Accommodation Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
The most common compartment of origin for deliberately lit fires in temporary 
accommodation structures is given as Table 3.12. The single most likely location for a 
deliberately lit fire is a bedroom, accounting for almost a third of all incidents. In most 
hotels and motels access to these compartments requires a key. This, combined with the 
time that deliberately lit fires are most likely to be started suggests that staff, a guest or 
someone with a guest is the most likely person to light a fire in these premises. This has 
implications for the security of the building as these individuals cannot reasonably be 
denied access. 
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Overall, the distribution of location of origin is highly skewed, with the top three items 
accounting for 50.3% of all incidents and six entries achieving more than 5% of the total. 
The incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is low at 0.7%. 
 
Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 46 31.7% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 15 10.3% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 12 8.3% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 11 7.6% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 9 6.2% 
Kitchen, Cooking area 8 5.5% 
Wall surface (exterior) 5 3.4% 
Wardrobe, Cupboard, Walk in pantry 4 2.8% 
Wall assembly: Concealed wall space 3 2.1% 
Patio, Court, Terrace, Gazebo 3 2.1% 
Other location of origin 29 20% 
Total 145 100.0% 
 
Table 3.12: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
temporary accommodation premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.8.3 Temporary Accommodation Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The most commonly ignited objects for temporary accommodation are listed as Table 
3.13 and this list has strong similarities to that of other types of premises. One difference 
that is readily apparent is the decreased significance of paper items and an increased 
incidence of bedding and cloth items. This is likely to be due to the presence of such 
items in a typical motel bedroom. With the exception of flammable liquids none of these 
items would be considered unusual in this type of building. The incidence of igniting 
multiple fires is 0.7% and the total use of accelerants is 4.8%. This gives 5.5% of 
deliberately lit fires where an appropriately chosen design fire may be inadequate.  
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 19 13.1% 
Unknown 16 11.0% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 15 10.3% 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 12 8.3% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 10 6.9% 
Bedding e.g. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 9 6.2% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 7 4.8% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 6 4.1% 
Rubbish in bin inside a structure, Ashtray 6 4.1% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 5 3.4% 
Box, Carton, Bag 5 3.4% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 4 2.8% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 4 2.8% 
Special items - not classified above 3 2.1% 
Linen e.g. Towels, Tablecloths (NOT Bedding) 3 2.1% 
Other object first ignited 21 14.5% 
Total 145 100.0% 
 
Table 3.13: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
temporary accommodation premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.8.4 Temporary Accommodation Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there have been nine incidents where people have been injured 
in deliberately lit fires in temporary accommodation. This has resulted in one fatality, two 
life threatening injuries, four moderate injuries and seven slight injuries. This is much 
higher than what has been encountered in most other premises. 
The fatality was involved in a fire where petrol had been used to accelerate the fire 
growth, however on arrival of the fire service the fire was classed as a small fire. The 
victim was recorded as being involved with the fires ignition with nothing preventing 
their escape59 suggesting that this may have been a case of suicide by fire. 
The two most significant fire scenarios, accounting for over half of the remaining events, 
was the ignition of either bedding or furniture in a bedroom or lounge. These incidents 
accounted for eight of the injuries including both of the life threatening injuries. 
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Deliberately lit fires are over-represented in the casualty statistics for temporary 
accommodation premises making up 16.7% of all fatalities and 16.2% of all injuries in 
this type of premises. 
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3.9 Care Accommodation Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Care accommodation covers all locations where people reside for a period of time under 
professional care. It covers all hospitals, hospices, old aged care and psychiatric 
institutions. The common element in this type of premises is that the residents, for some 
reason, are unable to look after themselves. These premises require particular 
consideration by the fire engineer as the ability for most occupants to escape is likely to 
be impaired. 
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Figure 3.23: New Zealand care accommodation premises annual deliberately lit fire rate 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were 287 deliberately lit fires in care accommodation 
premises. This represents 16.6% of all fires in this building category. Deliberately lit fires 
in this building category are dominated by fires in facilities for the mentally handicapped, 
accounting for 64.5% of all deliberately lit fires in this category of building. 
Approximately half of all fires in psychiatric institutions are deliberately lit. If 
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deliberately lit fires in psychiatric institutions are excluded, the proportion of fires that is 
deliberately lit drops to 7.5%. The average number of incidents has decreased from 29 
incidents per year to 24 incidents per year, a decrease of 19.7%. The annual deliberately 
lit fire rate is given as Figure 3.23. 
 
 
3.9.1 Care Accommodation Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
Deliberately lit fires in care premises show little bias towards occurring on any specific 
day. As these incidents are dominated by fires in psychiatric institutions this is not 
unexpected. The daily deliberately lit fire rate is given as Figure 3.24. 
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Figure 3.24: New Zealand care accommodation premises deliberately lit fire rate by day 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
There is considerable scatter in the hourly distribution of deliberately lit fires as shown in 
Figure 3.25. The plot may be divided into two roughly equal periods. Deliberately lit fires 
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are twice as likely to occur during the afternoon and evening period, compared with the 
morning period. The peak incidence occurs earlier at 8 p.m. and the minimum rate occurs 
between 5 and 9 a.m. 
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Figure 3.25: New Zealand care accommodation premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.9.2 Care Accommodation Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
There is much less variation in the choice of location to origin in care accommodation 
premises. This suggests that the typical perpetrator does not have the same access to the 
structure as those who light fires in other premises. Most deliberately lit fires are started 
in either the toilets or bedroom. Table 3.14 lists the other common locations of origin. 
Overall, the distribution of location of origin is very highly skewed, with the top three 
items accounting for 76.4% of all incidents and three entries achieving more than 5% of 
the total. The incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is low at 0.3%. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin Frequency % of 
Total 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 130 45.3% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 59 20.6% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 30 10.5% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 10 3.5% 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: 5 or more persons 8 2.8% 
Wall surface (exterior) 7 2.4% 
Other compartment of origin 43 15.0% 
Total 287 100.0% 
 
Table 3.14: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
care accommodation premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.9.3 Care Accommodation Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
As shown in Table 3.15, most deliberately lit fires in care accommodation premises are 
started using paper, cloth products or upholstered furniture, none of which would be 
considered out of the ordinary in these premises. With only 1.4% of fires lit using 
accelerants it is likely that access to accelerants may be limiting activity. The ignition of 
multiple fires is also low, only 1.4% of fires having multiple objects ignited. Based on 
this only 2.8% of fires are likely to challenge an appropriately selected design fire. The 
typical object ignited, combined with the location, time of day and the fact that the 
majority of deliberately lit fires in these premises occur in psychiatric institutions 
suggests that it is the patients that are responsible for lighting the majority of the fires. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Bedding e.g. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 51 17.8% 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 28 9.8% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 25 8.7% 
Linen e.g. Towels, Tablecloths (NOT Bedding) 19 6.6% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 18 6.3% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 18 6.3% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 15 5.2% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 15 5.2% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 15 5.2% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 14 4.9% 
Box, Carton, Bag 11 3.8% 
Rubbish in bin inside a structure, Ashtray 8 2.8% 
Cabinetry e.g. Desks, Tables, Drawers, Shelving, Wardrobe, 
Piano 6 2.1% 
Other object first ignited 43 15.0% 
Total 287 100.0% 
 
Table 3.15: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand care 
accommodation premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.9.4 Care Accommodation Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were eighteen casualty incidents resulting in eight 
moderate and eighteen slight injuries. The eight moderate injuries represent 30.8% of all 
moderate and life threatening injuries in care accommodation during the study period. 
Deliberately lit fires are over-represented in the injury statistics for care accommodation; 
however, with no fatalities attributed to deliberately lit fires they are under-represented in 
the fatality statistics. As deliberately lit fires are over-represented in the injury statistics 
for old aged care, care of the sick and injured, care of the physically disabled, the 
exclusion of psychiatric institutions from the statistics does not change these results 
significantly. 
 
While the majority of casualty incidents started in a bedroom, those fires that started in 
the lounges and television rooms represent a greater threat to life safety. Such rooms 
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typically have a greater occupancy than bedrooms and therefore removing building 
occupants from the compartment of fire origin is likely to be more difficult to achieve 
within the limited time available. Deliberately lit fires in lounges were twice as likely to 
result in a casualty incident compared with deliberately lit fires in bedrooms. With nine 
injuries attributed to fires in lounges, they resulted in almost as many injuries as the much 
more numerous bedroom fires.  
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3.10 Detention Accommodation Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Detention accommodation covers all premises where most of the occupants reside and are 
not permitted to leave under normal circumstances. This covers prisons, the cells of 
police stations and detention facilities for youths. These structures face particular issues 
for fire engineers due to the requirement that occupants remain confined. 
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Figure 3.26: New Zealand detention accommodation annual deliberately lit fire rate 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were 181 deliberately lit fires in detention accommodation 
premises. Deliberately lit fires make up 67.9% of all fires in these premises. These 
premises are more likely to experience a fire that is deliberately lit than one which is 
accidental. As illustrated in Figure 3.26, the long term trend for detention accommodation 
is distorted by a large number of incidents in 2006.  Prior to 2006, these premises 
experienced an average of 15 incidents per year during the study period. There were 31 
incidents in 2006, resulting in a 20% increase in the long term trend. If 2006 is treated as 
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an anomalous year and not included in the trending then this building category has 
experienced a slight decrease in the number of incidents occurring each year. 
 
 
3.10.1 Detention Accommodation Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
Detention facilities have an unusual daily trend, illustrated as Figure 3.27; they are the 
only type of premises that show a decrease in the rate of deliberately lit fires during the 
weekend. This may be due to activities that help to combat boredom such as visitation by 
family members which, due to other commitments, are more likely to occur at weekends. 
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Figure 3.27: New Zealand detention accommodation deliberately lit fire rate by day 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
The distribution of deliberately lit fires throughout the day is strongly biased towards the 
evening period. One third of all deliberately lit prison fires are started between 6 and 8 
p.m. This is likely to correspond to ‘free’ time where inmates do not have activities 
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organised for them. Between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. the incidence of deliberately 
lit fires decreases significantly. Prisoners are likely to be in their cells during this time 
and losses are likely to be borne by those who have lit the fire, a self correcting situation. 
Apart from a dip shortly after midday the incidence of deliberately lit fires in detention 
premises is essentially constant during daylight hours as shown in Figure 3.28. 
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Figure 3.28: New Zealand detention accommodation deliberately lit fire rate by hour 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.10.2 Detention Accommodation Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
Not surprisingly, the most likely compartment of origin for deliberately lit fires in prisons 
is a cell or other sleeping area. If the fires have been lit as an act of revenge then the most 
effective target is another inmate’s personal possessions, which are likely to be in their 
cell. Other fires may be lit as an act of vandalism to get back at the authorities and these 
may be lit in other locations. The most common locations to light fires are given as Table 
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3.16. Overall, the distribution of location of origin is very highly skewed, with the top 
three items accounting for 76.2% of all incidents and three entries achieving more than 
5% of the total. During the study period there were no fires which had multiple 
compartments of origin, considering the restrictions on mobility of the likely offender 
this is not considered surprising. 
 
Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 113 62.4% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 16 8.8% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 9 5.0% 
Machinery room/area, Engine room, Refrigeration room, Pump 
room, Lift motor room 6 3.3% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 5 2.8% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 5 2.8% 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: 5 or more persons 4 2.2% 
Small assembly area: Classroom, Meeting room, Multi-
purpose room 4 2.2% 
Other location of origin 19 10.5% 
Total 181 100.0% 
 
Table 3.16: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
detention accommodation between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.10.3 Detention Accommodation Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The use of paper, rubbish and bedding items dominate deliberately lit fires in detention 
facilities as shown in Table 3.17. Again only flammable liquids are likely to be 
considered as an introduced fuel. As expected, the use of accelerants in detention 
accommodation facilities is lower than in most other property types. This is almost 
certainly due to restrictions placed on the individuals. Only 3.3% of fires are assisted 
through the use of accelerants. Multiple items are ignited in 2.2% of cases giving a total 
of 5.5% of deliberately lit fires where an appropriately selected design fire may be 
inadequate. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 37 20.4% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 24 13.3% 
Bedding e.g. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 21 11.6% 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 20 11.0% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 13 7.2% 
Unknown 11 6.1% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 9 5.0% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 6 3.3% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 5 2.8% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 5 2.8% 
Multiple items 4 2.2% 
Other object first ignited 26 14.4% 
Total 181 100.0% 
  
Table 3.17: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
detention accommodation between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.10.4 Detention Accommodation Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
There were fifteen casualty incidents caused by deliberately lit fires in detention 
accommodation premises. These resulted in one fatality, two life threatening injuries, 
twenty-five moderate injuries and eleven slight injuries. This represents 50.0% of the 
fatalities and 96.4% of the life threatening and moderate injuries for this type of structure. 
Despite the fact that a fire in a prison being twice as likely to be deliberately lit as any 
other cause, deliberately lit fires totally dominate the casualty statistics. 
 
Due to the mobility restrictions placed on inmates there is the opportunity to injure a 
number of individuals, there have been three separate incidents where more than four 
people have been injured including one where seventeen people were injured, one fatally.  
In virtually all casualty incidents the fire was started in a sleeping area or cell, with only a 
single casualty incident occurring in a lounge area. This incident resulted in only a single 
injury. 
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The ignition of bedding and blankets is the fire scenario most likely to result in a 
casualty. One in five deliberately lit fires started using these materials results in a 
casualty. 
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3.11 Detached Dwellings: Overall Trends 
 
Detached dwellings cover all structures that are not physically attached to another 
inhabited building where people normally reside. This building category also includes 
granny flats and other freestanding buildings on private land. It does not cover structures 
such as apartments where multiple ownership titles exist for a single ratable block of 
land. 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were 3735 deliberately lit fires in detached dwellings or an 
average of 340 such fires per year. This represents 8.5% of the total number of fires 
experienced by this building category of structure. This figure is very similar to 
Norwegian data for residential property39. Over the last ten years the number of 
deliberately lit fires has dropped from 368 to 323 incidents per year, a decrease of 12.3%, 
the annual deliberately lit fire rate is given in Figure 3.29. 
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Figure 3.29: New Zealand detached dwelling annual deliberately lit fire rate between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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Detached dwellings dominate the annual statistics, both for the number of fires 
experienced and for the number of people injured and killed. Because of this, Figures 
3.29, 3.30 and 3.31 are very similar to the overall deliberately lit fire data given as 
Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. While still required to meet the requirements of the 
New Zealand Building Code, logistical problems prevent effective policing of the 
regulations. Many private houses have been modified without any thought towards fire 
safety. This section has been included mainly for the sake of completeness.  
 
 
3.11.1 Detached Dwellings: Time of Occurrence 
 
As expected deliberately lit fires in private houses shows the normal bias. An incident is 
more likely to occur during the weekend with 36.8% of fires occurring during weekend 
hours. This is illustrated in Figure 3.30. 
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Figure 3.30: New Zealand detached dwelling deliberately lit fire rate by day between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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The hourly distribution of incidents is shown as Figure 3.31. It also shows the normal 
frequency distribution with the peak occurring at midnight followed by a rapid decrease 
in the frequency of incidents until the minimum frequency is reached, occurring at 9 a.m. 
There is a steady increase through the day and early evening. 
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Figure 3.31: New Zealand detached dwelling premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.11.2 Detached Dwellings: Compartment of Origin 
 
The most common location to start deliberate fires in detached dwellings is listed as 
Table 3.18. While generally similar to the overall statistics, the incidence of fires being lit 
in multiple areas is higher than most property types. Overall, the distribution of location 
of origin is highly skewed, with the top three items accounting for 52.6% of all incidents 
and four entries achieving more than 5% of the total. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 802 21.5% 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 620 16.6% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 541 14.5% 
Kitchen, Cooking area 240 6.4% 
Wall surface (exterior) 178 4.8% 
Not Recorded 149 4.0% 
Product storage, Tank, Bin, Agricultural storage, Hay barn, 
Hay stack 141 3.8% 
Multiple areas of origin 113 3.0% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 87 2.3% 
Other location of origin 864 23.1% 
Total 3735 100.0% 
 
Table 3.18: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
detached dwellings between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.11.3 Detached Dwellings: Object First Ignited 
 
The objects most commonly used to start fires in detached dwellings are listed in Table 
3.19. There is considerable variation in the object used to start the fire as indicated by the 
fact that no positively identified object accounts for more than 8.2% of the total number 
of incidents. The high number of unknown objects is likely to be due to a combination of 
a lower level of post fire investigation (due to a lower monetary value of the structure) 
and the lack of fire protection in most houses resulting in more of the structure being 
destroyed. 
 
The high incidence of accelerant use may be accounted for by the fact that many 
properties keep small quantities of solvents for domestic use and petrol for equipment 
such as lawnmowers. With this in mind, the use of accelerants may be over-represented 
and no item stands out as an introduced fuel. Accelerants are used more frequently in 
house fires than in any other property type, accounting for 8.6% of all fires. The ignition 
of multiple items accounts for another 6.1% of deliberately lit fires so 14.7% of 
deliberately lit fires may be more severe than an appropriately selected design fire. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Unknown 550 14.7% 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 307 8.2% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 287 7.7% 
Multiple items 227 6.1% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 225 6.0% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 203 5.4% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 186 5.0% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 135 3.6% 
Bedding e.g. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 131 3.5% 
Floor coverings: Carpets, Mats, Rugs 120 3.2% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 116 3.1% 
Interior wall covering 114 3.1% 
Information not recorded 112 3.0% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 109 2.9% 
Agricultural: Hay, Straw (NOT food for human consumption) 107 2.9% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 103 2.8% 
Box, Carton, Bag 92 2.5% 
Other object first ignited 864 23.1% 
Total 3735 100.0% 
 
Table 3.19: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
detached dwellings between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.11.4 Detached Dwellings: Casualty Rate 
 
As stated, fires in detached dwellings dominate the overall fire casualty rate60. They also 
dominate the deliberately lit fire casualty statistics with 21 fatalities, 22 life threatening 
injuries 56 moderate injuries and 52 slight injuries. Three quarters of all deliberately lit 
fires deaths and 46.3% of all deliberately lit fire injuries occur in detached dwellings. 
 
The casualties in deliberately lit fires represent 10.3% of all fatalities and 7.6% of all 
injuries in detached dwellings so deliberately lit fires are slightly overrepresented in the 
fatality statistics but slightly underrepresented in the injury statistics for detached 
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dwellings. The only deliberately lit fires responsible for multiple deaths during the study 
period occurred in detached accommodation. 
 
The most likely area for a fatal fire to occur was the bedroom or lounge with six fatal 
fires in each compartment. The next most common area for fatal fires was the kitchen 
with three fatal fires. One possible reason for this is result the probability that, in many 
house designs, a fire in a kitchen or lounge is able to prevent the use of the normal escape 
paths. When considering all casualty fires these three locations account for 60.6% of all 
casualty incidents. 
 
With regards to the object first ignited, accelerants were used in 50.0% of all fatal fires 
and in 22.0% of all casualty incidents. This suggests that if accelerants are used an 
individual is twice as likely to be injured and 5.8 times as likely to be killed. While some 
of these fires may be attributed to suicide by fire, this is unlikely to reverse this trend. 
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3.12 Attached Dwellings: Overall Trends 
 
Attached dwellings cover all cases where multiple property titles are present on a single 
section of ratable land. This covers all apartment buildings, units that share a common 
boundary (e.g. a wall) as well as residential units located above shops. Between 1996 and 
2006, there were a total of 577 deliberately lit fires in attached dwellings, an average of 
52 per year. Deliberately lit fires make up 8.6% of all fires in this building category. The 
long term trend has increased from an average of 50 fires per year to 56 fires per year, an 
increase of 10.7%. The annual deliberately lit fire rate for attached dwellings is given as 
Figure 3.32. 
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Figure 3.32: New Zealand attached dwelling annual deliberately lit fire rate between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.12.1 Attached Dwellings: Time of Occurrence 
 
As shown in Figure 3.33, the daily distribution of deliberately lit fires is biased towards 
the weekend days with 39.0% of fires occurring on a either a Saturday or Sunday. The 
distribution during the week is essentially flat with no weekday standing out. 
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Figure 3.33: New Zealand attached dwelling deliberately lit fire rate by day between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
When looking at the distribution of deliberately lit fires by hour, in Figure 3.34, the 
amount of scatter in the results is readily apparent. While the peak and trough occur at 
approximately the same time as the overall trend, the chart is punctuated by a number of 
peaks in the data. The main issue for the fire engineer is that the time where most 
deliberately lit fires occur in attached dwellings corresponds with both the time of the 
highest occupancy and the lowest awareness of the building occupants, during the night 
hours. 
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Figure 3.34: New Zealand attached dwelling premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.12.2 Attached Dwellings: Compartment of Origin 
 
Three of the four most common compartments of origin for attached dwellings are 
bedrooms, lounges and kitchens which are all typically located within the apartment unit. 
This suggests that access beyond building security is not a strong barrier to the 
perpetrators. 
 
The incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is not high with 1.2% of fires 
having multiple compartments of origin. Table 3.20 summarises the most likely 
compartments of origin. Overall, the distribution of location of origin is highly skewed, 
with the top three items accounting for 53.8% of all incidents and five entries achieving 
more than 5% of the total. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 112 19.4% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 103 17.9% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 95 16.5% 
Kitchen, Cooking area 44 7.6% 
Wall surface (exterior) 34 5.9% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 24 4.2% 
Lobby, Entrance way 19 3.3% 
Rubbish, Industrial waste, Waste container 15 2.6% 
Patio, Court, Terrace, Gazebo 14 2.4% 
Other location of origin 117 20.3% 
Total 577 100.0% 
 
Table 3.20: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
attached dwellings between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.12.3 Attached Dwellings: Object First Ignited 
 
Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 94 16.3% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 61 10.6% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 54 9.4% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 43 7.5% 
Unknown 36 6.2% 
Bedding e.g. Blankets, Sheets, Duvet 32 5.5% 
Clothing (Not being worn) 27 4.7% 
Bedding e.g. Mattress, Pillow 26 4.5% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 26 4.5% 
Multiple items 24 4.2% 
Box, Carton, Bag 17 2.9% 
Floor coverings: Carpets, Mats, Rugs 17 2.9% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 12 2.1% 
Other object first ignited 108 18.7% 
Total 577 100.0% 
 
Table 3.21: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
attached dwellings between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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As illustrated by Table 3.21, the items most likely to be ignited in deliberately lit fires in 
attached dwellings are rubbish, paper items, upholstered furniture and cloth items. While 
not as common as in detached dwellings, there is a significant proportion of fires where 
the item first ignited is not positively identified. There are no items in the data that stands 
out as introduced fuels. Accelerants are used in 8.3% of deliberately lit fires and multiple 
fires within a single fire compartment are lit in 4.2% of deliberately lit fires. This results 
in 12.5% of fires where an appropriately selected design fire may be inadequate. 
 
 
3.12.4 Attached Dwellings: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there have been 47 casualty incidents in attached dwellings 
resulting in 4 fatalities, 10 life threatening injuries, 17 moderate injuries and 25 slight 
injuries. Thus the 8.6% of deliberately lit fires result in 9.4% of all fatalities and 8.8% of 
all injuries, indicating that deliberately lit fires are fairly evenly represented in the 
casualty statistics for this category of building. The distribution of casualty incidents by 
compartment of origin is similar to what is observed in detached dwellings with 
bedrooms, lounges and kitchens making up over three quarters of casualty incidents. 
 
The distribution of casualty incidents by object first ignited shows that the most 
hazardous scenarios are related to the fire being started in bedding material where one in 
five fires started on bedding results in a casualty. The presence of polyurethane in many 
mattresses is likely to be a contributing factor. Other fast fires such as upholstered 
furniture and drapes are also over-represented in the casualty statistics. This is consistent 
with the conclusions of US studies which have identified upholstered furniture and 
mattresses as the most likely cause of death in fires61. Accelerated fires are also over-
represented in the casualty statistics with one in seven fires where accelerants have been 
used resulting in a casualty. 
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3.13 Working Premises: Overall Trends 
 
The working premises category covers buildings where people go to complete their 
business activities. It covers all office buildings, banks, embassies and buildings operated 
by the defense forces. Between 1996 and 2006, there were 272 fires that were identified 
as being deliberately lit or 25 fires per year. This corresponds to 15.5% of the total 
number of fires in this building category. The overall trend is down for this category is 
downwards, decreasing from 29 to 21 fires per year, a decrease of 24.5%. From Figure 
3.35 below it is apparent that there were considerably more deliberately lit fires in 1996 
than in other years of the study. If this year is omitted as an outlier then the reduction in 
fires in this category is reduced to 10.7%. 
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Figure 3.35: New Zealand working premises annual deliberately lit fire rate between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.13.1 Working Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
While this building category shows some bias towards fires occurring during the 
weekend, this bias is less than what is observed with most other property categories. As 
shown by Figure 3.36, 36.7% of all fires occurred on a Saturday or Sunday. The daily 
incidence of deliberately lit fires is essentially flat during the working week before 
increasing over the course of the weekend. 
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Figure 3.36: New Zealand working premises deliberately lit fire rate by day between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
The distribution of deliberately lit fires by hour (shown as Figure 3.37) is unusual as it 
has the presence of a second peak occurring during the middle of the afternoon. This drop 
off at 5 p.m. is likely to correspond with workers departing their place of work and the 
increased activity increasing the risk to the perpetrator. Both the most likely and least 
likely times for a deliberately lit fire to occur appear to be delayed slightly compared with 
the overall statistics. As the majority of these fires are recorded as fires in offices and the 
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like, then this is unlikely to correspond to changes of shift. With the exception of the 
daily minimum at 10 a.m. and the afternoon peak at 2 p.m., the incidence of deliberately 
lit fires between 4 a.m. and 6 p.m. is essentially constant. 
 
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
00:00 04:00 08:00 12:00 16:00 20:00
Time of Day (hh:mm)
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 F
ire
s
 
 
Figure 3.37: New Zealand working premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.13.2 Working Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
The most common compartment of origin in working premises is given as Table 3.22. 
Overall, the distribution of location of origin is flat, with the top three items accounting 
for 29.8% of all incidents and six entries achieving more than 5% of the total. While the 
most common locations for fires in working premises are in locations where the public 
have ready access, the flat distribution of the most common locations prevents clear 
identification of trends. The incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is low 
at 1.5%. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Wall surface (exterior) 33 12.1% 
Lobby, Entrance way 25 9.2% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 23 8.5% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 19 7.0% 
Office 19 7.0% 
Hallway, Passageway, Corridor, Walkway in mall 15 5.5% 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 10 3.7% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 9 3.3% 
Rubbish, Industrial waste, Waste container 8 2.9% 
Manufacturing, Process, Work room 8 2.9% 
Unable to classify 7 2.6% 
Small assembly area: Classroom, Meeting room, Multi-
purpose room 6 2.2% 
Showroom, Sales area 6 2.2% 
Other location of origin 84 30.8% 
Total 272 100.0% 
 
Table 3.22: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
working premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.13.3 Working Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The objects most likely to be ignited first are listed in Table 3.23. The high incidence of 
paper materials is not unsurprising; most offices contain a large quantity of files giving a 
ready source of fuel that is easily ignited. With the exception of flammable liquids, all of 
the items listed in Table 3.23 are likely to be present in a typical office environment 
indicating the use of transitory fuel loads is unlikely. Accelerants are used in 4.8% of 
deliberately lit fires and multiple fires within a single fire compartment are lit in 1.8% of 
deliberately lit fires for this property type. In 6.6% of fire incidents an appropriately 
selected design fire may be inadequate. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 61 22.4% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 29 10.7% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 29 10.7% 
Unknown 14 5.1% 
Box, Carton, Bag 14 5.1% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 14 5.1% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 9 3.3% 
Rubbish in bin inside a structure, Ashtray 9 3.3% 
Floor coverings: Carpets, Mats, Rugs 7 2.6% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 7 2.6% 
Basket, Barrel, Rubbish bin (NOT rubbish in bin) 7 2.6% 
Curtains, Blinds, Drapes 6 2.2% 
Packing, Wrapping material 6 2.2% 
Other object first ignited 60 22.1% 
Total 272 100.0% 
 
Table 3.23: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
working premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.13.4 Working Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were no casualties recorded for fires that were deliberately 
lit. There were no fatalities and seven injuries recorded for all fires in the working 
premises category. The lack of casualties prevents further analysis. 
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3.14 Manufacturing and Storage Premises: Overall Trends 
 
Manufacturing and storage premises cover all industrial and storage facilities. It covers 
all manufacturing sites, both for primary and secondary industries as well as all forms of 
storage facilities, ranging from finished product storage though to domestic storage 
companies. Between 1996 and 2006, these premises experienced 723 deliberately lit fires, 
an average of 66 fires per year. This represents 11.0% of the total number of fires that 
occurred in this property category. The annual incidence of deliberately lit fires in this 
property type is given as Figure 3.38. During the course of the study the annual number 
of incidents in this property group has declined from 70 incidents per year to 63 incidents 
per year, a decrease of 10.5%. 
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Figure 3.38: New Zealand manufacturing and storage premises annual deliberately lit 
fire rate between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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Deliberately lit fires in these premises are dominated by fires in storage facilities, 46% of 
all deliberately lit fires in this building category occurred in storage facilities. A 
significantly higher proportion of fires in storage premises are deliberately lit (25% 
compared with 6.3% for manufacturing premises). This is broadly in line with UK data 
on the proportion of warehouse fires which listed malicious intent as the leading cause of 
ignition with 29% of warehouse fires being started in this manner62. 
 
 
3.14.1 Manufacturing and Storage Premises: Time of Occurrence 
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Figure 3.39: New Zealand manufacturing and storage premises deliberately lit fire rate 
by day between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
The daily distribution of incidents shows a strong bias towards weekend fire setting. As 
shown in Figure 3.39, 40.7% of all deliberately lit fires occur on either a Saturday or 
Sunday. There is a steady increase in the incidence of deliberately lit fires from 
Wednesday up until the peak of Saturday, before declining at the start of the week. The 
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high incidence during the weekend is not considered unusual as while a number of 
manufacturing and storage sites are seven days per week operations, the majority of such 
facilities are operational during the working week only. 
 
The distribution of incidents by hour is given as Figure 3.40, it shows the typical peak in 
activity occurring shortly after midnight followed by a sharp decline until 7 a.m. followed 
by a steady increase throughout the working day and evening. The presence of a 
secondary peak at 5 p.m. is likely to correspond to fire setting activity by staff as they 
leave the premises. 
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Figure 3.40: New Zealand manufacturing and storage premises deliberately lit fire rate 
by hour between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.14.2 Manufacturing and Storage Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
Due to the wide range of businesses in this category it was expected that the distribution 
of deliberately lit fires would be very flat. Table 3.24 shows that this is not the case with 
the one in six fires being lit in a vehicle garage. The compartment of origin is biased 
towards the exterior of the structure. Overall, the distribution of location of origin is 
skewed, with the top three items accounting for 40.6% of all incidents and four entries 
achieving more than 5% of the total. The incidence of fires being lit in multiple 
compartments is low at 1.8%. 
 
Most Common Location Of Origin No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 130 18.0% 
Product storage, Tank, Bin, Agricultural storage, Hay barn, 
Hay stack 88 12.2% 
Wall surface (exterior) 75 10.4% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 47 6.5% 
Not Recorded 35 4.8% 
Manufacturing, Process, Work room 27 3.7% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 25 3.5% 
Shipping area, Receiving area, Loading area, Packing area 25 3.5% 
Lobby, Entrance way 20 2.8% 
Rubbish, Industrial waste, Waste container 17 2.4% 
Road, Street, Parking lot, Highway, Motorway 17 2.4% 
Storage and garage area - not classified above 17 2.4% 
Maintenance shop, Repair, Welding, Paint shop, Paint spraying 
area 15 2.1% 
Other location of origin 185 25.6% 
Total 723 100.0% 
 
Table 3.24: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
manufacturing and storage premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.14.3 Manufacturing and Storage Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The most commonly used items to start deliberately lit fires in manufacturing and storage 
facilities are listed as Table 3.25. There are no items in this data that are considered 
unusual in a typical manufacturing site, however, unless designed specifically for their 
storage, storage facilities typically do not permit storage of hazardous products such as 
flammable liquids or gases so these should be considered introduced fuels in these cases. 
Accelerants are used in 5.5% of deliberately lit fires and multiple fires within a single fire 
compartment are lit in 3.9% of deliberately lit fires for this property type. In 9.4% of fire 
incidents an appropriately selected design fire may be inadequate. 
 
Most Common Object First Ignited No. of 
Incidents 
% of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 104 14.4% 
Unknown 103 14.2% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 43 5.9% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 35 4.8% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 33 4.6% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 33 4.6% 
Box, Carton, Bag 30 4.1% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 28 3.9% 
Multiple items 28 3.9% 
Packing, Wrapping material 27 3.7% 
Information not recorded 27 3.7% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 20 2.8% 
Dust, Lint, Fibre, Wood chips, Sawdust, Shavings, Bark 17 2.4% 
Interior wall covering 15 2.1% 
Other object first ignited 185 25.6% 
Total 723 100.0% 
 
Table 3.25: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
manufacturing and storage premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
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3.14.4 Manufacturing and Storage Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were six separate incidents in manufacturing and storage 
premises resulting in one moderate injury and five slight injuries. This represents 3.8% of 
the total fire injuries in this building category. Overall there were three fatal fire incidents 
resulting in three fatalities in this building category. Deliberately lit fires are therefore 
under-represented in both the injury and fatality statistics in this category of building. 
 
No clear trends were identifiable when looking at the casualty incidents; every incident 
was started in a different compartment with a different object first ignited. The UK data 
indicates that over a similar period of time there were five fatalities and 51 injuries, 
giving an injury to fatality ratio of 10:1. The New Zealand casualty data does not 
contradict this ratio. 
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3.15 Intermittent Use Premises 
 
This building category describes structures that are occupied intermittently such as car 
parks, telephone exchanges and phone boxes. Between 1996 and 2006, there were 130 
incidents in these structures corresponding to 12 incidents per year. The five year average 
trend is distorted by a large number of incidents occurring in 2003, where they occurred 
at twice the frequency of other years. If 2003 is omitted from the data the overall trend 
shows a decline of 3.8%. The overall trend is given in Figure 3.41. 
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Figure 3.41: New Zealand intermittent use premises annual deliberately lit fire rate 
between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
Incidents in this building category are totally dominated by fires in phone boxes with 
93% of the 130 fires in this category occurring in phone boxes. Three quarters of these 
fires are lit using paper material, most likely the phone book.  
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With the increasing use of mobile phones and a decline in the number of pay phones in 
service the number of fires in this property group is expected to decline. Due to the small 
size of a phone box, anyone present in the phone box at the time of ignition is likely to be 
directly involved with starting the fire. They also have a negligible travel time to escape 
making fire engineering a trivial exercise.  As there have been no injuries in this building 
category and, excluding phone boxes, there have been few incidents in this category 
further analysis is not justified. 
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3.16 Other Premises: Overall Trends 
 
The other premises cover all structures that are not captured by any of the previous 
building categories. This includes all structures on railway property, vacant buildings and 
structures at construction and demolition sites. The fire safety systems of vacant 
buildings will have been designed based on the most recent use and the fire safety 
requirements of buildings under construction (once the systems are installed) are 
designed around the buildings’ future use. During the construction and vacant phases of 
the buildings’ life the fuel loads are typically assumed to be less than normal use and 
therefore a fire will be less severe but this assumption has little impact on the initial fire 
growth inside the structure. 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were 963 incidents in ‘other’ premises, an average of 88 
incidents per year. Over the last eleven years the incidence of events in these structures 
has declined 14.8% from 96 to 82 incidents per year.  This represents 42.6% of all fires 
for these structures. A total of 267 fires, or 27.7% of all of these incidents occurred in 
vacant buildings with another 17.4% occurring in buildings under construction. Fires in 
vacant buildings and buildings are more likely to be lit deliberately than all other fire 
causes combined. This high likelihood of vacant buildings being involved in deliberately 
lit fires has been well documented in literature39,63. The annual distribution of deliberately 
lit fires in ‘other’ structures is given as Figure 3.42.  
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Figure 3.42: New Zealand ‘other’ premises annual deliberately lit fire rate between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.16.1 Other Premises: Time of Occurrence 
 
There is a significant bias towards fires occurring during the weekend with 42.4% of all 
deliberately lit fires occurring on a Saturday or Sunday. Apart from a slightly higher 
probability of a fire occurring on a Friday there is no identifiable trend during the week. 
The daily distribution of fire incidents is shown in Figure 3.43. 
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Figure 3.43: New Zealand ‘other’ premises deliberately lit fire rate by day between 1996 
and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
With regards to the hourly distribution of deliberately lit fires in the ‘other’ building 
category the trends are virtually identical to the overall trend with the peak incidence 
occurring shortly before midnight and the minimum frequency occurring at 9 a.m. The 
hourly distribution of fire incidents is shown in Figure 3.44. 
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Figure 3.44: New Zealand ‘other’ premises deliberately lit fire rate by hour between 
1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.16.2 Other Premises: Compartment of Origin 
 
The compartments most likely to be involved in a deliberately lit fire are listed as Table 
3.26. The entries in Table 3.26 are biased towards the exterior of the structure. Overall, 
the distribution of location of origin is flat, with the top three items accounting for 29.8% 
of all incidents and six entries achieving more than 5% of the total. While higher than 
many other building types the incidence of fires being lit in multiple compartments is low 
at 2.5%. 
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Most Common Location Of Origin Frequency % of 
Total 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 139 14.4% 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 77 8.0% 
Not Recorded 71 7.4% 
Vacant structural area 66 6.9% 
Wall surface (exterior) 62 6.4% 
Road, Street, Parking lot, Highway, Motorway 55 5.7% 
Unable to classify 42 4.4% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 33 3.4% 
Product storage, Tank, Bin, Agricultural storage, Hay barn, 
Hay stack 31 3.2% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 29 3.0% 
Area under construction or major renovation 22 2.3% 
Wall assembly: Concealed wall space 21 2.2% 
Other compartment of origin 315 32.7% 
Total 963 100.0% 
 
Table 3.26: Most frequent location of fire origin for deliberately lit fires in New Zealand 
other premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.16.3 Other Premises: Object First Ignited 
 
The most commonly used items to start fires in this building category are still rubbish and 
paper however the proportion of structural timbers and wall coverings is much higher. 
This is likely to be due to an absence of other readily available materials. Books and 
upholstered material may be considered introduced fuels in some cases; however their 
use is unlikely to result in a more severe fire than an appropriately selected design fire. 
The most common items used are given as Table 3.27. Accelerants are used in 4.3% of 
deliberately lit fires and multiple fires within a single fire compartment are lit in 3.9% of 
deliberately lit fires for this property type. In 8.2% of fire incidents an appropriately 
selected design fire may be inadequate. 
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Most Common Object First Ignited Frequency % of 
Total 
Rubbish, Garbage, Waste 162 16.8% 
Unknown 93 9.7% 
Framing, Structural member, Interior walls and doors 70 7.3% 
Newspaper, Magazine, Files 63 6.5% 
Information not recorded 60 6.2% 
Rolled material, Rolled paper (not newspaper) 44 4.6% 
Paper; excluding newspaper or rolled paper 43 4.5% 
Interior wall covering 40 4.2% 
Exterior side wall covering surface, Cladding (including eaves) 39 4.0% 
Multiple items 38 3.9% 
Flammable liquid and gases (not aerosols or propellants) 33 3.4% 
Books 32 3.3% 
Upholstered Furniture e.g. Chairs, Sofas, Beds, Vehicle Seats 21 2.2% 
Other object first ignited 225 23.4% 
Total 963 100.0% 
 
Table 3.27: Items most frequently ignited in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand ‘other’ 
premises between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.16.4 Other Premises: Casualty Rate 
 
Between 1996 and 2006, there were two deliberately lit fire incidents that resulted in a 
casualty; these incidents resulted in two moderate injuries. This corresponds to 37.5% of 
the overall injury rate for this type of structure. There were no fatal fires in the ‘other’ 
premises category. The two events have different compartments of origin and were 
started in different ways preventing any meaningful conclusions from being drawn. 
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3.17 Considering Deliberately Lit Fires For Design Purposes 
 
At present, deliberately lit fires are not required to be considered in a systematic manner 
for any structure in New Zealand. An examination of the New Zealand deliberately lit 
fire statistics has highlighted several factors that need to be considered when assessing 
the risk from deliberately lit fires. Clearly this risk is not the same for all buildings so it is 
not appropriate to consider a single rule for all structures. The factors identified from the 
incident statistics are: 
 
· The probability that a given fire in the building will be deliberately lit. 
· The likelihood that a deliberately lit fire scenario will differ from an 
appropriately selected design fire. 
· The life safety benefits of considering deliberately lit fires. 
 
In addition to these factors, fire engineering literature has identified an additional two 
factors that may impact on the decision to include deliberately lit fires for specific 
projects, namely: 
 
· Property protection. 
· Cost to the end user 
 
All building categories will be assessed against the first three of these criteria. The final 
two categories are too specific to the individual building to be considered at the 
overarching level examined in this work. 
 
 
3.17.1 Probability That A Fire Is Deliberately Lit. 
 
To determine which types of structures are more prone to deliberately lit fires the total 
number of deliberately lit fires and the proportion of all fires that are deliberately lit are 
given as Table 3.28. It is readily apparent that a fire in a detention facility such as a 
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prison is more likely to be deliberately lit than any other cause. As already identified, 
fires in care facilities are dominated by fires in psychiatric institutions which, with 50.2% 
of fires in psychiatric institutions being deliberately lit, are also more likely to be 
deliberately lit than any other cause. Fires in education and crowd premises such as 
public houses are also highly likely to be deliberately lit. In both categories over 40% of 
all fires in these buildings are deliberately lit. 
 
Building Category Total Number of 
Deliberately Lit Fires 
Proportion Of All Fires 
For Building Category 
Detention Accommodation 181 67.9% 
Education 983 47.8% 
Crowd 947 42.6% 
Open Grandstands 123 32.2% 
Care Accommodation 287 16.6% 
Working 272 15.5% 
Retail 540 14.7% 
Storage/Manufacturing 723 11.0% 
Attached Dwelling 577 8.6% 
Temporary Accommodation 145 8.6% 
Detached Dwelling 3735 8.5% 
Intermittent Use 130 - 
Other - - 
 - Vacant buildings/ 
    Construction sites  435 57.6% 
 - Rest of other buildings 528 37.1% 
Overall 9606 13.3% 
 
Table 3.28: The likelihood that a fire will be deliberately lit by building category (FIRS 
Statistics) 
 
Fires in the ‘other’ building category are dominated by fires in vacant structures and 
construction sites. While fires in these buildings are also highly likely to be deliberately 
lit; the low occupancy of these structures means that they will not be considered further. 
 
The intended use of the building should always be considered here, some buildings may 
experience an increased risk of attack for political, religious or ideological reasons and 
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accurate statistics on these specific buildings may require a more detailed examination of 
the fire incident statistics. 
 
 
3.17.2 Deliberately Lit Fire Severity 
 
Fortunately, most deliberately lit fires are the result of the opportunistic ignition of items 
already present in the compartment and the fact that the fire has been ignited deliberately 
is not a significant factor in the resulting fire growth rate. In such cases, use of published 
data from organizations such as the SFPE64 and other literature65 will result in a design 
fire that adequately protects against these opportunistic fires. There is a second group of 
deliberately lit fires where the use of standard design fire curves would be considered 
inadequate.  The most commonly identified incidents involve the ignition of multiple 
fires or the use of accelerants and their frequency is summarised as Table 3.29. 
 
The ignition of fires in multiple compartments does not appear to be a common situation. 
In virtually all building categories it accounts for less than 1.8% of all deliberately lit 
fires. More likely is the ignition of a number of fires in a single compartment. While fires 
in multiple compartments have the potential to block off escape paths for building 
occupants the ignition of fires within a single compartment will impact on the time 
required for the compartment to reach flashover. This will be discussed in further detail 
in the next Chapter. The use of accelerants can either act to spread the fire to secondary 
objects, effectively acting to ignite secondary fires earlier, or they may accelerate the 
initial growth stage of the fire. The use of accelerants will be discussed in Chapters five 
and six. 
 
While the point where the frequency of accelerated/multiple fires transitions from an 
unlikely threat to a credible threat is open to debate, retail buildings, attached and 
detached dwellings experience the greatest proportion of these fires. Detention, care and 
temporary accommodation and working use structures experience the least of these 
severely challenging fires. 
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Building Category Proportion of 
Fires in 
Multiple 
Compartments 
Proportion of 
Multiple 
Fires in 
Single 
Compartment 
Proportion 
of Fires 
Where 
Accelerants 
Used 
Overall 
Proportion 
of 
Challenging 
Fires  
Detached Dwelling 3.0% 6.1% 8.6% 17.7% 
Attached Dwelling 1.2% 4.2% 8.3% 13.7% 
Retail 1.7% 3.5% 6.1% 11.3% 
Storage/Manufacturing 1.8% 3.9% 5.5% 11.2% 
Education 1.3% 3.7% 5.9% 10.9% 
Crowd 1.7% 3.7% 5.3% 10.7% 
Open Grandstands 1.6% 1.6% 7.3% 10.5% 
Working 1.5% 1.8% 4.8% 8.1% 
Temp. Accommodation 0.7% 0.7% 4.8% 6.2% 
Detention 
Accommodation 0.0% 2.2% 3.3% 5.5% 
Care Accommodation 0.3% 1.4% 1.4% 3.1% 
Intermittent Use - - -  - 
Other         
  - Vacant Buildings/ 6.0% 8.6% 2.2% 16.8% 
     Construction sites         
  - Rest of other buildings 1.3% 2.2% 5.0% 8.5% 
Overall 2.2% 4.4% 6.2% 12.8% 
 
Table 3.29: The proportion of deliberately lit fires likely to challenge existing design 
fires by building category and type of fire (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
3.17.3 Life Safety Considerations 
 
The number of people injured and killed in deliberately lit fires in New Zealand is given 
as Table 3.30. The ratio between the number of injuries and deaths is very similar to the 
UK data for deliberately lit fires in warehouses62; however the US overall data gives an 
injury to fatality ratio nearer 3:113. The overall fatality rate per fire in the US deliberately 
lit structure fires is calculated as 0.0081 for the 2003 year. This is nearly three times 
higher than the New Zealand rate and accounts for the difference in these statistics.  
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Building Category Fatalities Total Injuries 
Detached Dwelling 21 130 
Attached Dwelling 4 52 
Detention Accommodation 1 38 
Temporary Accommodation 1 13 
Retail 1 0 
Care Accommodation 0 26 
Education 0 8 
Storage/Manufacturing 0 6 
Crowd 0 5 
Open Grandstands 0 1 
Working 0 0 
Intermittent Use 0 0 
Other 0 2 
Overall 28 281 
 
Table 3.30: New Zealand deliberately lit casualty rate by building category (FIRS 
statistics). 
 
Clearly, the deliberately lit fire casualty statistics are dominated by incidents in detached 
dwellings. When looking at the fatality and casualty rates on a per fire basis, the impact 
of the number of incidents is removed. This is presented as Table 3.31. When considering 
the fatality rate in isolation, the most significant property types are attached dwellings 
and temporary accommodation closely followed by detached dwellings and detention 
accommodation. Due to the relatively small number of fires in each category, the fatality 
rate per fire for the open grandstand, temporary accommodation and intermittent use 
categories is vulnerable to distortion. A single fatality in any of these building categories 
results may result in the significance of that category being overstated. To minimise the 
impact that this can cause the fatality rate has been combined with the injury rate to 
obtain an overall casualty rate. The casualty rate per fire presented in Table 3.31 has 
assumed that all injuries are weighted the same as a fatality. When considering the risk of 
being injured in a deliberately lit fire, detention facilities dominate the injury statistics 
followed by all other forms of sleeping accommodation. 
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Building Category Fatality 
Rate/fire 
Injury 
Rate/fire 
Casualty 
Rate/fire 
Detention Accommodation 0.0055 0.2099 0.2155 
Attached Dwelling 0.0069 0.0901 0.0971 
Temporary Accommodation 0.0069 0.0897 0.0966 
Care Accommodation 0.0000 0.0906 0.0906 
Detached Dwelling 0.0056 0.0348 0.0404 
Storage/Manufacturing 0.0000 0.0083 0.0083 
Open Grandstands 0.0000 0.0081 0.0081 
Education 0.0000 0.0081 0.0081 
Crowd 0.0000 0.0053 0.0053 
Retail 0.0019 0.0000 0.0019 
Working 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Intermittent Use 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other 0.0000 0.0021 0.0021 
Overall 0.0029 0.0293 0.0322 
 
Table 3.31: Probability of fatality, injury and unweighted casualty per fire by building 
category. 
 
Due to its contentious nature, reliable estimates of how many injuries are considered 
equal to a single fatality are difficult to obtain. However some estimates of the economic 
cost of injury are available66 and this data may be used as a means of weighting the 
different levels of injury when calculating the overall burden on society on a per fire 
basis. Details of the calculation process are included as Appendix B, with the final 
estimate of the lifetime cost of an injury due to a deliberately lit fire presented as Table 
3.32. The lifetime injury costs for most of the accommodation categories are significantly 
higher than for the other categories. 
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Table 3.32: Estimated lifetime injury cost per deliberately lit fire. 
 
 
3.17.4 Property Protection 
 
The contents of structures such as museums, historical structures and art galleries have 
significance beyond their monetary value. In the case of a museum or art gallery it is the 
contents of the building that determines its value while it the case of many historical 
structures it is the significance of the building itself that derives its special significance 
for the community. 
 
The value of a structure may be determined based on cultural reasons, religious reasons, 
or it may be derived from some historical event. While not required to meet the 
requirements of the New Zealand Building Code, the protection of property may be a 
goal of the fire engineering brief. For example, in the fire engineering design of school 
buildings the Ministry of Education recommends67: 
‘The sprinkler design brief should be extended to consider providing protection under 
canopies, verandahs and accessible areas under wooden floors. Similarly allowances for 
potential multiple fire starts or the use of accelerants should be considered.’ 
Building Category Estimated Injury Cost/Fire (NZ$) 
Attached Dwelling 3386.13 
Temporary Accommodation 3202.31 
Detention Accommodation 3127.73 
Detached Dwelling 2313.32 
Retail   645.86 
Care Accommodation   162.97 
Crowd   104.41 
Education     12.64 
Storage/Manufacturing       9.93 
Open Grandstands       3.95 
Working       0.00 
Intermittent Use       0.00 
Other       9.87 
Overall 1263.69 
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The Ministry of Education recommendations serve to confirm the importance of the two 
severe fire scenarios identified from the incident statistics. 
 
 
3.17.5 Cost Considerations 
 
The final consideration for any engineering design is the cost of the project. Unless 
required by regulation, the cost of any design must be balanced against the benefits it 
offers and if the project does not offer benefits in proportion with the project cost it is 
unlikely to be accepted by the client. 
 
 
3.17.6 FIRS Analysis Results 
 
This chapter has presented an analysis of all deliberately recorded by the New Zealand 
Fire Service from 1996 through to 2006. The analysis was completed by breaking up all 
fire incidents into building categories, roughly corresponding with the purpose group 
classification used in C/AS1 and then examining each category to determine the most 
likely fire scenarios. It concluded by outlining some proposed criteria to estimate the risk 
to a building from deliberately lit fires.  
 
In many cases, designing buildings around deliberately lit fires is not warranted. No 
building category was identified by all criteria considered, however detention 
accommodation, attached dwellings and detached dwellings were identified through 
multiple criteria, and therefore including provision for deliberately lit fires in the design 
brief for these buildings should certainly be considered. For the other building categories, 
the decision to include or exclude deliberately lit fires as a potential design scenario 
requires further examination of the individual building. 
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3.18 Issues With Using Fire Incident Statistics 
 
While a useful source of data, there are a number of issues that need to be considered 
when using fire incident statistics to gauge the rate of deliberately lit fires in a particular 
type of structure. 
 
· Unreported fires: The majority of fires are not reported to authorities and 
therefore do not appear in the fire statistics. While no reliable method exists to 
quantify the number of fires that are not reported to the Fire Service, their effect 
on the casualty statistics is likely to be small. The justification for this is that a fire 
that results in a fatality or injury requiring hospitalisation is likely to be a non-
trivial fire and therefore help is more likely to be sought from the Fire Service. 
 
· Missing Data: For a number of reasons there are a significant number of 
incidents where some of the data is either not recorded or recorded as ‘unknown’. 
The method of dealing with this for this study has been to acknowledge this but 
not include the incidents further. For the known entries, this effectively results in 
the data giving a lower boundary of the true situation. 
 
· Coding Inconsistencies: Despite the best intentions of database authors, there are 
inconsistencies in the coding of fires. For example, in the case of a fire in a bulk 
petrol storage tank, the storage tank could be coded as either the location of origin 
or object first ignited. Another example of this is the coding of a fire in a flat. If a 
group of adults are in a flatting situation in a freestanding house then this could be 
legitimately coded as either a ‘flat’ or a ‘house’.  
 
· Coding Priorities: Fire databases have a priority in recording data. From 
discussions with the Fire Service the FIRS database records any fire that involves 
a structure as a structure fire, even if the fire started in vegetation and spread to 
the structure. This is consistent with the US NFIRS database, where any fire 
under or touching a structure that involves the structure is considered a structure 
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fire68. This means that for structures where fires are permitted outside for the 
purpose of rubbish disposal, the incidence of deliberately lit fires may be slightly 
over-represented and the incidence of rubbish or garden waste may also be over-
represented as an object first ignited. As a source of error, this is unlikely to be a 
significant cause of error for structures other than detached accommodation. 
 
· Resources allocated to fire investigation: The amount of resources devoted to 
investigating fires can have a significant effect on the statistics. If insufficient 
resources are allocated to the detection of deliberately lit fires then the probability 
that an incident is coded as either accidental or unknown cause increases. This 
will result in the erroneous conclusion that deliberately lit fires are less of a 
problem than the true situation. 
 
· Identification of Accelerants: Many synthetic materials share the same 
petroleum based origin as accelerants and these may also result in false positive 
readings. The positive detection of accelerants in a post fire investigation may 
also be countered by the legitimate presence of solvents and fuels. Small 
quantities of fuels and industrial solvents such as mineral turpentine are present in 
many houses and after a fire; their presence can lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that accelerants have been used. Conversely, in industrial or working structures, 
where solvents are used frequently the presence of an accelerant may be logically 
explained away, leading a false negative result. In all of these cases the correct 
conclusions are dependent on the skill and experience of the fire investigator. 
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4.0 Multiple Fires 
 
The ignition of multiple fires represents fire scenarios where there is a potential for loss 
of life and the current design philosophy may prove to be inadequate. Two individual 
scenarios have been identified from the FIRS analysis: 
 
· The ignition of fires in multiple compartments. 
· The ignition of multiple fires in a single compartment. 
 
The combined incidence of these two scenarios represents 5.4% of deliberately lit fires. 
While during the study period there were few casualties attributed to either scenario the 
risks posed by these fire scenarios cannot be discounted.  
 
Each of these scenarios raises different issues for the fire engineer so they will be 
discussed separately. As the most appropriate solution to each of the issues raised in this 
chapter will depend on the individual structure, no attempt has been made to provide ‘the 
solution’, rather the purpose of this chapter is to highlight the key issues that need to be 
considered by the designer in the event multiple fires is used as a design scenario. 
 
 
4.1 Ignition of Fires in Multiple Compartments 
 
The ignition of fires in multiple compartments is not a common scenario accounting for 
2.2% of all deliberately lit fires. From a practical perspective it poses a low risk to life 
safety as the time taken to light a number of fires in separate locations increases the risk 
of discovery, making this an unlikely event in an occupied building. From a life safety 
perspective however, the ignition of multiple fires can close off escape paths, raising the 
risk to those building occupants that are present. 
 
The building groups that are at most risk from the ignition of fires in multiple 
compartments are detached accommodation buildings such as houses or farms and soft 
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targets such as vacant buildings or buildings under construction none of which are 
heavily occupied. 
 
An examination of the FIRS data reveals that in the 213 recorded incidents where fires 
have been lit in multiple compartments there have only been three casualties; all in 
detached dwellings.  One fire resulted in a fatality as well as a moderate injury while the 
second casualty incident resulted in second moderate injury. The low casualty rate from 
these fires is likely to be partially due to the rarity of these events and the relatively small 
number of fires in New Zealand so firm conclusions as to the actual life safety risk of 
these fires cannot be drawn. 
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Figure 4.1: New Zealand deliberate ignition of fires in multiple compartments rate by 
day between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
The ignition of fires in multiple compartments is strongly biased towards those times 
where the risk of discovery is low. The distribution between the days of the week is 
 121 
presented as Figure 4.1 and it shows a bias towards weekend activity, with 35.7% of all 
incidents occurring on either a Saturday or Sunday. The number of incidents that 
occurred on a Thursday is also higher than the balance of the working week with no clear 
cause. 
 
The distribution of such fires over the course of the day also shows a strong bias towards 
night activity with 52.6% of incidents occurring between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. This is 
presented as Figure 4.2. This strong bias towards night time activity indicates that there is 
little life safety benefit to considering the ignition of fires in multiple compartments in 
buildings that are occupied only during the day. Because of this, when talking about life 
safety, the discussion will focus on accommodation and crowd activity structures. 
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Figure 4.2: New Zealand deliberate ignition of fires in multiple compartments rate by 
hour between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
 
 122 
The most commonly ignited items in cases where fires are lit in multiple compartments 
are summarised in Table 4.1. At first glance it appears that the ignition of fires in multiple 
compartments differs from ‘normal’ deliberately lit fires in that accelerants and the 
ignition of multiple items within individual compartments are more common, however 
this is misleading. 
 
Most Common Items First Ignited Frequency % Of 
Total 
Multiple materials first ignited 56 26.3% 
Unknown 39 18.3% 
Rubbish (material having no value in the same container or 
pile) 20 9.4% 
Wood: sawn, finished timber 18 8.5% 
Petrol 15 7.0% 
Flammable Liquid e.g. Kerosene, Methylated spirit, Ethanol, 
Turpentine 14 6.6% 
Treated paper e.g. building paper, wax or tar paper, wallpaper 13 6.1% 
Fabric, Fibre (finished) 6 2.8% 
Paper e.g. Uncoated, untreated, ground up & recycled, used as 
insulation 3 1.4% 
PVC e.g. Floor Tiles, Guttering/Pipes, Plastic Bags, Elec. 
Insulation 3 1.4% 
Wood pulp 3 1.4% 
Cardboard 2 0.9% 
Hay, Straw, Chaff 2 0.9% 
Plastics - not classified above 2 0.9% 
Processed wood, Paper - not classified above 2 0.9% 
Vinyl e.g. Floor coverings, Wallpaper (but NOT vinyl-coated) 2 0.9% 
Wool, Wool mixtures (finished goods) 2 0.9% 
Other 23 10.8% 
Total 213 100.0% 
 
Table 4.1: Most common objects first ignited in incidents where fires are lit in multiple 
compartments (FIRS statistics). 
 
The most commonly ignited item recorded appears to be the use of multiple materials; 
however this is likely to be due to the structure of the FIRS database and the reporting 
officers’ intention to populate the field in an appropriate manner. The FIRS database does 
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not give the option to provide ignition information on the individual seats of fire in such 
cases. 
 
Accelerants also appear to be used more frequently in this sort of incident, comprising 
14.6% of cases where fires are lit in multiple compartments compared with 6.2% of cases 
for all deliberately lit fires. However, of the 31 cases where accelerants were used, 25 of 
them occurred in detached dwellings. If this building category is excluded then the 
proportion of fires where accelerants are used drops to 6.1%, virtually identical to the rate 
of accelerant use for all deliberately lit fires. 
 
Other than these two points the items most frequently used to start fires in multiple 
compartments are similar to a typical deliberately lit fire with rubbish, paper and wooden 
products being used most frequently. The high frequency of the item first ignited being 
recorded as ‘unknown’ results from a lower level of investigation into fires in detached 
dwellings combined with an increased likelihood that the structure experiences 
significant damage making conclusive identification of the seat of fire difficult. 
 
 
4.1.1 Early Fire Behaviour 
 
As the fires are located in separate compartments, energy transfer from one fuel package 
to another will be limited or nonexistent. The initial growth stage for each individual fire 
will be identical to what it would be if the fire had been ignited in isolation. Once the 
fires reach a certain size, there exists the possibility that energy transfer from the hot fire 
gases to the fuel package of another fire may become significant but this will depend on 
the configuration of the structure and actual locations of the fires.  
 
There is also the possibility that one fire may retard the growth of another due to 
ventilation limitations imposed by the structure. Further work is required to quantify what 
will happen in a given situation. 
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4.1.2 Detection 
 
A key parameter that influences the response time of a detection system is the distance 
from the detector to the fire69. Other important parameters are the type of detector used, 
the presence of obstructions between the fire and detector and the growth rate of the fire. 
In New Zealand, the type of detector and detector spacing are governed by NZS 
4512:200370. Because of this, the response time of a given detector will be dependent 
only on the distance to the closest fire and the fire growth rate. A secondary fire, located 
further from the detector is unlikely to significantly alter the detector activation time so 
the response time for the overall system will be determined by the individual detector 
with the most favorable detection conditions.  
 
The detection time for the system as a whole is determined by the first detector to 
activate.  Less favorable detector/fire combinations will not improve the response of the 
overall system. So for design purposes, the activation time of the detector in the most 
favorable location should be used when calculating the required safe egress time. 
 
 
4.1.3 Escape Provisions 
 
One issue that needs to be addressed when looking at the ignition of fires in multiple 
compartments is the possibility that both primary and secondary escape routes can be 
blocked off. If this were to be included, then the life safety objectives of the Building Act 
are likely to only be achievable by providing places of refuge for building occupants or 
excessive levels of security.  
 
Consistent with the boundaries outlined in Chapter one, such actions will not be 
considered as a design fire scenario. Many crowd activity buildings have a relatively 
large number of exits and accommodation buildings are likely have some level of 
security, so the targeting of escape paths is considered to be an unlikely event. If fires in 
multiple compartments is required to be considered for other structures a scenario where 
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one escape route is blocked and a secondary fire directly threatens building occupants 
should be considered. Currently when designing an unsprinklered building to C/AS1, one 
exit from a compartment is considered unavailable so this approach may be considered to 
be an extension of this philosophy. Safe egress from a building with two exits would be 
difficult to achieve under this constraint. Further examination of individual incidents is 
required to determine the actual risk from this fire scenario. 
 
The most common method used to determine escape times is by calculating the Available 
Safe Egress Time (ASET) and comparing this to the Required Safe Egress Time. The 
RSET in minutes is given by equation 4.171. 
 
movpre tttRSET ++= det        4.1 
 
Where: tdet = Detection time (min). 
 tpre = Pre-movement time (min). 
 tmov = Movement time (min). 
 
The ASET is normally taken as the time taken for the first tenability criteria to be 
exceeded. If RSET is less than ASET then the design is considered safe. When 
considering escape from an incident where fires have been lit in multiple compartments 
the detection time is unlikely to be significantly reduced as described above. The pre-
movement time will be unchanged but the actual movement time is likely to be increased 
due to the longer travel time required to use a secondary exit. 
 
 
4.1.4 Smoke Control 
 
The smoke control system of a building is typically designed based on a single fire. In the 
event of fires in multiple compartments any surplus in the design is likely to be quickly 
taken up from the additional fires. To design a smoke control system to have the capacity 
to deal with multiple fires will be significantly more expensive. 
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The mass flow rate of the smoke plume is proportional to the heat release rate in 
kilowatts raised to the one third power72, assuming the same convective heat release rate 
and height to the base of the smoke layer for each fire, in the cases of n fires the total 
mass flow rate is given by equation 4.2, adapted from Klote & Milke. 
 
 ccntot QnZQnkm ..0018.0...071.0
35313132
, += &&     4.2 
 
Where: ntotm ,& = Total smoke mass flow rate of n fires (kg/s). 
 k      = Wall factor. 
 n      = Number of individual fires. 
 cQ&    = Convective heat release rate of one fire (kW) 
 Z      = Height above the top of fuel (m) 
 
Assuming that each fire has the same convective heat release rate and height of rise this 
may be simplified through the use of a multiple fire factor, an as given in equation 4.3. 
 
 snntot mam && ., =         4.3 
 
Where: ntotm ,& = Total smoke mass flow rate of n fires. 
 na    = Multiple fire factor (taken from Table 4.2). 
 sm&    = Smoke mass flow rate of a single fire (kg/s). 
 
From discussions with the Fire Service and Police it would be considered rare for fires to 
be lit in more than five compartments. Because of this Table 4.2 has not been extended 
beyond five fires. If the smoke control system is not improved to meet this greater smoke 
volume then the available time for egress will be reduced due to this greater smoke 
volume. 
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Number of Fires HRR of single 
fire (kW) 2 3 4 5 
100 1.37 1.67 1.94 2.19 
200 1.42 1.78 2.10 2.42 
500 1.51 1.96 2.39 2.81 
1000 1.59 2.13 2.66 3.17 
2000 1.67 2.31 2.94 3.55 
5000 1.78 2.53 3.28 4.01 
 
Table 4.2: Additional Fire Factor an for use in equation 4.3. 
 
 
4.1.5 Sprinkler Design 
 
Unless rendered inoperable by the arsonist, sprinklers have proven effective at controlling 
fires that are deliberately lit with over 68% of fires extinguished by the activation of a 
single sprinkler head and over 90% extinguished by four or fewer heads73. Fires lit in a 
large number of compartments do have the possibility of overwhelming the sprinkler 
system by activating an extremely large number of heads however this is considered 
unlikely. Marryatt’s data on the number of sprinklers that activate in deliberately lit fires 
gives a mean of 1.9 sprinklers operating on a given fire. Physically partial activation of a 
sprinkler makes little sense, however it can be interpreted as one sprinkler does activate 
and a second sprinkler has a high probability of activation.  
 
Based on a practical upper limit of five fires and the mean number of sprinklers 
activating, it is expected that nine or ten sprinklers will activate in a typical multiple 
incident with ignition in multiple compartments. This is broadly consistent with the 
incidents given in Marryatt’s and other researchers74 work. 
 
In New Zealand sprinkler installation is governed by NZS 4541: 200375 which the hazard 
determines both the number of sprinklers and floor area that the designer must work to. 
This ensures that the minimum water coverage based on the hazard class of the 
compartment is not exceeded at any point in the compartment. The difference between 
extinguishment, containment and a runaway fire for a given hazard class depends on the 
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water coverage rate75 which is dependent on the available water pressure at the sprinkler 
head. The likelihood that fires in multiple compartments will overwhelm the sprinkler 
system is therefore dependent on the pressure drop along the supply lines and on the 
location of the fires. With larger diameter pipes having smaller pressure drops per unit 
length76, there is some advantage in system effectiveness against multiple fires to be 
gained by the use of larger diameter pipes however this will impact on the sprinkler 
system cost. 
 
 
4.1.6 Computer Modeling 
 
Zone models such as BRANZFire77 are designed to predict the smoke behaviour of a 
single fire. There is typically no provision to include a second fire in a simulation. This 
raises serious questions as to the ability of such models to predict conditions in cases 
where multiple fires have been lit. Running the simulation with a single fire in each 
location cannot give correct answers once the ceiling jets start to mix. Alternatively 
running the simulation with a single large fire is likely to over predict hazards in the 
compartment selected as the origin. When attempting to simulate fires in multiple 
compartments in this way, the onset of flashover is also likely to be incorrect. 
 
A Computation Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model such as the Fire Dynamics Simulator 
(FDS)78 is likely to be more accurate when predicting the complex interactions between 
the ceiling jets of multiple fires. It has the advantage that the growth rates of each fire do 
not have to be the same, enabling a high level of flexibility when modeling such events. 
However the single reaction chemistry used to predict yields of smoke products is likely 
to be the main cause of problems. This simplification is adequate in many cases with a 
single fire however; its reliability becomes suspect when considering multiple fires with 
markedly different fuel packages. The yields of toxic species from one fire may be 
considerably different to what is generated from the other fires and this currently cannot 
be modeled in programs such as FDS. 
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4.2 Ignition of Multiple Fires Within A Compartment 
 
The other scenario that has been considered is the ignition of a number of fires within a 
single compartment. This is a more common fire scenario, accounting for 4.4% of all 
deliberately lit fires or an average of 39 incidents per year. Like the ignition of fires in 
multiple compartments the time taken to light a number of fires increases the risk of 
discovery, making it far more likely that this will be done in a building that is not highly 
occupied. As indicated in Table 3.29, the ignition of multiple fires is primarily an 
accommodation issue; over half of all such fires are lit in detached dwellings. Education, 
vacant buildings and buildings under construction are also significant targets for this sort 
of attack. 
 
An examination of the FIRS data reveals that in the 424 incidents there have only been 
nine incidents which have resulted in one or more casualties. One of these incidents 
resulted in a single fatality, one resulted in two moderate injuries, one incident resulted in 
a single slight injury and the remaining six incidents resulted in a single moderate injury 
each. Two of the nine incidents occurred in an attached accommodation structure and the 
remaining seven occurred in detached houses. These incidents account for 3.6% of the 
fatalities and 3.2% of the injuries suggesting that multiple fires are under-represented in 
the casualty statistics. This is likely to be due to a low occupancy of the building at the 
time of the attack due to a desire to avoid detection by the perpetrator, so firm 
conclusions about the life safety hazards of the ignition of multiple fires within a 
compartment cannot be drawn. 
 
Deliberately lit fires where multiple items are ignited within a single compartment are 
more likely to occur during the weekend; 38.2% of incidents occur on either a Saturday 
or Sunday. Activity during the week is fairly constant. The distribution of incident during 
the week is presented as Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3: New Zealand deliberate ignition of multiple fires in a single compartment 
rate by day between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
The distribution of incidents during the day is illustrated as Figure 4.4. It shows a 
significant increase in the number of incidents that occur between the hours of 9 p.m. and 
4 a.m. For most the day the rate is fairly evenly distributed, however there is a small 
increase during the afternoon and early evening. The overall distribution is flatter than for 
fires in multiple compartments with 46.0% of incidents occurring between the hours of 9 
p.m. and 3 a.m. While biased towards evening, a quarter of such fires do occur between 
the hours of 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. so a scenario in a working environment cannot be 
completely discounted. 
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Figure 4.4: New Zealand deliberate ignition of multiple fires in a single compartment 
rate by hour between 1996 and 2006 (FIRS statistics). 
 
The compartment most likely to be targeted for the ignition of multiple fires is included 
as Table 4.3. As expected with a dataset dominated by detached dwellings, the 
compartments most likely to be subjected to an attack of this sort are garages, lounges 
and bedrooms. If detached dwellings are excluded from the list then there is only a slight 
change in the results. The top two items are unchanged, bathrooms, supply rooms, 
kitchens and the lobby become more common as initial fire compartments and lounges 
and kitchens are less common as initial fire compartments. From this, it is clear that the 
fire compartment is not particularly sensitive to the inclusion of detached dwellings. 
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Compartment of Origin Frequency % of 
Total 
Garage, Carport, Vehicle storage, Storage Shed 78 18.4% 
Multiple areas of origin 59 13.9% 
Lounge, Common room, TV room, Sitting room, Music room 39 9.2% 
Bedroom, Sleeping area, Cell: under 5 persons 36 8.5% 
Kitchen, Cooking area 19 4.5% 
Supply room/area, Tool room, Maintenance supply room 18 4.2% 
Toilet, Locker room, Washroom, Rest room, Bathroom, Sauna, 
Out house, Portable toilet 17 4.0% 
Wall surface (exterior) 13 3.1% 
Not Recorded 12 2.8% 
Unable to classify 9 2.1% 
Other locations of origin 124 29.2% 
Total 424 100.0% 
 
Table 4.3: Most common compartment of origin for multiple fires within a single 
compartment. 
 
 
4.2.1 Early Fire Behaviour 
 
The ignition of multiple fires within a single compartment may impact on many of the 
assumptions made in fire engineering calculations.  In the initial stages of each fires 
growth, the upper layer will still be relatively cool and the early behaviour of each fire is 
unlikely to be significantly affected by the presence of additional fires within the 
compartment. Once radiation becomes more significant as a heat transfer medium each 
fire is able to radiate energy directly to the other fuel packages and the interactions 
between the fires become more significant. From this point in time the fires begin to 
deviate from their isolated behaviour due to energy transfer between the fuel packages. It 
is expected that the growth of each individual fire will be accelerated compared to that 
fire burning in isolation. 
 
There is also the impact of the heat released by the secondary fires themselves. The onset 
of flashover is determined by the total energy released within the compartment. A 
number of smaller fires may initiate flashover significantly faster than a single large fire. 
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Once flashover has occurred, all objects within the compartment will be burning and the 
resulting post flashover fire will be the same as in the case of a single fire being ignited. 
That is, post flashover behaviour will not be impacted by the presence of the additional 
fires. These two issues are illustrated qualitatively in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Generalised fire growth showing the impact of a second fire on the heat 
release rate of the individual fires and the total compartment heat release rate 
 
 
4.2.2 Detection 
 
With the additional energy and smoke released into the upper layer by the additional fires 
in the compartment the detection time may be less than that of a single fire. The 
magnitude of any reduction will be determined the combined fire heat release rate and the 
distribution of fires within the compartment. The actual detection time for such a scenario 
would best be obtained by modeling. 
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4.2.3 Escape Provisions 
 
The ignition of multiple fires within a single compartment is unlikely to significantly 
affect escape times. Both pre-movement and travel times will be the same as in the case 
where only a single fire has been lit, and the location of the individual relative to the fire 
and their exit will determine travel times. The earlier detection time discussed above will 
result in a reduced RSET compared to a single fire; however the faster fire growth will 
also result in a reduced ASET. The impact on building occupants must be determined on 
a case by case basis. 
 
 
4.2.4 Smoke Control 
 
The fundamental smoke control issues will be similar to those indicated with fires in 
multiple compartments, however there is an additional constraint imposed in that the 
maximum combined heat release rate within the compartment will also be limited by the 
compartment ventilation. While the capacity of the smoke control system, and therefore 
its cost, are likely to be larger than what would be obtained under the current design 
philosophy, the ventilation limit is likely to limit the magnitude of these increases. 
 
 
4.2.5 Sprinkler Design 
 
In small compartments (smaller area than the design area for the sprinkler system) the 
ignition of multiple fires is unlikely to impact on sprinkler performance. A sprinkler 
system designed to NZS 4541:2003, will be able to handle the operation of all sprinklers 
in the design area so, if the sprinkler has been designed according to the hazard present, a 
compliant system should cope with the presence of the additional fires. 
 
In the case of large fire compartments, defined as those larger than the design area, the 
presence of additional fires may cause problems due to insufficient water pressure. It is 
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expected that as the compartment size (and the number of sprinkler heads) increases, the 
risk of overwhelming the sprinkler system will increase. Based on the three to five fires 
typically experienced in these cases, if the sprinkler system is able to cope with the 
simultaneous delivery from ten sprinkler heads then it is likely to cope with the majority 
of such fires.  
 
 
4.2.6 Computer Modeling 
 
Modeling multiple fires within a single compartment is easier in a zone model than 
modeling fires in multiple compartments. While the model cannot have more than a 
single fire, the ‘black box’ approach to the fire compartment means that there is little 
difference between two fires contributing to the smoke layer or one, larger fire. 
 
Obtaining parameters such as layer height in a zone model for multiple fires is difficult at 
best. Reverse engineering a single heat release rate to get one parameter correct is likely 
to result in errors for other parameters. For example if a number of small fires is modeled 
as a single large fire the calculated smoke layer is likely to be smaller but hotter 
compared to the true situation. Results from such simulations should be treated with 
caution. This approach also ignores the effect of radiation between fuel packages so is 
likely to under predict the overall energy release rate. 
 
Modeling multiple fires in a single compartment using FDS is likely to give reasonable 
results for occupants located outside the fire compartment. FDS does include radiation 
transfer from the fire to its surroundings and except in cases where the production of soot 
is low79, the program is able to give reasonable predictions of the radiation transfer. The 
limitations of the single reaction chemistry is also likely to be reduced as, outside the fire 
compartment the smoke is likely to be well mixed so an appropriately selected yield is 
likely to give an adequate prediction as to the concentration of airborne contaminants. 
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5.0 Accelerated Fires 
 
The second severe fire scenario identified in the New Zealand FIRS database analysis 
was the use of accelerants. Any introduced fuel package that makes a fire burn more 
rapidly or spread faster than normal may be considered an accelerant, however due to the 
increased quantity of plastic materials present in a typical compartment, fires in modern 
buildings have faster growth rates than fires in similar structures in the 1960’s80, so the 
definition of an accelerant is now typically applied to the use of flammable liquids or 
solid chemical compounds such as those found in pyrotechnics. 
 
Holborn et al. has obtained estimates of the growth rates of accelerated fires based on an 
analysis of fires in London. Based on a αt2 fire growth, they obtained a value 0.085 kW/s2 
for α when the fire was lit using flammable liquids or gases81. This puts the use of 
accelerants into the boundary of an ultra fast fire which is likely to be faster than what is 
typically assumed during the design process. From an investigative perspective the use of 
an ultra fast fire may be adequate however, for design purposes this is may be insufficient 
to adequately characterize the risk to building occupants.  
 
 
5.1 Contribution to Casualty Statistics 
 
Accelerants are used in 6.2% of deliberately lit fires in New Zealand yet they account for 
52% of all fatalities from deliberately lit fires. For injury statistics they are similarly over-
represented, accounting for 28% of life threatening injuries, 29% of moderate injuries and 
11% of slight injuries. Clearly, the use of accelerants results in a fire that is more 
hazardous to individuals within the structure. As the severity of the injury increases, the 
probability that an accelerant has been used also increases. If deliberately lit fires are to 
be considered as a potential design scenario, then the maximum life safety benefits will 
be achieved if accelerants are considered as part of the design brief. 
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5.2 Types of Accelerant Used 
 
While fires may be accelerated by a large number of fuels, petrol is by far the most 
common accelerant encountered in forensic casework, both here in New Zealand82 and in 
the United States21. The United States data, taken from the Ohio Arson Crime 
Laboratory, indicates that petrol is positively identified almost five times more frequently 
than any other accelerant, accounting for just over half of the positive accelerant tests. 
The other accelerants frequently detected in accelerated fires in the United States are 
summarised as Figure 5.1. The high incidence of using petrol as the accelerant may be 
due to its ready availability, low cost, lack of traceability and its high flammability. 
 
Kerosene
11%
Petrol
54%
Paint Thinner
5%
Turpentine
5%
Mixtures
7%
Diesel Fuel
8%
Other
10%
 
 
Figure 5.1: Breakdown of the accelerants used in US deliberately lit fires as identified by 
the Ohio Arson Crime Laboratory. 
 
Because of its frequent use in fire incidents, petrol has been selected as the accelerant to 
be used in the experimental program. Petrol is the most volatile of the common liquid 
hydrocarbon fuels; it is a complex mixture of over two hundred different compounds and 
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is readily ignitable with a flash point of approximately -40°C. In New Zealand, its 
physical properties are controlled by schedules one and two of the Petroleum Products 
Specification Regulations, 200283. Due to its complex composition, petrol does not have 
a set composition however New Zealand regular grade fuel has the following 
compositional limits: 
 
· Total aromatic content 42% maximum. The most common molecules present are 
toluene and xylene but it also may include a benzene content of up to 1%. 
· Olefin content 18% maximum. These compounds are unsaturated molecules 
consisting of alkenes and cycloalkenes. 
· Oxygenates are not permitted to be added to New Zealand fuels so the oxygen 
content of New Zealand petrol may be assumed to be zero. 
 
The balance of the fuel is made up of saturated alkanes, with molecule sizes ranging from 
four carbon atoms through to nine carbon atoms. Both straight and branched carbon chain 
molecules will be present in a typical sample of fuel. The relevant properties from a fire 
engineering perspective are: 
 
· Density: A typical density of regular grade fuel is 0.73 kg/m3. 
· Calorific Value: This is not a specification item but the gross calorific value of 
petrol is 47.8 MJ/kg84. 
· Flammable range: This is not a specification item but it ranges from 0.6% to 
8.0%85. 
· Reid Vapour Pressure: This is a measure of the volatility of the fuel and is 
seasonally adjusted to enable easy starting of vehicles. The vapour pressure of 
New Zealand fuels ranges between 60 and 90 kPa. Because of this high vapour 
pressure, the concentration of gaseous petrol in a confined container is usually 
above the upper flammable limit and ignition or an explosion is not possible.  A 
small volume of petrol in a relatively large space may result in vapour 
concentrations within the flammable range. 
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· Autoignition Temperature: This is not a specification item and strongly depends 
on the octane number of the fuel. Results ranging from 248°C for 65 Octane fuel 
to 412°C for 87 Octane fuel have been reported21. In New Zealand the octane 
number of petrol is obtained using the Research Octane (RON) test method while 
the octane number of US fuels is typically based on the calculated Anti-Knock 
Index (AKI). The New Zealand regular grade (91 RON) fuel has an AKI of 86.5, 
giving an autoignition temperature of approximately 410°C. 
 
The certificates of quality for the fuel used during the experimental program have been 
included as Appendix C.  
 
Even if only a single flammable liquid is considered there are still a number of ways that 
it may be utilised as an accelerant. These include: 
 
· Pouring a quantity of fuel on a surface and lighting it to get the target object 
burning such as occurred in the Happyland Social Club fire86. 
· Using a trail of fuel to spread a fire quickly from one target object to another. 
· Throwing a fragile container of fuel with a lit wick at a hard object to get the 
target ignited. This is known as a Molotov cocktail. 
 
Pouring a quantity of flammable liquid on the floor or an object is one of the most 
common forms of accelerated fire; however this is difficult to recreate in a laboratory 
environment. The airflow required to measure oxygen depletion is much greater than 
what would be encountered in a typical compartment. This airflow removes a portion of 
the vapour that builds up prior to ignition, rendering any resulting fire curves 
unrepresentative of a real fire. There are also a number of safety issues with the ignition 
of the fuel vapour. Because of this safety concern, pours of flammable liquids have not 
been investigated as part of this research. 
 
Many offenders take steps to avoid being observed when they commit crimes. In the case 
of deliberately lit fires, minimising the time that the offender is at the seat of the fire 
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reduces the risk that they are observed. The fastest method of utilising an accelerant is 
through the use of a Molotov cocktail where the offender is able to stand back and throw 
the lit fuel package. The applicability of this fire scenario was demonstrated by a number 
of incidents that occurred in New Zealand during the study period where Molotov 
cocktails were deployed. These incidents contributed to the casualty statistics including at 
least one fatality. The deployment of a Molotov cocktail has also been identified as a gap 
in the fire engineering literature; in recent determinations this fire scenario has been 
identified as a potential fire scenario where there is currently no established heat release 
rate data available88.  
 
 
5.3 The Furniture Calorimeter 
 
The University of Canterbury furniture calorimeter is based on Thornton’s rule, which 
states that for a large number of organic liquids and gases, a more or less constant amount 
of heat is released per unit mass of oxygen consumed. Huggett found this to be true for 
organic solids as well as obtaining an average value for this constant of 13.1MJ/kg of 
oxygen89. The University of Canterbury calorimeter measures oxygen, carbon dioxide 
and carbon monoxide using a Seimans Ultramat/Oxymat 6 analyzer sampling from the 
exhaust duct. The extraction hood is located 3.0 meters above the floor of the fire 
laboratory however a temporary floor was installed to prevent damage to the laboratory 
floor, reducing the distance to the base of the extraction hood to approximately 2.8 
meters. The extraction system removes air at the rate of approximately 4m3/s from the 
laboratory with make up air being supplied through vents and the laboratory door. The 
raw data is recorded at one second intervals and then exported into an Excel spreadsheet 
to calculate the gas concentrations and heat release rate.  
 
When the fuel is able to be accurately characterised, values of the heat released per unit 
mass of oxygen consumed and the heat released per unit mass of oxygen for the 
combustion of CO to CO2 may be adjusted to improve the accuracy of the measurement. 
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As the chemical properties of petrol are not well defined, the default values of 13.1MJ/kg 
and 17.6MJ/kg have been used for these two parameters. 
 
 
5.3.1 Experimental Setup 
 
Calorimeter test standards usually require an unrestricted airflow around all four sides of 
the exhaust duct with at least two meters between the edge of the exhaust hood and a 
wall. The University of Canterbury calorimeter has two walls within two meters of the 
exhaust hood but this is not considered to be an issue for this work. To be effective, 
Molotov cocktails are required to be broken against a hard surface so the resulting fire 
will usually have airflow restricted on one or more sides. As part of the later experimental 
setup and to contain the resulting fire, a concrete block wall was built on two sides of the 
extraction hood so the fire had an unrestricted supply of oxygen on only two sides. This 
concrete block wall is shown in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The overall experimental configuration showing the concrete block wall on 
two sides of the extraction hood. 
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To maximise the probability that the bottle broke in a repeatable manner the bottle was 
suspended from a chain attached to the center of the extraction hood. The bottle was then 
drawn back and suspended at a height of approximately two and a half meters above the 
temporary floor as illustrated in Figure 5.3. The release mechanism consisted of a pin, 
connected to a length of wire that could be pulled from within the control room to release 
the bottle. The bottle would swing down and break against a steel bar with a beveled 
knife edge. The fuel was ignited by an electrical spark from two electrodes located one 
either side of the steel knife edge. With the bottle breaking between the two electrodes 
there was a spark on either side of the fuel package and ignition was effectively 
instantaneous. The knife edge and the two electrodes used to ignite the breaking fuel are 
illustrated as Figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: One liter bottle of petrol suspended prior to run. 
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Figure 5.4: Steel knife edge and electrodes used to ignite the petrol. 
 
To minimise the quantity of smoke that escaped collection via the extraction hood fire 
blankets were suspended around the perimeter of the hood. For the initial trial runs three 
blankets were used with the unenclosed side facing the point of release; however it was 
observed that with the larger fuel volumes a significant quantity of smoke escaped the 
extraction hood. In an attempt to quantify these losses, a number of trials were completed 
with a fourth fire blanket positioned along the front edge of the extraction hood to 
prevent smoke escaping out the front of the extraction hood. A photograph showing fire 
blankets suspended from two sides of the extraction hood is shown as Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.5: Fire blankets suspended from extraction hood perimeter (two sides only). 
 
In addition to the gas analysis, two video cameras were used to film each experimental 
run. One of these cameras was located in line with the drop chain and the other was 
located at an angle of approximately 60° to the drop chain. The approximate location and 
viewing angle of each of these cameras is shown in Figure 5.6. Additional compartment 
temperature measurements were not taken during any of the experimental runs as the 
compartment temperatures in real fire situations are a function of the compartment size 
and ventilation.  This diagram also shows the location of the steel target in the center of 
the fume hood and the line of approach for the Molotov cocktails. 
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Figure 5.6: Schematic of the initial experimental arrangement. 
 
 
5.4 Experimental Issues 
 
A Molotov cocktail reaches its peak heat release rate within only a few seconds of 
ignition. Due to this rapid growth in the heat release rate the curves are sensitive a 
number of issues normally neglected when dealing with fire curves. The major sources of 
error that were considered as part of this research were: 
 
· The methodology used to smooth the data. 
· The response of the sensors.  
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To account for these two issues a detailed examination of how the data was collected and 
manipulated was required. The methods used to deal with these two issues are discussed 
below. 
 
 
5.4.1 Experimental Noise 
 
To reduce the amount of noise in the data five point averaging has been applied to the 
raw data to produce the heat release rate curve obtained. A five point averaging method 
was selected to be used for the noise reduction as it provided a reasonable smoothing 
function yet still maintains the general shape of the raw data. Due to the rapid growth and 
short duration of these fires, averaging over a longer interval of time had a significant 
impact on the shape of the heat release rate curve obtained, particularly around the peak 
heat release rate. As the averaging interval increases, there is a significant decrease in the 
peak heat release rate obtained along with an increase in the time taken to reach the peak.  
An experimentally obtained heat release rate history with and without the averaging is 
given as Figure 5.7. It shows the minimal impact of the five point smoothing on the shape 
of the heat release rate curve while eliminating the majority of the noise from the raw 
data. 
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Figure 5.7: The impact of five-point averaging on experimental results from the furniture 
calorimeter. 
 
 
5.4.2 Time Delays and Instrument Response 
 
All physical measurements suffer from measurement errors. When measuring a 
parameter that changes with time, the ability of the sensor to follow these changes is one 
potential source of error as the measured result will follow behind the true value of the 
parameter measured. For parameters that do not change rapidly with time these delays do 
not significantly impact of the accuracy of the measurement however for variables that 
change significantly over a short time interval these delays may introduce significant 
errors. 
 
The furniture calorimeter is subject to two major delays in measurement. There is the 
time it takes for the fire gases to physically move from the fire through to the detectors, 
this is known as the transport lag. There is also the time that the instruments take to 
measure a property, process the result and send it to the data logging software. This lag is 
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known as the sensor lag. As the sensors are located in at different points in the exhaust 
system and process inputs at different rates these lags are different for each parameter 
recorded. The effect of these delays on a unit step change in an input variable is 
illustrated in Figure 5.8. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Impact of delays on a unit step change in input signal. 
 
The spreadsheet used to generate the fire curves accounts for both of these two lags 
through a single time shift. In most fire tests the rate of change in the measured 
parameters is slow relative to these delays and the sensor lag may be incorporated within 
the transport lag without significantly impacting on the accuracy of the results. In the 
case of a Molotov cocktail, the resulting fire rapidly grows from ignition to the peak heat 
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release rate so these delays may become a significant source of error if handled in this 
manner. 
 
The transport lag for each parameter was removed by manually shifting the data along the 
time axis within the results spreadsheet. The sensor lag for the various sensors was 
examined using a ‘sampled-data’ method outlined by Goodeve90.  The intent of this 
method is to assess the magnitude of the change between successive time steps and use 
this to apply a correction to the output of the next time step. The basis of this method is 
that the response function, H(t) of the oxygen sensor to a unit step change may be 
represented by a first order exponential lag, i.e. 
 
 tinstetH b--= 1)((         5.1 
 
Where: βinst = Correction coefficient (fixed for the instrument). 
 
Under this assumption it is possible to work backwards from the measured output and 
determine what the input function must have been to produce the response obtained. If 
the instrument coefficient is appropriately selected the corrected output will more closely 
represent the actual inputs.  
 
Two tests were completed with a gas burner fueled by propane to characterise the lags for 
the oxygen, carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide sensors. In each test the heat release 
rate was manually adjusted in a stepwise manner using a mass flow controller to create a 
step function and the response of the furniture calorimeter was measured. The output 
from the sensors was then corrected to obtain the best fit to the input data. 
 
The sampling interval used by the furniture calorimeter is 1 second and it was found that 
best results were obtained with βinst=1.0. However this correction did not provide any 
significant improvement in data quality when applied to the temperature measurements or 
to the individual gas concentration results. The effects of sensor lag on the measured 
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parameters is therefore acknowledged to be present, but no further manipulation will be 
done to correct for this source of error. 
 
 
5.5 Characterising A Molotov Cocktail 
 
Characterising a Molotov cocktail for fire engineering design purposes requires obtaining 
the heat release rate and toxic species production rates for the petrol used. The principle 
fire product species that will be included in this analysis are carbon dioxide and carbon 
monoxide, obtained directly from the furniture calorimeter tests. At the time of the 
experimental work there was no provision to measure soot levels in the furniture 
calorimeter so this data was obtained by examining a number of samples in the cone 
calorimeter. 
 
In the figures to follow those trials where only three fire blankets were used to contain the 
smoke are shown as the unenclosed runs in the following figures (Unen Run 1 and Unen 
Run 2). The trials where the hood was completely surrounded by fire blankets are shown 
as the enclosed runs (Enc Run 1 and Enc Run 2). 
 
As a check of the energy losses in each trial, the total energy released during the fire was 
compared against the amount of energy deployed based on the mass of fuel used and the 
heat of combustion. The heat of combustion of petrol is available in literature however 
there is considerable variation in the data. The gross heat of combustion used by the oil 
industry83 is 47.8MJ/kg.  As this is a gross figure, it represents an upper limit of the heat 
of combustion. Fire engineering literature64 quotes a more conservative value of 
43.7MJ/kg and due to these differences; samples of petrol were tested in the cone 
calorimeter to obtain an experimental value for the heat of combustion.  
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5.5.1 Cone Calorimeter Experiments 
 
Three replicate trials were completed to obtain both the heat of combustion for use in the 
calculations and to obtain an estimate of the quantity of soot produced in the unrestricted 
combustion of petrol. A sample of fuel was placed in a container and ignited under the 
cone. Measurements were taken of the following variables at one second intervals: 
· Mass loss rate 
· Gas species in the flue gas (Oxygen carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide) 
· Pressure in the duct 
· Temperature in the duct 
 
This data was manipulated using an Excel spreadsheet similar to that used for the 
furniture calorimeter to obtain the heat release rate history of the test run. The heat 
release rate history for one of these runs is given below as Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9: Heat release rate history for a petrol sample in the cone calorimeter. 
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During the period of steady state burning, between 150 and 300 seconds in Figure 5.9, the 
heat release rate obtained was divided by the mass loss rate to obtain a heat of 
combustion. The average heat of combustion for the three trials was 39.5MJ/kg. As this is 
lower than the value quoted by Brabrauskas this has been taken as a lower limit for the 
calculations to follow. 
 
The cone calorimeter experiments also served to measure the amount soot produced 
during the combustion of petrol. In each trial a quantity of the flue gas was drawn 
through filter paper and the paper weighed to obtain the amount of soot collected. 
 
 
5.5.2 Quantity of Fuel 
 
The most significant parameter when characterising a Molotov cocktail is the quantity of 
fuel used. If the ultimate goal is to meet the life safety requirements of the Building Act 
then the requirement that the building be occupied places practical limits on the quantity 
of fuel that may be deployed. An individual carrying more fuel than they can effectively 
conceal on their person is likely to arouse suspicion and this limits the fuel volume to a 
few liters. The size of a single container also limits the volume of fuel that can be 
employed. Glass bottles are frequently used as the container for Molotov cocktails and 
these bottles generally have a maximum volume of 1000 milliliters although the 1125 
milliliter bottles used by alcohol suppliers are still in circulation. Larger bottles are 
occasionally used for promotions by the alcohol suppliers but these bottles are not as 
commonly sold. Initially three commonly used bottle sizes (350 milliliters, 750 milliliters 
and 1000 milliliters) were selected for the experimental program but during the 
experimental program a 1500 milliliter bottle was obtained and this was also tested.  
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5.5.3 Results: Heat Release Rate History 
 
Four trials were completed using 350mL of petrol. The five point averaged heat release 
rate history for the 350mL trials is given as Figure 5.10. All four runs show very similar 
characteristics with the growth rate, peak heat release rate and decay phase being similar 
in all four runs. All runs reached their peak heat release rate within thirteen seconds of 
ignition and all fires had decayed back below 50kW after forty seconds. The peak heat 
release rate obtained in these experiments ranges between 340 and 380kW. The effect of 
the additional fire curtain is minimal, as is expected with these relatively small fires.  
 
The peak heat release rates with the additional fire blanket are, on average, 35 kW or 9% 
greater than when only three fire blankets were used. In these small fires, a proportion of 
this discrepancy is likely to be due to the normal scatter of test results rather than any real 
difference between the two test conditions.  
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Figure 5.10: Heat release rate history for the four 350mL fuel trials. 
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Energy losses from the 350mL trials ranged between 5.9 and 20% based on a heat release 
rate of 39.5MJ/kg. Due to the small nature of these fires the extraction system was able to 
capture almost all of the smoke indicating that these losses are likely to be due to a 
combination of experimental error and heating of the area around where the Molotov 
cocktail was deployed. 
 
Four trials were completed using 750mL of petrol. Figure 5.11 shows the heat release rate 
histories for these trials. Three of the four trials show very similar growth rates, decay 
rates and time to peak heat release rate. Unenclosed test run one had a slower growth rate 
and a less sharply defined peak heat release rate compared to the other tests at this fuel 
volume. All four tests show a similar decay rate, three tests dropping below 100kW 
within forty seconds and all test curves below this threshold within fifty seconds. The 
effect of the fourth fire blanket is more significant; peak heat release rates with the 
additional blanket are, on average, 140 kW or 16% greater than when three fire blankets 
are present. 
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Figure 5.11: Heat release rate curves for the four 750mL fuel trials. 
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Energy losses from the 750mL trials ranged between 3.7 and 20% with an average loss of 
12.2% based on a heat release rate of 39.5MJ/kg. Visually these fires produced more 
smoke that was not captured by the extraction system however the calculated energy 
losses do not support this observation. Again the losses are likely to be due to a 
combination of experimental error and heating of area around the fire 
 
Four trials were completed using 1000mL of petrol. Figure 5.12 shows the heat release 
rate histories for these trials. The three enclosed trials and the second unenclosed trial 
show virtually the same growth rate and decay rate. The heat release rate for these four 
trials dropped below 100kW within forty seconds and all five were below 100kW after 
fifty seconds. The contribution of the fourth fire blanket is more significant again; peak 
heat release rates with the addition blanket are, on average, 240 kW or 21% greater than 
when only three fire blankets are present. This is not unexpected as the extraction hood 
has a constant capacity and as the fire size increases, the proportion of smoke lost from 
the bottom edge of the extraction hood also increases.  
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Figure 5.12: Heat release rate curves for the five 1000mL fuel trials. 
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Energy losses from the 1000mL trials ranged between 4.2 and 23% with an average loss 
of 13.8% based on a heat release rate of 39.5MJ/kg. The increase in heat release rate 
observed for the fully enclosed trials is confirmed by a lower average energy loss- 12.6% 
versus 13.8% energy losses for the unenclosed trails. Again the losses are likely to be due 
to a combination of experimental error and heating of area around where the Molotov 
cocktail was deployed. 
 
The heat release rate curve for the single 1500mL trial is shown below as Figure 5.13. To 
minimise the energy losses this trial was completed with the extraction hood fully 
enclosed. It shows a similar shaped growth stage to the 1000mL fire curves, peaking 
between ten and fifteen seconds and decaying back below 100kW after approximately 
forty seconds. As only a single test was completed at this fuel volume it is not possible to 
compare test runs to examine the repeatability at this fuel volume. 
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Figure 5.13: Heat release rate curve for 1500mL fuel trial. 
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5.5.4 Results: Peak Heat Release Rate 
 
The peak heat release rate for all samples tested is summarised as Figure 5.14. As the 
intent is to obtain a worst case design fire, peak heat release rates given in this section 
have not been smoothed by averaging. Over the fuel volume range examined, there is a 
strong correlation between the maximum heat release rate for each sample and the fuel 
volume used. The peak heat release rate may be characterized in terms of the volume of 
the container used to deliver the fuel. The constant of proportionality ranges from a 
minimum of 1.07kW/mL of fuel to 1.34kW/mL of fuel. At lower fuel volumes, the peak 
heat release rate shows little scatter however as the volume of the container increases the 
amount of scatter in the data also increases. 
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Figure 5.14: Molotov cocktail peak heat release rate against fuel volume. 
 
While the 1500mL test lies within the range given, there was a noticeably different fuel 
behavour observed during this fire. In all of the smaller samples there was little or no 
pooling of liquid petrol on the floor while during the 1500mL test pooling of liquid fuel 
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was apparent. This suggests that there is a transition from a momentum controlled fuel 
spread to some other limiting mechanism between 1000 and 1500 millilitres.  
 
 
5.5.5 Results: Growth Phase 
 
A selection of the tests, selected to illustrate the full range of growth rates encountered in 
the test program, are plotted as Figure 5.15. 
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Figure 5.15: Heat release rate histories for Molotov cocktails deployed in an open space 
showing the impact of fuel volume on the fire growth rates. 
 
Irrespective of the quantity of fuel used, the maximum heat release rate was reached 
between nine and eighteen seconds after ignition. In general, as the fuel volume increased 
the time taken to reach the peak heat release rate also increased however this difference is 
relatively small with the average difference in time between the 350mL tests and the 
1500mL test being approximately two seconds as shown in Table 5.1. 
 159 
Enclosed Tests Unenclosed Tests Sample 
Volume (mL) Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 1 Run 2 
Average 
Time (sec) 
350 9 10 - 14 13 11.5 
750 12 10 - 16 11 12.3 
1000 13 13 11 18 9 12.8 
1500 13 - - - - 13.0 
 
Table 5.1:  Measured time to peak heat release rate for a Molotov cocktail for fuel 
volumes between 350 and 1500mL. 
 
Equation 5.2 gives a reasonable approximation of the time to peak heat release rate. 
 
700
11 Vt pk +=        5.2 
 
Where: tpk = Time to peak heat release rate (seconds) 
  V   = Fuel volume (mL) 
 
Plotting the initial growth rate against the commonly used t-squared and t-cubed fire 
growth curves shows that the growth rate is significantly greater than both of these fire 
curves. To obtain a growth rate that reaches the required peak heat release rate in the 
short time available necessitates the use of very large constants, in the case of the t-
squared fire curve the constant α must have a value of approximately 9.0 kW/s2. 
 
The test curves were also compared against exponential fire growth as described by 
Law91. The value of the initial fire heat release rate was taken as 10kW as recommended 
in Law’s paper. Unless the exponential constant has a value of approximately 0.4/s it will 
also fail to reach the required heat release rate in the time available. 
 
The shape of the growth phase part of the heat release rate curve is illustrated below as 
Figure 5.16. Clearly a Molotov cocktail has a much faster growth rate than the standard t-
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squared or t-cubed fire curves. Even the use of an exponential fire growth curve 
underestimates early fire behavior. The best fit to the data is obtained by using a linear 
growth rate over a growth period until the peak heat release rate is achieved. 
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Figure 5.16: Initial heat release growth rate comparison. 
 
 
5.5.6 Results: Decay Phase 
 
Due to the extremely transient nature of a Molotov cocktail fire there is no steady state 
phase. Consequently the fire moves directly from the peak heat release rate into the decay 
phase. At larger fuel volumes, the shape of the decay phase is largely independent of the 
fuel volume used. In the majority of tests above 350mL volume, the heat release rate 
drops from approximately 70% of its peak value (at approximately five seconds after the 
peak heat release rate) to approximately 100kW over a period of approximately twenty 
five seconds. An exponential decay function provides a good fit to the data over this time 
as shown in Figure 5.17.  
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Figure 5.17: Decay function of Molotov cocktail between fifteen and eighty seconds. 
 
This function provides an adequate approximation out to about eighty seconds where the 
fire may be assumed to have consumed the available fuel and self extinguished. 
Extending the exponential decay out this long has been done only to complete the design 
fire for a Molotov cocktail in isolation. In situations of interest to the fire engineer, the 
Molotov will have been used as a means to ignite a secondary object and the heat release 
rate of this object is likely to dominate the overall heat release rate during this time 
period. The decay function that is applied between fifteen and eighty seconds is of the 
form: 
 
tCVCQ ´-´´= 2exp1&        5.3 
 
Where  Q&  = Heat release rate of the fire (kW) 
  V = Fuel volume (mL)   
t   = Time after ignition (seconds) 
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The constants C1 and C2 depend on the fuel volume used.  Constant C1 varies slightly 
with the fuel volume and a value of 3.9kW/mL of fuel gives the best results over the fuel 
volume range examined. Constant C2 does not vary much with the fuel volume and a 
value of 0.09 provides an adequate result over the range of fuel volumes investigated. 
 
 
5.5.7 Results: Overall Heat Release Curve 
 
The previous sections may be combined to obtain the overall heat release rate curve as a 
function of the fuel volume. A predicted heat release rate curve has been calculated and 
compared against the heat release rate curve for one of the actual tests included for 
comparison. This comparison has been included as Figure 5.18. 
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Figure 5.18: Comparison between the predicted and actual heat release rate curves 
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Due to the fact that the peak heat release rate is obtained using point data and the balance 
of the curve is obtained using averaged data there is a slight over prediction of the peak 
heat release rate. Due to the short nature of this phase of the fire this difference is not 
likely to result in excessive conservatism. The balance of the predicted heat release rate 
curve follows the experimentally obtained data closely. 
 
 
5.5.8 Results: Yield of Carbon Dioxide 
 
The yield of toxic gases is also important, both for the fire engineer and for the fire 
investigator. The variable composition of petrol makes exact assessment of the yields of 
fire products both unreliable and of little use, however the results are likely to fall within 
a relatively narrow range. In the case of carbon dioxide the theoretical yield may be 
estimated based on an assumed fuel composition. 
 
Compound       Formula        Carbon Fraction (%) 
Butane          C4H10                  82.8%   
Hezane          C6H14                  83.7% 
Octane          C8H18                  84.2% 
Decane          C10H22                  84.5% 
Alkenes & Cycloalkanes          CnH2n                  85.7% 
Benzene          C6H6                  92.3% 
Toluene          C7H8                  91.3% 
Xylene          C8H10                  90.6% 
 
Table 5.2: The carbon fractions of the main components of petrol. 
 
The component of petrol with the greatest carbon fraction is benzene (C6H6) with a 
carbon content of 92%. The component with the lowest carbon content is butane (C4H10) 
with a carbon content of 82%. These two compounds form the boundary of typical 
carbon to hydrogen ratios encountered in petrol. As the benzene component is restricted 
by regulation to less than one percent the mean carbon content is likely to be closer to 
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that of the butane. Carbon to hydrogen ratios for molecules of various forms are given in 
Table 5.2. 
 
The average carbon fraction for petrol lies in the range 85-90%, roughly corresponding to 
a composition of CnH2n. Based on this assumed composition, the theoretical maximum 
yield of carbon dioxide is therefore given by equation 5.4: 
 
 OnHnCOnOHC nn 2222 .5.1 +®+     5.4 
 
In mass terms this is: 
 
   1844325.114 ´+´®´´+´ nnnn  
 
Or, for every gram of petrol consumed 44/14= 3.14g of carbon dioxide are produced. 
 
As the mass of the fuel was not directly measured during the furniture calorimeter trials, 
the mass loss rate (and the yield of carbon dioxide) cannot be obtained directly and must 
be calculated by back calculating based on the heat release rate.  
 
The mass loss rate of the fuel was estimated by dividing the heat release rate obtained by 
heat of combustion as in Equation 5.5. 
 
   
CH
Qm
D
=
&
&        5.5 
 
Where: m& = Mass loss rate of the fuel (kg/s) 
  Q&  = Heat release rate of the fire (kW) 
  ΔHc = Heat of combustion for petrol (MJ/kg) 
 
Use of the lower experimental heat of combustion will result in a higher mass loss rate 
and therefore is likely to underestimate the actual yield of carbon dioxide. Use of the 
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higher oil industry heat of combustion will give a lower mass loss rate and is likely to 
overestimate the yield of carbon dioxide. Separate calculations were done using both 
figures to bracket the expected yield of carbon dioxide. 
 
The mass of carbon dioxide was obtained by converting the molar fraction of carbon 
dioxide in the exhaust gases from the furniture calorimeter to a mass fraction using 
equation 5.6. 
 
   
Air
COCOAir
CO M
MXmm 222
&
& =      5.6 
 
Where: 2COm& = Mass flow rate of carbon dioxide (g/s) 
  Airm& = Mass flow rate of air in exhaust duct (g/s) 
  XCO2 = Molar fraction of carbon dioxide in exhaust duct (from sensors). 
  MCO2 = Molar mass of Carbon dioxide (=44g/mol). 
  MAir = Molar mass of Air (=29g/mol). 
 
Five-point averaging has been applied to both the mass of air and the molar fraction of 
carbon dioxide as the calculations are sensitive to fluctuations in both parameters. The 
yield of carbon dioxide was averaged only during those times when the mass loss rate 
was greater than 10g/s as is shown in Figure 5.19. The average yield of carbon dioxide 
for all furniture calorimeter trials is given as Figure 5.20. A linear curve of best fit using 
ΔHc = 47.8MJ/kg is represented by the ‘Upper bound CO2 Yield’ and a similar curve 
using ΔHc = 39.5MJ/kg is represented by the ‘Lower Bound CO2 Yield’. 
 
The theoretical carbon dioxide yield of 3.14g/g lies between these two boundaries and an 
average yield of carbon dioxide of 3.0g/g is obtained. Considering the very transient 
nature of these fires this is considered acceptable. While there appears to be an increase 
in the yield of carbon dioxide with fuel volume, the magnitude of this increase is small 
and cannot be supported on either theoretical grounds or confirmed based on the test 
results obtained.  
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Figure 5.19: Calculation range used to determine the yield of carbon dioxide 
 
2.00
2.20
2.40
2.60
2.80
3.00
3.20
3.40
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Volume (mL)
Ye
ild
 o
f C
O
2 (
g/
g)
Enclosed Unenclosed Upper Bound CO2 Yield Lower Bound CO2 Yield
 
 
Figure 5.20: Yield of carbon dioxide as a function of fuel volum
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5.5.9  Results: Yield of Carbon Monoxide 
 
The yield of carbon monoxide was obtained using the same method used previously to 
obtain the yield of carbon dioxide with Equation 5.7 used in place of Equation 5.6. 
 
   
Air
COCOAir
CO M
MXmm && =       5.7 
 
Where: COm& = Mass flow rate of carbon monoxide (g/s) 
  Airm& = Mass flow rate of air in exhaust duct (g/s) 
  XCO = Molar fraction of carbon monoxide in exhaust duct (from sensors). 
  MCO = Molar mass of Carbon monoxide (=28g/mol). 
  MAir = Molar mass of Air (=29g/mol). 
 
Carbon monoxide yields were plotted for both ΔHc = 47.8MJ/kg and ΔHc = 39.5MJ/kg as 
before and the results are given as Figure 5.21. The test results suggest an increase in the 
yield of carbon monoxide with fuel volume. This is likely to be a real phenomenon rather 
than a false product of a limited number of tests as it may be explained by a decrease in 
the completeness of combustion with increasing fuel volume caused by oxygen depletion 
at a local level within the heart of the fire. 
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Figure 5.21: The yield of carbon monoxide as a function of fuel volume. 
 
The yield of carbon monoxide does show some dependency with the fuel volume with an 
average expected yield given by equation 5.8, based on the data in Figure 5.18. 
 
   022.0109 6 +´= - VyCO      5.8 
 
Where: yCO = Yield of carbon monoxide (g/g) 
  V  = Volume of fuel deployed (mL) 
 
 
5.5.10 Results: Yield of Soot 
 
At the time of testing the furniture calorimeter was unable to measure soot yields. The 
soot yields were obtained from the cone calorimeter test runs and should therefore be 
considered as a guide only. The three test runs completed gave an average soot yield of 
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0.038g/g. As the tests were run separately, the yield of soot cannot be compared to the 
volume of fuel used though it is likely to follow the same trend as the carbon monoxide 
due to the fact that both are measures of the completeness of combustion. 
 
 
5.6 Computer Simulation 
 
The heat release rate data may be utilized directly using either zone models or CFD 
models. If the fires are being simulated in isolation the yields of fire products may also be 
directly used. When trying to simulate the ignition of secondary items the single reaction 
chemistry used in models such as FDS is likely to require some manipulation of the fire 
products data to give meaningful results.  
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6.0 Impact of the Surroundings 
 
A fire burning in an empty space is different to a fire burning in a real compartment 
where objects provide obstructions to the transfer of oxygen to the fire and reflect energy 
back onto the fuel package. Especially in the case of liquid fuel, the shape and surface 
roughness of the impact surface can also impact on the resulting fire spread and therefore 
the heat release rate. To examine the impact of these variables a series of tests were 
conducted to simulate a Molotov cocktail deployed within a stairwell. 
 
 
6.1 Scenario Significance 
 
Attached accommodation structures such as apartment buildings are second most likely 
structure type to be subjected to a fire where accelerants are used with accelerants of 
some form being used in 8.3% of deliberately lit fires. Within this building category, 
flammable liquids are the fourth most common item ignited in such fires. When these 
points are combined with the facts that such buildings are likely to have a greater 
occupancy during the time of peak risk from deliberately lit fires and that occupants may 
be asleep during this time, the life safety risks from such fires is readily apparent. 
 
The New Zealand building code requires protection of other people’s property so in the 
case of apartment buildings designed to C/AS151, each individual apartment is required to 
be a separate firecell so unless the fire is in an escape path, building occupants outside the 
compartment of origin are likely to have a high chance of escaping the effects of the fire. 
Because of this, the greatest risk to building occupants comes from a fire started in a 
common area such as the entrance or within a hallway. 
 
C/AS1 allows buildings with a building height of up to ten meters to be designed without 
sprinklers and have a single means of escape. This height limitation effectively limits the 
structure size to four floors. C/AS1 also permits up to fifty occupants per floor, resulting 
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in up to two hundred occupants having their only escape cut off by a single fire located 
within the escape path.  
 
In attached accommodation buildings the proportion of fires that occur in those common 
areas which may be used for escape is relatively low with 10.1% (or 58 incidents) of all 
deliberately lit fires occurring in lobbies, hallways and internal stairwells. These fires 
represent a risk to all building occupants and are typically the result of an introduced fuel 
load. Accelerants are used in 13% of these incidents. It is these scenarios that are the 
focus of this portion of the testing program. 
 
 
6.2 Experimental Arrangement 
 
The experimental arrangement is similar to what was used in the preliminary testing. The 
two concrete walls were used to contain the fire and they also had the additional 
requirement to provide support for the flight of stairs that were included in this portion of 
the test program. The stairs were positioned with no space between the edge of the stairs 
and the rear wall, much as stairs are installed within many real structures. The top end of 
the flight of stairs was positioned against the other wall. For the tests with a Gibb 
plasterboard wall, timber framing was placed against the block wall and sheets of 
standard plasterboard were screwed to the timber frame with screws located at 400mm 
centers. The joins between the sheets of plasterboard were left unfinished. The flight of 
stairs was then positioned against the surface of the plasterboard. 
 
The stairs themselves were constructed to meet the requirements of D1/AS192. The 
wooden stairs consisted of ten particle board steps with a 180mm riser and a 285mm 
tread. The width of each step was 1000mm and each timber stringer was 45mm wide and 
250mm deep. Each flight of stairs was given two coats of polyurethane to seal the timber. 
The steel stairs consisted of the same riser and tread profile as well as the same stringer 
depth however the thickness of the stringer was reduced to approximately 6mm, the 
thickness of the steel plate used. 
 172 
 
The physical arrangement of the flight of stairs within the test space is illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Schematic of stair arrangement. 
 
As indicated in Figure 6.1, two separate test configurations were examined. Tests were 
completed deploying the Molotov cocktail under the stairwell with an approach 
perpendicular to the path of the stairs. A second test configuration where the Molotov 
cocktail was deployed on the top surface of the stairs, six steps up from the base of the 
step. The angle of the swing was approximately 40° off perpendicular to the stairs. 
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To eliminate the impact of previous tests each set of wooden stairs was only used twice, 
one test was completed on top of the steps and the second was under the steps. To ensure 
that this practice did not impact on subsequent tests, the order of the tests were varied 
with the first test on one flight of stairs being the on top and the first test of the repeat 
series being below the stairs. 
 
 
6.3 Parameters Under Investigation 
 
The volume of fuel used and the fuel were not varied during this phase of the test 
program, 1000 milliliters was used in all tests as it represents a reasonable worst case for 
a Molotov cocktail. This also provided some consistency to examine the parameters that 
were under investigation in this portion of the test program.  
 
Two target points were selected in this portion of the test program. The first target 
location was effectively the same as what was used in the previous chapter representing a 
Molotov cocktail thrown under a flight of stairs that is unenclosed underneath the steps. 
The second target was located approximately half way up the stairs and represents a 
Molotov thrown on the stairs.  
 
The impact of the stairs themselves was examined by having stairs manufactured from 
two different materials, one combustible and the second made from a non-combustible 
material. The combustible configuration involved stairs made from timber and particle 
board as outlined above while the second, non-combustible configuration involved stairs 
made from steel plate. 
 
The impact of the surroundings was examined by looking at two of the most common 
wall construction methods, concrete blocks and plasterboard over a timber frame.  
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To keep the test program manageable there were a number of variables that are likely to 
impact on the resulting fire that were not examined. These variables and their potential 
impacts include: 
 
· Design of the flight of stairs. Use of stairs with no solid risers is likely to allow 
additional oxygen to reach the fire or allow a Molotov deployed on top of the 
stairs to have significant burning on the ground below. 
· Changing the impact surface. The presence of carpet or other porous surface is 
likely to significantly impact the spread of fuel from the breaking bottle. A porous 
surface may absorb some of the fuel impacting on the spread of fuel over the 
surface and hence the shape of the resulting heat release rate curve. If the surface 
is combustible it may also directly contribute to the fire. 
· Delivery of the fuel package. To keep the tests as repeatable as possible all 
Molotov cocktails were deployed using the swing arrangement outlined in chapter 
five with the bottle breaking against a steel edge. Changing the delivery is likely 
to impact on how the petrol spreads out from the point of impact and the resulting 
fire. 
 
 
6.4 Results: Heat Release Rate History 
 
With three variables under investigation- target location, stair material and wall material 
there was a total of eight test configurations. At two experimental trails were completed 
for each test configuration with an additional trial of the Molotov being deployed above 
the steel stairs with a block surround. This gave a total of seventeen experimental trails 
completed in this stage of the test program. The heat release rate curves for these 
seventeen trials are given as Figures 6.2 to 6.9.  
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Figure 6.2: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed above the wooden stairs surrounded by block wall. 
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Figure 6.3: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed below the wooden stairs surrounded by block walls. 
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Figure 6.4: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed above the wooden stairs surrounded by Gibb walls. 
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Figure 6.5: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed below the wooden stairs surrounded by Gibb walls. 
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Figure 6.6: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed above the steel stairs surrounded by Gibb wall. 
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Figure 6.7: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed below the steel stairs surrounded by Gibb wall. 
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Figure 6.8: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the three trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed above the steel stairs surrounded by block walls. 
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Figure 6.9: Five point averaged heat release rate curves for the two trials where 1 Liter 
of petrol is deployed below the steel stairs surrounded by block walls. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, five-point averaging has been applied to the raw 
data to obtain smoothed heat release rate curves. With only a few exceptions the peak 
heat release rate fell within the boundaries obtained in previous results without the stairs, 
with a maximum observed heat release rate for all tests of 1.6MW and a minimum 
observed heat release rate of 1.0MW. The average heat release rate observed during these 
tests was 1.2MW which lies in the middle of the boundaries determined in the previous 
chapter. 
 
The location of the fire plays only a minor impact on the resulting fire heat release rate. It 
has virtually no impact on the peak heat release rate obtained and locating the fire below 
the stairs delayed the time to peak heat release rate only when combined with the wooden 
stairs. The limited impact of the target location is surprising as it was expected that, in the 
case of a Molotov deployed on top of the stairs, the surface area that is covered by the 
fuel would be greater resulting in a higher heat release rate. The fact that this did not 
occur suggests that, for the fuel volumes and configurations considered, the area covered 
by the fuel, and hence the resulting fire heat release rate, is limited more by the 
momentum given to the bottle of petrol than the surface area available for coverage. The 
increased time to peak heat release rate that occurred when the petrol was deployed 
below the flight of wooden stairs suggests that the wooden stairs act to retard radiation 
feedback to the liquid fuel compared to the unrestricted flames or steel stairs. 
 
The steel stairs had very little impact on the time taken to reach the peak heat release rate, 
with an average time to peak heat release rate of 12.8 seconds, identical to what was 
obtained for the fires within a clear compartment. For the wooden stairs, the time to peak 
HRR was increased by a little less than six seconds, or by nearly 50% to an average time 
of 18.5 seconds. The reason for this delay is not clear but as the stairs survived with only 
surface charring, it suggests that they make a negligible contribution to the overall heat 
release rate. For the peak heat release rate the wooden stairs gave an average result that 
was roughly 100kW less than for the steel stairs. While the peak heat release rate results 
for both the steel and wooden stairs lie within the range obtained in chapter five, the time 
delay to the peak heat release rate for the wooden stairs suggests that the wooden stair 
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retard the fire growth rate rather than the steel stairs giving a more rapid growth. This is 
likely to be due to retarded heat transfer back to the fuel package as a result of the lower 
thermal conductivity of the wooden members93.  
 
The wall material plays very little role in a fire of such short duration, there is essentially 
no impact on both the time taken for the fire to reach its peak heat release rate and the 
peak heat release rate itself. The difference in peak heat release rate between the block 
and plasterboard lined wall is only 30kW and this difference may be explained by a 
combination of the contribution from the paper coating on the plaster board and 
experimental error. 
 
The comparison for the peak and growth parameter is summarised in Table 6.1. 
 
Parameter Peak Heat Release 
Rate (kW) 
Time to Peak HRR 
(s) 
All above stairs trials 1190 14.6 
All below stairs trials 1190 16.5 
All wooden stairs trials 1140 18.5 
All steel stairs trials 1240 12.8 
All Gibb wall trials 1210 15.6 
All block wall trials 1180 15.5 
Average of all trials 1190 15.5 
 
Figure 6.1: Average peak heat release rate and time to peak heat release rate for all trials 
involving the stairs. 
 
The decay rate showed the greatest similarity to the results obtained in the empty 
compartment. In virtually all cases the fire had dropped below 100kW within twenty five 
to thirty seconds after the peak heat release rate had occurred. 
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As the fuel volume was not a variable examined during this phase of the test program, 
equation 5.2 cannot be reconstructed to directly incorporate the impact of the variables 
above with confidence. It is expected that the form of the equation has some dependence 
on the thermal properties of the stair material however, due to the fact that only two stair 
materials were examined this cannot be verified. From a practical perspective, there are 
only three materials commonly used to form stairs in buildings, namely steel, wood and 
concrete so this level of detail is not warranted. Based on the assumption that the impact 
of the fuel volume is independent of both the impact location and stair material, equation 
6.1 provides an adequate representation of the impact of the stairs and location: 
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Where: ksm = Constant for the stair material (taken from Table 6.2). 
kloc = Constant for the target location (taken from Table 6.3). 
 
Fitting the test data to the equation gave the following values for the constants ksm and 
kloc. 
 
Stair Material Value of ksm 
Steel 0.3 
Wooden 4.5 
No stairs 0.0 
 
Table 6.2: Recommended values of ksm  
 
Target location Value of kloc 
Above stairs 0.9 
Below stairs 1.8 
 
Table 6.3: Recommended values of kloc 
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The balance of the heat release rate curve is similar to what was obtained in the previous 
chapter so the equations developed to describe the rest of the heat release rate curve may 
be used without modification. 
 
While the number of tests is not sufficient to demonstrate that these differences are 
statistically significant they do indicate that the surroundings do have an impact on the 
heat release rate curves and suggest that the mechanism for this impact is through energy 
transfer from the fire to the surroundings and back to the fuel package. 
 
 
6.5 Results: Yield of Carbon Dioxide 
 
The yield of carbon dioxide was calculated using the same method used for when the 
stairs were not present. As before, the upper bound carbon dioxide yield was calculated 
based on a heat of combustion of 47.8 MJ/kg and the lower bound carbon dioxide yield 
has been calculated based on a heat of combustion of 39.5MJ/kg. The result of these 
calculations for all seventeen trials is included as Figure 6.10. The upper bound for the 
yield of carbon dioxide ranges between 3.1g/g through to a maximum value of just over 
3.6g/g. The lower bound results are approximately 0.5g/g less than these values. In the 
case of the wooden stair there is no clear trend that may be inferred from the data with 
almost all results falling within the range 3.34 to 3.40g/g. For the steel stairs the trend is 
more apparent, every result that was lower than the average was obtained in a test where 
the fuel was deployed under the stairs and every result that was above the average was 
obtained in a test where the fuel deployed above the flight of stairs. 
 
This suggests that the steel stairs do restrict the oxygen supply to the fire however there is 
no clear reason why this difference was not observed for the wooden stairs. Two options 
that could explain the absence of the drop in carbon dioxide production from under the 
wooden stairs is the oxygen content of the polyurethane coating or alternatively the drop 
may have been lost in noise of the short duration of the fire. 
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Figure 6.10: Yield of carbon dioxide from all of the stair runs. 
 
 
6.6 Results: Yield of Carbon Monoxide 
 
The yield of carbon monoxide was obtained using the same methodology as before and 
the results are given as Figure 6.11. As expected when a Molotov cocktail is deployed on 
the top of the stairs the average yield of carbon monoxide is virtually identical to what 
was obtained during testing in the open. The range for the typical carbon monoxide yield 
was between 00.027 and 0.032 g/g fuel. These yield results were not sensitive to the 
material that the stairs are made of. 
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Figure 6.11: Yield of carbon monoxide from stair runs. 
 
When looking at the target location, there was a clear delineation between the tests on the 
top of the stairs and those deployed below the stairs with the average carbon monoxide 
yield three times greater when the Molotov is deployed under the stairs. The average 
yields of carbon monoxide when the Molotov is deployed below the stairs range between 
0.82 and 0.99 g/g fuel. 
 
Based on this data equation 5.8 requires modification to account for the influence of 
ventilation on the yield of carbon monoxide. Fire engineering literature normally 
calculates the yield of carbon monoxide as a function of the equivalence ratio via 
equations of the form94: 
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Where: yCO  = Yield of carbon monoxide (g/g fuel) 
  ¥,COy   = Yield of carbon monoxide under well ventilated conditions.  
    (g/g fuel) 
               α, β & ζ  = Correlation coefficients for the fuel package 
  Φ  = Equivalence ratio. 
 
At this stage there is insufficient data to obtain this level of precision as only two 
ventilation conditions were examined. As the yield of carbon monoxide is affected by 
both the volume of petrol deployed and the ventilation conditions of the space further 
testing is required to confirm the appropriateness of the form of equation 5.7. Reducing 
the availability of oxygen is results in increased production of carbon monoxide, so the 
yield of carbon monoxide is be inversely proportional to the available ventilation. As 
only two ventilation conditions were examined, this impact cannot be characterised in 
terms of an open area with any confidence so it has been characterised in terms of a 
ventilation factor.  Equation 6.3, a modified version of equation 5.7 to include the impact 
of ventilation, provides an adequate fit to the test results completed in this work however, 
this has not been validated with small fuel volumes under a flight of stairs and it is 
expected to over predict the carbon monoxide yield in such cases. 
. 
  
vent
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Where: YCO = Yield of carbon monoxide (g/g) 
  V    = Volume of fuel deployed (mL) 
  Cvent = Ventilation factor. 
 
The ventilation factor has a value of 0.33 for a Molotov cocktail deployed under a 
stairwell with enclosed risers and a value of 1 for a Molotov cocktail deployed in an 
unenclosed space. 
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6.7 Ignition of Secondary Items 
 
In every test completed using the wooden stairs, the stairs survived with only minimal 
charring. The mass and physical arrangement of the combustible material resisted the 
ignition of the wooden stairs for the short duration of the fire. While it cannot be said that 
it is not possible to ignite the stairs directly from a 1000 milliliter Molotov cocktail, the 
direct ignition of heavy combustible material such as the stairs by a Molotov cocktail 
appears to be an unlikely event. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Wooden cribs in position under the stairs 
 
To obtain some insight into the true risks from a Molotov cocktail two trials were 
completed with the presence of additional combustible material under the stairs. The 
space under a flight of stairs is frequently used for the storage of goods and this material 
represents a fuel load that is much more ignitable than the heavy frame of the flight of 
stairs. Rather than place a quantity of miscellaneous items under the stairs, wooden cribs 
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were used to simulate a generic fuel load. The positioning of the cribs is illustrated as 
Figure 6.12. 
 
The timber cribs were made from rough sawn timber pieces arranged as outlined in Table 
6.4. 
 
Parameter Value 
Timber pieces length 600 mm 
Timber pieces end section 50 x 50 mm 
Pieces per layer 6 
Spacing between pieces 50 mm 
Number of layers 5 
Total mass 24.5 kg (average) 
 
Table 6.4: Physical dimensions and characteristics of timber cribs 
   
As the cribs had been assembled from radiate pine with a net heat complete combustion 
of ΔHc=17.9 MJ/kg93. Based on this figure and the mass above, the wooden cribs 
represent a fuel load of 454 MJ. As many synthetic materials have a much higher heat of 
combustion this is equivalent to a mass of 15kg for a typical synthetic polymer (based on 
a heat of combustion of 30 MJ/kg). Such a mass could be reasonably expected to be 
stored in the cupboard space under a typical stairway. 
 
A Molotov cocktail containing 1000 milliliters of petrol was deployed under the stairs 
and it proved sufficient to ignite the wooden cribs. Even though the fire was much less 
intense, with peak heat release rate of little more than 200 kW, the much longer burning 
duration of the wooden cribs resulted was able to ignite the heavy timber of the stairs. 
This indicates that the presence of additional light combustible materials significantly 
increases the risk of the fire becoming established. The heat release rate curves of the 
wooden crib in isolation and the wooden crib under the stairs are given as Figures 6.13 
and 6.14 respectively. 
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Figure 6.13: Heat release rate curve for wooden crib in the open ignited by a 1000mL 
Molotov cocktail 
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Figure 6.14: Heat release rate curve for wooden crib under stars ignited by a 1000mL 
Molotov cocktail. 
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From the results above it is apparent that the stairs start to contribute to the heat release 
rate approximately 200 seconds after ignition. The impact of the Molotov cocktail on the 
heat release rate curve for the wooden crib was not examined in detail however evidence 
suggests that the use of a Molotov cocktail resulted in a reduction in the time taken for 
the wooden crib to reach its peak heat release rate of between one and two minutes. This 
has a direct impact on the available time for escape for building occupants. 
 
While the wooden cribs were not dried prior to the test they had been stored under cover 
for a long period of time so the moisture content of the timber is estimated at 8-12% 
based on the local ambient conditions. This is likely to have increased the likelihood that 
a Molotov would be able to ignite them however this is expected to be true for most other 
combustible products in storage. 
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7.0 Conclusion: Designing For Deliberately Lit Fires 
 
This research aimed to identify those structures which are at most risk of deliberately lit 
fires and identify potential fire scenarios that cover the majority of deliberately lit fire 
events. Finally it takes one of the fire scenarios identified and constructs a reasonable 
worst case fire curve for a Molotov cocktail.  
 
Like accidental fires, the majority of deliberately lit fires are relatively trivial in nature, 
posing little life safety risk, however there are a proportion of such fires that do cause 
significant property damage and result in injury and/or death. As the proportion of people 
injured or killed in deliberately lit fires is similar to the proportion fires that are 
deliberately lit, the life safety risk from deliberately lit fires is comparable to the overall 
fire life safety risk.  
 
One of the objectives of the New Zealand Building Code is to protect people from injury 
or illness caused by the effects of fire. The building code does not distinguish between 
fires that are deliberately lit and those that are accidental yet the majority of current fire 
engineering designs specifically exclude deliberately lit fires as a fire scenario. For some 
buildings deliberately lit fires represent a significant fraction of a structure’s overall fire 
risk so excluding deliberately lit fires may compromise the safety of building occupants. 
By excluding deliberately lit fires at the beginning of the design process, fire engineers 
are not satisfying the objectives of the Building Code. 
 
 
7.1 When Should Deliberately Lit Fires Be Considered? 
 
From the analysis of the New Zealand fire statistics, different types of structures face 
different levels of risk from fires that are deliberately lit. Both the probability that the fire 
is deliberately lit and the distribution of such incidents during the week are strongly 
dependent on the structures use. In the case of prisons and mental institutions, fires are 
more likely to be deliberately lit than all other fire causes combined, so ignoring 
 191 
deliberately lit fires as a potential ignition scenario is effectively ignoring the most 
common cause of fire for these structures. Education facilities and crowd structures such 
as bars and restaurants are also popular targets with over forty percent of all fires being 
deliberately lit. In the case of crowd structures such as bars, restaurants and nightclubs 
their greatest risk from deliberately lit fires also coincides with their period of greatest 
occupancy. 
 
The second approach used to assess the life safety risk from a deliberately lit fire is the 
risk that a person will be injured or killed from a particular event. Based on the historical 
records, the number of people injured or killed in deliberately lit fires is much greater for 
accommodation facilities including temporary accommodation, prisons, apartments and 
detached homes. Deliberately lit fires in these types of structures are more likely to result 
in a casualty due to the slower response of sleeping building occupants. The low life 
safety risk for fires in education facilities is a result of 80% of deliberately lit fires 
occurring outside school hours. 
 
The final decision as to when deliberately lit fires should be included in the design 
process is a matter for the regulatory authorities and the clients’ property protection 
goals. However, the structures mentioned above face a significant risk from deliberately 
lit fires that needs to be considered. The decision to include or exclude deliberately lit 
fires for these structures should be raised early in the design process. 
 
 
7.2 What Additional Fire Scenarios Are Required to Address 
Deliberately Lit Fires? 
 
Approximately ninety percent of deliberately lit fires are simply the malicious ignition of 
items already present within the compartment or introduced fuel packages that result in 
fires of similar intensity. The majority of deliberately lit fire incidents are likely to be 
covered by existing design fires. In a fire engineered building, the growth rate of such a 
fire should be no greater than that of the appropriate design fire. In such an incident, the 
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fact that the fire was deliberately lit will have little or no impact on conditions within the 
structure. Incorporating this group of deliberately lit fires into the design process could be 
achieved by ensuring that the ignition locations and any assumptions made in developing 
the fire curve result in a reasonable worst case fire curve for the object considered. If this 
is achieved then the resulting fire curve will be adequate for both accidental and 
deliberately lit fires. Design fire heat release rate curves that are not based on a worst 
case ignition for the object concerned may be inadequate for use when deliberate ignition 
is included within the design brief. 
 
Two fire scenarios were identified from the FIRS database as not being covered by 
existing fire curves, these two scenarios account for approximately ten percent of 
deliberately lit fires. The two fire scenarios are: 
 
· The ignition of multiple fires. 
· The use of accelerants.  
 
The ignition of multiple fires poses a number of issues for the fire engineer particularly 
with regards to smoke management and sprinkler system design, however based on the 
New Zealand fire statistics; the life safety risk from this fire scenario is not significantly 
greater than for any other deliberately lit fire scenario. The low life safety risk is due to 
the low occupancy close to the seats of the fires required to prevent discovery of the 
perpetrator.  
 
The second scenario, the use of accelerants, represents a much greater risk to building 
occupants. Between 1996 and 2006 these fires resulted in one third of all deliberately lit 
fire injuries and one half of all deliberately lit fire fatalities so from a life safety 
perspective they represent the single largest component of the overall deliberately lit fire 
risk. In virtually all buildings, including the use of accelerants as a potential fire scenario 
would result in increased fire protection costs so this is unlikely to strike an appropriate 
balance between economics and life safety. Designing attached dwellings and retail 
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buildings around the use of accelerants has the potential for life safety benefits with a 
much reduced cost to society. 
 
 
7.3 A Design Fire For A Molotov Cocktail 
 
A Molotov cocktail may be characterised by the type of fuel deployed. In the 
experimental program petrol was used as the fuel and a Molotov produced using other 
fuels may not have the same characteristics presented in this work. Another significant 
variable required to characterise a Molotov is the quantity of fuel used. Once this is 
obtained the heat release rate curve may be readily predicted based on the fuel volume. 
The following equations provide a reasonable worst case design heat release rate curve 
for a Molotov of up to 1500 milliliters. 
 
The surroundings do have an impact on the initial heat release rate growth however 
unless other material is ignited they have little impact on the rest of the heat release rate 
curve. The likely mechanism for this impact is via retarding of the heat transfer back to 
the fuel package. The time to peak heat release rate may be estimated from: 
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and the worst case peak heat release rate may be found from: 
 
  VQpk ´= 34.1  
 
A linear growth from zero time to tpk provides an adequate representation of the data. 
There is a short period of approximately five seconds duration where the heat release rate 
decays linearly to 70% of the peak heat release rate. From this point through to extinction 
at approximately eighty seconds, the decay phase may be modeled by: 
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  tCVCQ ´-´´= 2exp1  
 
The yields of carbon dioxide and soot have not been characterised in terms of the fuel. 
The average yield of carbon dioxide during the experimental runs was 3.0 g/g and the 
surroundings only have a small impact on this result. The yield of carbon monoxide may 
be estimated from: 
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There appears to be some dependence on the fuel volume and a strong dependence on the 
surroundings. The yield of soot may be taken as 0.038g/g. The impact from the fuel 
volume and surroundings could not be confirmed due to the different experimental 
technique used to obtain the soot measurements. 
 
Due to the low mass of fuel typically used, accelerants represent an ignition scenario for a 
secondary object rather than a full fire scenario. When accelerants are used in safe paths 
and other areas where little or no combustible materials are present, they are unlikely to 
pose a high risk to building occupants due to the short duration of the fire. The presence 
of additional combustible material will significantly increase the life safety risks from 
accelerants.  
 
Like all deliberately lit fires, accelerants are frequently relegated to a housekeeping issue 
rather than a fire engineering issue under the logic that if there is no fuel to burn then the 
use of an accelerant, or lighting of materials, is unlikely to cause significant damage. This 
approach ignores the introduction of combustible materials into critical areas such as safe 
paths by individuals who are unaware of the requirements such spaces. It will only be 
effective in areas where there is tight control of housekeeping and maintenance to remove 
all unwanted combustible materials.  
 
 195 
A second commonly recommended method of reducing the risk from deliberately lit fires 
is through the use of security measures to prevent unauthorized access. While these will 
have an impact on opportunistic arson from exterior sources, increased security will 
provide little barrier to those individuals who are lawfully able to be present in the 
building.  
 
The ideal solution is for the fire engineer to identify if a particular structure is more likely 
to be exposed to a deliberately lit fire and, for those projects that are at risk, to identify 
whether accelerants or multiple fires need to be considered. Where a significant risk is 
identified then this must be communicated to the other stakeholders. The best solution for 
the individual building, considering housekeeping, building security and fire protection 
may then be found. This enables the risk of deliberately lit fires to be managed in the 
most effective way for all stakeholders while meeting the requirements of the building 
code. 
 
 
7.4 Recommendations For Further Research 
 
One limitation of the statistical analysis was the small size of the New Zealand fire 
incident database. Comparisons to international data were made when such data was 
available and several attempts were made to obtain deliberately lit fire data from the 
United States but these were unsuccessful. The statistical component of this work would 
be much stronger if the analysis was repeated using deliberately lit fire data from the 
United States. The larger size of the US database would also be useful to identify any 
additional fire scenarios that were not identified from the New Zealand fire statistics due 
to a low frequency of occurrence. 
 
The ignition of secondary items from the short duration of the Molotov fire was not 
investigated in detail. The ignition of heavy structural timbers by a Molotov cocktail 
appears to be unlikely however it was able to ignite the rough sawn timber of the wooden 
cribs. It is highly likely that fabrics and furniture items would be ignited from an attack of 
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this nature. Some attempt to characterise the ignition capabilities of a Molotov cocktail 
would provide guidance as to when the use of such devices may be safely neglected. 
 
In those cases where the use of a Molotov cocktail is considered during the design, its 
impact on the initial growth of the secondary object would also be of use. Some reduction 
in the time to peak heat release was observed but no attempt was made to characterise the 
magnitude of this impact. Adequately characterization of this impact would enable fire 
engineers to use a combined Molotov cocktail – secondary item fire curve with 
confidence in their designs. 
 
The other significant unknown area where more research is required is to address the 
generation of carbon monoxide as a function of the equivalence ratio. Due to the variable 
nature of the composition of petrol such data is expected show some scatter; the testing of 
fuels from a number of different refineries should provide an estimate of the magnitude 
of this scatter. 
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Appendix A - Purpose Group Breakdown 
 
Fires have been assigned to the purpose groups outlined in C/AS1 based on table A1. 
 
General Property Use Number 
of Fires 
Purpose 
Group 
Airport 3 CM 
Boarding house, Half-way house, Dormitory, Rooming, 
Lodging, Home stay, Backpacker 90 SA 
Church, Cemetery, Religious use 87 CL 
Commercial – not classified above 118 WM 
Communications, Research – not classified above 18 WM 
Community hall, Marae, Maori cultural use 95 CL 
Conservation, Recreation park, Reserve 20 NA 
Construction, Renovation – not classified above 9 NA 
Construction, Renovation, Demolition site 168 NA 
Defence, Military use 11 WL 
Doctors/Dentists emergency clinic, Medical centre 25 WL 
Educational, Health, Institutional – not classified above 35 CE 
Farming, Horticulture, Agricultural use 239 SH 
Flat, Apartment, Home unit 577 SR 
Hospital, Hospice, Rest home, Rehabilitation centre 287 SC 
Hotel, Motel, Lodge, Timeshare 55 SA 
Industrial, Manufacturing 157 WM 
Laboratory, Research use 1 WM 
Library, Museum, Art gallery, Court etc 55 CL 
Lifestyle block 17 SH 
Mine, Quarry, Oil well 4 NA 
Non existent address 2 NA 
Office, Bank, Embassy, Fire/Ambulance station 236 WL 
Open land 40 NA 
Passenger terminal 35 CL 
Power station 5 WM 
Prison, Correctional institution 181 SD 
Railway property 78 NA 
Recreational use, Theatre, Indoor sports, Pool, Park, Zoo, 
Aquarium 329 CL 
Recreational, Assembly – not classified above 80 CL 
Residential – not classified above 78 SH 
Restaurant, Pub, Tavern 123 CL 
Road, Street, Motorway 145 NA 
Rubbish tip, Transfer station, Hazardous waste disposal 49 NA 
 
Table A1: FIRS database property use by purpose group. 
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General Property Use, Continued Number 
of Fires 
Purpose 
Group 
Rural – not classified above 10 NA 
School: Pre-school through to Secondary/High 879 CE 
Service/Repair use, Dry cleaner, Laundromat, Mechanical 
workshop 91 WM 
Shop, Shopping mall, Supermarket, Service station, Car 
yard, Other sales use 537 CM 
Single house 3401 SH 
Sports club, Health club 143 CL 
Sportsfield, Stadium 123 CO 
Storage, Warehousing 333 WM 
Stormwater, Harbour, Lake, River, Beach, Waterfront area 39 NA 
Telephone exchange, Communications use, Control room, 
Data processing 130 IA 
Unable to classify 132 NA 
University, Polytech, Teachers college, Other post-
secondary 69 CE 
Vacant building, Section 267 NA 
   
TOTAL 9606  
 
Table A1 cont: FIRS database property use by purpose group. 
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Appendix B: Weighting The Casualty Rate 
 
The National Center for Injury Prevention and Control data gave the following costs per 
injured person for fire incidents: 
 
Injury Severity Cost ($US) 
Fatality 249,367.00 
Injury requiring hospitalisation   33,303.00 
Injury not requiring hospitalisation        347.00 
 
Table B2: Costs of injury by fire. 
 
One issue with using this data was that it only identified two levels of injury whereas the 
New Zealand Fire Services statistics identified three levels of injury. This issue was 
resolved by assuming the following relationships. 
 
· A fatality in both statistics corresponds cleanly 
· An injury requiring hospitalisation has been assumed to be equivalent to a Life 
threatening injury in the NZ Fire Statistics. 
· An injury not requiring hospitalisation has been assumed to be equivalent to a 
slight injury in the NZ Fire Statistics. 
 
To obtain a cost for a moderate injury it was noted that the costs presented above 
decrease by approximately an order of magnitude for the step between fatality and 
hospitalisation but decreases by two orders of magnitude when moving down to an injury 
not requiring hospitalisation. The cost of a moderate injury was interpolated between 
these two points, giving a cost of US$3400 per moderate injury. 
These costs were then converted into New Zealand dollars using an exchange rate of US$ 
0.715= NZ $1.00 
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Appendix C: Petrol Certificates of Quality 
 
The following certificates of quality were in effect during the testing program. 
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